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FOREWORD
This report tei , minates NASA-Langley Contract NAS1-15506 for preliminary develop-
ment of a Cost and Benefit Design Optimization Model for fault-tolerant flight control
systems (FTFCS). The work consisted of three tasks;
1. Review of existing modeling methods that might be appropriate for fault-
tolerant system optimization
2. Development of requirements for a fault-tolerant system optimization model
3. Development of an optimization model specification
The work was conducted from October 1978 through December 1979, under the NASA
Technical Monitor, Mr. A. H. Lindler. Study partic.ipants and their areas of contri-
bution were:
T. P. Enright, Program Manager
J. Rose, Principal Investigator
R. C. Fairfield, FTFCS Definition
P. Nagel/D. M. Rose, Reliability Model Review
A. N. Pozner/F. Scholz, Combinatorial Analysis
J. W. Wassal/D.L. Streiffert, SIMSCRIPT Simulation
L. 13. 10hepavd, Airline Operational Definitions
M, J. Healy, Optimization Methods
A. P. Zob, Airplane Scheduling Methods
United & Delta, Requirement and Specification Review
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1.0 SUMMARY
Fault-tolerant systems have the potential for providing the high levels of reliability
necessary for airplane flight-critical and flight-critical functions. This report
addresses the problem of selecting the most cost-effective fault-tolerant system from
the many system alternatives. The objectives of the study, therefore, were to
determine the means of evaluating alternative configurations of a fault-tolerant
;system operating in different commercial airline environments and to develop a
method of optimizing their design characteristics for a given environment. A set of
requirements for an optimization model was developed, and the models that could
potentially satisfy these requirements were reviewed. No single model was found
capable, of performing the required analysis. However, several existing models can be
modified and combined to provide most of the required optimization capability.
The proposed, combined model is one that simulates as closely as possible the opera-
tion of fault-tolerant systems in airline service. The model will simulate real-world
airline operations and generate statistics on operating benefits and penalties, labor and
material resources expended, and the resulting economic advantages and penalties.
Since many dependent variables are Involved in such analyses, careful selection of an
optimization method was necessary. The report provides details of the optimization
technique selected and details of the algorithms to be used throughout the model.
Airline review of the model was solicited, and many of the comments received were
embodied in the model.
2.0 INTRODUCTION
cA digital system technology is growing rapidly, and the advent of large-scene integration(LSI) components is providing the ability to automate complex control functions. This
document addresses the problem of evaluating cost effectiveness and selecting the
appropriate fault-tolerant flight control systems (FTFCS). rho selection is oompil-
cated by the numerous design configurations that have become available as a direct
result of the increasing versatility and relaatively low procurement costs of the system
components. The objective of this study was to create the capability to evaluate the
effect of an aircraft 1?`l'i,CS oil airline operations and to else this capabil-
ity in tradeoff studies to optimize FTCCS design.
This document describes the work accomplished oil 	 Contract NASI-15505 as
Phase I of a possible three-phase NASA program. The purpose of Phase I was to
evaluate existing and new modeling' methods and, based oil evaluation, to develop
modal requirements and specifications for a Cost Benefit Design Optimization Model
(0,BDOM). The approach for completing the wort needed to develop model
requirements and specifications was as follows:
1.
	
	
Make a literature search for available models capable of performing a part or all
of the required functions for Cost Benefit Optimization,
2. Become familiar with fault-tolerant flight control concepts that Wright be
conceived in the 1980-1990 time period to ensure that the model developed can
be used to analyze potential flight control concepts.
3. Develop a set of model requirements.
4. Develop n model specification.
5. Document the critical assumptions and rationale oil which the requirements and
specifications are based.
Since there is no way of testing the validity of many potential simplifying assumptions,
the model developed is initially a very comprehensive one. However $ once results
become available, it will be possible to determine the important parameters and male
valid simplificattions in the interests of economy.
The model design provides all to simulate the operation of FTFCS in typical or
actual airline scenarios, the latter being important for model validation. Although
there was no question of the ability to use the completed model for evaluation of given
design concepts, it was necessary to devote considerable effort to the problem of
optimization. A pattern search method was selected as the only practical method of
optimization. The amount of design optimization that can be performed is a function
of how efficiently the model can be programmed. An efficient program will facilitate
the optimization of the amount of replication to be used. The determination of the
best equipment packaging design has also been examined and represents a very large
optimization study, depending riot only oil
	
efficient program, but also on a sizable
amount of compute , time.
Since program efficiency is important, SIMSCRIPT was selected as the best of several,
possible p 1 rogreamMing languages for the simulation portion of the model. SINISCltiPT
is compactible with 1` ORTRAN, which is the language for other portions of the model
partially in existence, namely, the economic analysis and search technique.
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Possible use of the model by airlines for examination of the potential benefits of
v'C cs was it consideration in developing the spcci f l^sit inn
Finally, the model requirements and specification w,
United Airlines at their draft stage and found tc be ai
maintenance and economic analysis.
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3.0 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
ACES Airline Lost Estimating System
ACSYNT Aircraft Synthesis Program
AFTI Advanced Flight Technology Integration
AS3031 comprehensive simulation of a commercial airplane operation
ATE automatic test equipment
CAB Civil Aeronautics Board
CARE Computer-Aided Reliability Analysis
CARSRA Computer-Aided Redundant System Reliability Analysis
CBDOM Cast and Benefit Design Optimization Model
CLP lease payments
EROI extra return on investment
FAA Federal Aviation Administration
FCD fuel consumed because of drag
FCR fuel cost reductions
INCA federal payroll taxes
FIi'O first in first out
FMC flutter mode control
FORTRAN Formula Tz anslation —a programming language
-' FPS foot, poui,d, second units
FTFCS' fault-tolerant flight control system{s} I
FTMP Fault-Tolerant Multiprocessor
GASP a simulation programming language {
GLA gust load alleviation
GOALS General Operation and Logistics Support Model ^	 1GPSS General Purpose Simulation System
l- FCS Hypothetical Flight Control System
IAAC Integrated Application of Active Controls
h IBM International. business Machines
INC Federal and State income tax
IO input,	 output
ll2S Internal Revenue Services
ITC investment tax et: dit R
KMS kilogram,
	 meter, second units
'
LAS lateral-augmented stability
LIFO last in first out
LRU Ii ne -replaceable unit
t LSI large-scale Integration
MARR minimum attractive rate of return
MLC Maneuver Load Control
E MOVES Marine Operational V/STOL Environment Simulation
NRC net retirement credit
OAG Official Airline Guide
00 operating benefits
O&M operations and maintenance
ORLA Optimum Repair Level Analysis
1 PAS pitch-augmented stability
PASCAL a programming language
ROl return on investment or rate of retur n
E SIFT Software Implemented Fault-Tolerant System
SIMSCtIPT ` a high-level simulation language
SRI Stanford Research International
^.
^. MFM^rs n .... w»x.rp^IM..:
TA tax adjustments
T013 total costs a 1d. benefits
TDA tax depreciation allowance ".r
VDEP Vehicle Design Evaluation Program
V/STOL Vertical or Short Takeoff and Landing
IDENTIFIED COSTS AND BENEFITS
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4.0 MODEL REQUIREMENTS
To ensure that any model developed will accommodate all fault-tolerant flight control
system (FTiF CS) options, the Contractor reviewed and considered models, data, FTFCS
designs, active controls options, reliability models, and airline operations and costs.
This section summarizes the review, including fault-tolerant design options (sec. 4. t),
available models (see. 4.2), and model requirements (see. 4.3), and the requirements
generated by this review.
4.1 FAULT-TOLERANT DESIGN OPTIONS
The options examined in this study ;.range from the application of advanced navigation-
al concepts through the development of active flight controls. Although they cover a
wide range of concepts, they were similar in their design features, which require high
reliability of software, firmware, or hardware for successful operation. An example of
one such project is the Integrated Application of Active Controls (IAAC) airplane that
Is a part of the NASA Energy Efficient Transport Program. The IAAC project seeks to
improve fuel economy by reducing weight and drag using such concepts as;
•	 Fly-by-Wire
•	 Relaxed Static Stability
•	 Gust and Maneuver Load Alleviation (GLA)
•	 Flutter Mode Control (FMC)
Control surfaces to implement these features are shown in Figure .. Such concepts
can be flight crucial and may be flight critical. A flight-crucial function is any
.	 (
)j
??1
Figure 1. Critical Functions for Fault-Tolerant Flight Control Systems(Hypothetiwl Airliner)
7
i
{
4
fq
1
77
function that, by its complete loss, causes an immediate unconditional flight safety
hazard. A flight-critical function is any function that, by its complete loss, results in
a potential flight safety hazard that can be averted by appropriate; flight crew actions.
Of the current active flight control options being considered, only pitch-augmented
stability (PAS) is flight crucial. The potential use of digital computers for navigation,
fuel management, systems management, and other critical and noncritical functions
provides the possibility of incorporating fault tolerance in other systems. Fault
tolerance, the ability to sustain a failure without degradation of function, can be
achieved by using online spares or by shedding nonessential load(s) when a failure
occurs. In this way,surplus computation capacity can be used to replace failed FTFCS
states. Using such concepts, fault tolerance provides a method of achieving safe
flight control systems with the potential for very high .reliability.
The features of failure detection and recovery, which are inherent in the design of
fault-tolerant systems, are achieved in contemporary design concepts by means of
replication, voting, and reconfiguration. The relatively low cost of digital components
is now snaking replication and massive redundancy economically possible and reptne-
sents a new concept for control system technology. However, the failure detection
and recovery features that make fault tolerance possible also make both reliability and
cost benefit optimization more complicated than for conventional systems.
To develop a Cost and Benefit f'^-sign Optimization Model (CBDOM) that can accom-
modate the potential fault-tolerant systems developed during the 1980s, the compon-
ents, software, firmware, and architecture that might be used were identified. Sever-
al concepts were then reviewed in depth, including an Advanced Flight 'Technology
Integration (AFTI) airplane and two alternative flight control computer concepts
currently being designed under a NASA-funded contr ct. The NASA systems are the
Software Implemented Fault-Tolerant (SIFT) systemM being developed by Stanford
Research International (SRI) in collaboration with Bendix, and the Fault -Tolerant
Multiprocessor (FTM p) 2 ) under development by Charles Stark Draper laboratories and
Collins Radio. Typical SIFT and FTMP concepts and AFTI are described in Appendix
Vi.
4.2 AVAILABLE MODELS
Available models that might be used for evaluation and optimization of FTFCS designs
were identified so that requirements for a new model could be tailored for existing
model compatibility. Several models were reviewed in detail, including reliability
(see. 4.2.1), operational and maintenance (sec. 4.2.2), economic analysis (sec. 4.2.3),
performance (sec. 4 . 2.4), the Miller model (sec. 4.2.5), and optimization (sec. 4.2.6).
4.2.1 Reliability Models
Five reliability models were reviewed; details are provided in Appendix V. Of the five
reliability models, Computer-Aided Reliability Analysis (CARE 111)(3) appears to be the
most promising approach, with Computer-Aided Redundant System Reliability Analysis
(CARSRA) as a possible approach if it were further developed. CARE W has the
ability to handle nonconstant hazard rates, transient fault recovery, complex success-
path definition with replicated and switched stages, coverage, and latent failure
modeling. CARSRA is a FORTRAN-programmed Markov model, developed to facili-
tate the reliability assessment task for fault-tolerant, reconfigurable systems. It has
	 {
been used by the Contractor on several occasions and has given comparable results on
simple analN es that can be checked by other means. However, the documentation for
CARSRA(4) cued the FORTRAN code, which was available to the Contractor, does not
F
L
Iprovide sufficient detail or comments to ensure full understanding of the model
algorithms. Work would be required to document CARSRA and increase its analysist,	 capacity before it could be considered for use in design optimisation.
Finally, as part of Phase 1, a reliability simulation was developed in SIMSCRIPT for a
simplified fault-tolerant system; it Is detailed at the end of Appendix V111. Complex
systems can certainly be modeled in a similar way, and the computer programming
involved is minimal compared to developing a general-purpose model such as CARE ,111.
However, for a simple system, the computer running time is on the order of 1.5 seconds
for 10`1 simulated syste ►;i operating hours. The simulation of simultaneous failures
with a verb, low ,probability of occurrence would require 10 12 simulated system operat-
ing hours or more to accumulate a statistically-adequate estimate of system reliabil-
ity. Thus, a computer run designed to simulate failures? Including simultaneous
failures for a simple system configuration, could involve 4 or 5 hours of Cyber 175
computer time. This time would increase for larger, more complex systems.
4.2.2 Operational and Maintenance Models
Operational modeling is defined in this document as the development of mathematical
models of the events (excluding maintenance) that impact the costs and benefits of
fault-tolerant systems during typical or specific Airline use. The operational model
determines the degradation of fault-tolerant systems that occurs, the time available
for maintenance, and the consequence of inadequate maintenance. Maintenance is
defined as inspection and total or partial restoration of degraded equipment. Both
operations and maintenance are stochastic processes.
A search was made for simulations capable of modeling the operation and maintenance
of fault-tolerant systems.
AS3031 is a comprehensive simulation of commercial airplane operation and ►nainten-
ance that provides many of the features necessary to evaluate fault-tolerant systems.
AS3031, Which is fully described in Appendix III, has only some of the features required
to evaluate fault-tolerant systems. For instance, equipment repair is not simulated
and different mechanic skill levels are not recognized. Rationale for requiring such
features is as follows:
• The ability to add replication to an FTFCS enables maintenance to be deferred
and delays avoided at some added investment in FTFCS equipment. In turn,
delaying maintenance until it is convenient allows centralized rather than
dispersed maintenance. The ability to optimize such maintenance strategies is
probably important and requires the detailed modeling of repair.
• Oil flight-critical and flight-crucial ystems, Feder(i1 Aviation Adminis-
tration (FAA) Advisory Cirealars 120-28R 5) and 120-29 (6) require initial and
recurrent training of personnel used in the maintenance of Category 11 and III
landing equipment. It is anticipated that similar requirements will pertain to
FTFCS and will require a limited number of mechanics with specialized skills.
The General Operation and Logistics Simulation Support (GOALS) model(?) provides
for simulation of operations and maintenance of military airplanes. GOALS was
developed for organizational maintenance simulation and will not handle a network of
stations and repair shops that is necessary for commercial operation. Written in
General-Purpose Simulation System (GPSS) for on International Business Machines
i
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(IBM) computer, GOALS requires a core storaage allocation of 470K bytes, which is at
large program.	 oi l
Marine Operationai V/s*rOL Environment Simulation (MOVES)(6) was developed by the
Navy to simulate carrier-bused or land-based operation and maintenance. Like
GOALS, it will not handle a network of stations and is also written in GPSS. Noweverp
the repair routines are very comprehensive and have a logic similar to that needed for
commercial airplane operation.
	 =t
The Mod Ill Level of Repair,model is all Repair Level Analysis (ORLA) model
developed as a part of the Naval Air Systems Command Project 'Explore. While Mod iII
represents state of the art in ORLA, it will only handle a given design configuration,
and the problem of design for repair has not been tackled. Mod III is written in
SimCRirr (a itigla-level simulation language).
4.2.3 Economic Analysis
Previous work by tine Contractor had established that only one model existed that
Identifies and isolates cost categories at a level suitable for commercial airplane
equipment cost analyses and evaluations. This model, the Airline Cost Estimating
System (ACES), is written in FORTRAN and requires some modifientions so that it can
accept input front a maintenance and operations simulation. ACES would also be
required to perform cost benefit :analyses, rather than just cost con1rarisons. Cost
benefit analysis is required to conveniently handle the evaluation of a , single fault-
tolerant system configuration. See Appendix 11 for a description of ACES.
4.2.4 Airplane Performance 	 rya'
Weight and drag predictions, which tire required to assess the costs and benefits
associated with a given system design, require the capability of calculating fuel burned
for a given flight plan. The two performance prediction models reviewed by the
Contractor were Aircraft ^S,Y^!nthes ►s Programs (ACSYNT)t9 and Vehicle :Design
Evaluation Program ( VDEP ^ u). Both models appear too large in scale to be
incorporated in the CBDOM, taut could be reviewed more thoroughly to determine if
parts of their could be used in the future. As a recourse, tabulated performance
values in the CBDOMcouldbe used, such as those provided in Section 5.3.3 (FCR--fuel
cost reductions). Such values will be available from NASA studies like the IAAC(Contracts NAS1 -14742 and NAS1-15325).
4.2.5 The Miller Model
The work to 0evelop a maintenance model for K-out-of-N subsystems, performed by
D. R. Aliller lt), is extensively reviewed in Appendix IV. It confirms the desirability
of using simaulaation to solve the various problems associated with operating and
m a intaining com plex airplane systems.
4.2.6 Optimization
The available optimization techniques can be divided into three groups: Heuristic and
Pattern Search, Integer and Dynamic Programming, and Conjugate Direction Methods.
The number of different methods is indicative of the difficulty of performing optimiza-
tions and the variety of optimization problems, Of the techni ties reviewed, the direct-
search Simplex method of Spendley, Ilext, find Iiimsworth( l2
 and Nelder and Mead(l3) ix
i
l t7
I
+4
seems most appropriate. Further discussion of their methods is provided in Section
5.4.,
4.3 MODEL REQUIREMENT (DESCRIPTION AND RATIONALE)
Having considered typical systems to be optimized and models available to do the job,
the following set of requirements for a CBDOM was developed. The requirements are
described first, then the rationale.
4.3.1 Design Evaluation
Requirement--The CBDOMshould be capable of evaluating alternative design concepts
of faidt tolerant systems, ineludingcomputers, software, firmware, sensors, actuators,
and data buses required for noncritical, critical, and crucial flight control surfaces.
Rationale--The ability to assess the costs and benefits associated with different design
configurations enables the best design elternative to be selected. Also implied is the
ability to use the model in a series of tradeoff studies so that a designer can attempt
to optimize the design.
4.3.2 Design Optimization
Requirement--The CBDOM should be capable of optimizing design. 	 j
Rationale--Many design alternatives are possible within a given system concept and
can significantly affect costs and benefits.
	
Primary examples of design alternatives
are the amount of replication and the packaging arrangements used. While the number
of alternativesfor the former are bounded by safety requirements and are therefore
I	
'
small, no such convenient boundary exists for the latter, packaging.
	 For example,
Appendix X shows that while three components can be packaged in five ways, six
components can be packaged in 233 ways.	 Subsequent increases are even more
dramatic.	 Packaging affects costs associated with spares, repair, and reliability
(reliability being degraded by increasing numbers of connectors as the number of
1 components to a module becomes smaller). 	 It is unlikely that a designer could trulyoptimize a representative system by comparing the results of a series of tradeoff
a studies, other than by accident. 	 The above translates into a subset of requirements
it (listed below) that the CBDOM should provide the capability to optimize in terms of
airline profitability.
t
i
•	 The levels of redundancy, voting, and replication that should be provided
s' s	 The types and reliability of components and software that are economically 
advantageous
4 •	 The optimum packaging for hardware and software
•	 The optimum maintenance plan:
` •	 Condition monitoring versus periodic maintenance
•	 Repair versus discard
•	 Locations at which "replace ment or repair should be performed (i.e., at life
stations, base station, or supplier)
l a
0	 The quantities and locations in which spare units should be stocked
4.3.3 Adaptability
Requirement--The
 
model should be capable of ad»atation so that airlines, and avionics
and airframe manufacturers can perform east-of-ownership analyses for avionic
component; design, and operation and maintenance studies.
Rationale--As far as can be established, the proposed model fills a gap in the
analytical tools available not only for design, but also for establishing profitable
operation of flight control and other airplane systems of similar complexity and
importance.
4.3.4 Validation
Requirement--The CBDOM should be capable of being validated.
Rationale--The rationale for this requirement is obvious, and its implementation is
addressed in Sections 7.2 and 7.3.
4.3.5 Ease of Change
Requirement--The CBDOM should be capable of being readily changed'.
Rationale--As well as satisfying the requirement for adaptability by manufacturers
and airlines, the C13DOM model development will be evolutionary. Once a comprehen-
sive model is validated, it will be possible to make simplifications that can be checked
for their effect on the results of an optimization. Conversely, it must be possible to
check the validity of simplifications provided in the interests of economy.
4.3.6 Risk Analysis
Requirement—It should be possible to determine the cost consequences of errors in
estimates, both in input to and output from the model.
Rationale Since much of the data used as input to the model will be based on limited
amounts of interpolated or extrapolated historical data, the ability to establish the
sensitivity of the design to errors in model input and approximations within tale model
is a requirement, although one that may not be easily satisfied.
i
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5.0 MODEL SPECIFICATIONi
The Cost and Benefit Design Optimization Model (CBDOM) consists basically of five
parts and will have functions described in sections corresponding to the numbered
blocks of Figure 2. In the CBDOM, a reliability calculation is not included. As
previously stated, Computer-Aided Redundant System Reliability Analysis (CARSRA)
was rejected for two major reasons: its inability to handle large problems and the lack
of documented information describing the theoretical basis of the model. Tile
alternative choice, Computer-Aided Reliability Ana y is (CARE) Ill, which was
selected based on information from preliminary details appears to be suitable for
integration in the CBDOM, but will not be available for some time. No other suitable
model was found.
Equipment descrip tion	 Evaluation conditions
(5.1.11
	
(5.1,2)
Describe the FTFCS
	 Provide the evaluation
equipment to be	 scenariooptimized
(5.1.3)
Simulate the operation	 Operationsp	 and maintenance of
	 and
each FTFCS configuration	 maintenance
(5.1.4)
Produce response function	 Economic
data (profit versus variables) 
I analysis
^	 1 5.1.51
FTFCS = fault-tderant	
ES
nput variable
f I Igh t control system 	 for the maximumO tirnizationconfiguration of 	 p
Note; Numbers in parentheses correspond to document subsections.
Figure 2 Elements of the Overall Model
l
Given these limitations, the following procedure for using CBDOM is proposed: 	 k
1. The user must establish the weight, drag, and fuel savings associated with the
desired fault-tolerant flight control system (FTFCS) configurations. Fuel savings
must be expressed as a function of flight length.
2. The user must determine the dispatch minimum complement for each type of
co mponent in the system using a reliability prediction program such as CARL,
IIIl31.
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3. When provided with details of the design and operating environment, the CDUOM
will increase the number of components beyond the dispatch minimum eomple-
ment until a cost-optimized' system is achieved using a Nelder and Mead simplex
search technique, described in Section 5.4 and Reference 13.
4. The user must ensure that replication has not increased to a level where safety
has been impaired by an increased probability of simultaneous failures due to tite
increased amount of software, firmware, and hardware.
To the above procedure, a "failure generation" module in the operations And mainte-
nance (O&M) simulation portion of the CBDOM must be included that had not been
originally planned. A simple combinatorial algorithm was considered and is more fully
discussed in Section 5.2.5. The proposed CBDOM, shown in Figure 3, could be expand-
ed to include CAR . 11I or parts of an airplane design program such as Aircraft
Synthesis (ACSYNT)(9).
SELECT NEXT
FTFCS
	
SIMULATE	 GENERATE	 SIMULATE
INPUT DATA
	 CONFIGURA-	 EQUIPMENT	 AND RECORD	 MAINTENANCE
TION FOR	 OPERATION	 FAILURES	 AND REPAIR
ANALYSIS
• Fault-tolerant flight control
system descriptions
• Airline descriptions
Economic factors•
PERFORM
ECONOMIC
• Optimization controls ANALYSIS	 I
• Simulation initialization
• Benefits description
+YES
Ili/
CHANGE
MAINTENANCE
RESOURCES
YES	 NO
NO	 MORE	 YES MAXIMUM	 DETERMINEOUTPUT
RESULTS	 ONFIGURATIO S	 PROFIT	
NEXT SET
OSSIBL	 FOUND	 OF INPUT?	 2*	 VARIABLES
,Figure a Simplified Cost Benefit Optimization Model
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5.1 EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION
Part of the model accepts and contains the user-supplied configuration description.
For a given range, this description defines the reliability and maintainability
characteristics of software, firmware, and components that forma stage. Other user
inputs are the acceptable combinations of stages that form line-replaceable units
(LRU); dependencies among components, stages, and LRUs; the dispatch-critical
components; and the turnback and diversion complement of each defined component.
Characteristics of non-FTFCS equipment that compete for the same maintenance
facilities as the FTFCS must also be defined, but are fixed from an optimization
standpoint. Further information on the link lists used for design definition is provided
in Section 5.2.4. An experimental PASCAL program was developed to demonstrate
that the recordkeeping function can be performed while simulation of failures is in
progress.
5.1.1 Evaluation Scenario
Part of the model accepts and contains the operating conditions to optimize the
FTFCS design. These conditions_ are: (1) a description of airplane schedules, fleet
size, and route structure; (2) the initial location of maintenance resources; and (3) the
number of shifts to be used. Economic analysis constants (such as wage rates, the
price of fuel, and inflation rates) are built into the model, but will change with an
overriding user input.
5.1.2 Operations and Maintenance Simulation
A Monte Carlo simulation is the preferred, if not the only, means of predicting FTFCS
operating costs. The rationale for using the Monte Carlo simulation instead of a closed-
form analysis method is provided in the following paragraphs of this section.
Approximate analyses of a hypothetical fault-tolerant multiprocessor (FTMP)
performed during this study show that small design changes can significantly affect
spares quantities and airplane delays (appendix IX). Therefore, two important model
attributes must be an ability to accurately: (1) predict the spares to be provisioned,
and (2) represent the incidence of delays.
The quantity of spares provided is a function not only of the equipment characteristics
of failure rate, repair time, and cost, but also of airline characteristics of operating
hours, penalties of stockouts, route structure, shipping costs, and maintenance policy.
Since one of the consequences of a stockout maybe an airplane delay or cancellation,
spares costs and delay costs are not independent. In turn, delays sire a function of a
number of probabilistic events, including:
6	 Airplane scheduled ground time
•	 Reliability of equipment
0	 Visibility of failures
•	 Deferrability of failures
•	 Availability of mechanics with the right skills
•	 Availability of spares and test equipment
•	 Ability to fix the problem at the first attempt
The lack of independence between spares costs and delay costs, and their stochastic
nature make a close,-form analytical cost optimization virtually impossible without
is
i
decoupling and assumptions for which there is no validity test. Appendix 1V deals
further with this point.
As an alternative to a elosed-form optimization, the Monte Carlo simulation repre-
sents a relatively straightforward, feasible method of producing an effective model.
Complex stochastic airline processes, with and without dependencies, can be readily
represented and, with a comprehensive, validated model, simplifying assumptions can
be made for improving its efficiency and can be checked if computer running time
becomes a problem.
As noted in Section 4.2, several available simulations were reviewed for possible
Incorporation into the CBDOM, but none was found suitable for FTFCS optimization.
'rho existing simulations did not treat equipment repair in adequate detail and were
not capable of being used in an optimizing mode without considerablemodification.
Therefore, a new simulation, specified in Section 5.2, is proposed with the ability to
consider both fixed resources (for model validation against airline actuals) and optimi
table resources.
Four simulation languages were reviewed for suitability during Phase l: 	 Formula
Translation (FORTRAN), GASP, General Purpose Simulation System (GPSS), and
SimschiPT. SIMSCRIPT was selected because of its economic programming, flexible
E output, easily checked structured code, and comi atibility with existing FORTRAN
programs proposed for use in other- parts of the model.
The algorithms for the proposed simulation, provided in Section 5.2, consist of an
English language description of the airline operations. 	 This language translates
directly into SIMSCRIPT code, as illustrated by the following examples:
English Language	 SIMSORIPT
Each LRU enters a prioritized queue on	 FOR EACH JOB IN
arrival at the repair facility. 	 Components	 Q1 WITH PRTY = 3,
demanding immediate repair are placed on
	
CALL INTERRUPT
a shortage list and given top priority.	 GIVING JOB
Overtime labor is used to alleviate repair 	 IF N.Q1 GE 15
backlog whenever the backlog is 15 or 	 SCHEDULE AN
more LRUs.	 END.SHIFT IN 3
HOURS JUMP AHEAD
The simulation clock is to be a variable-time advance based on the spacing of discrete
events such as flights, failures, or repairs that are simulated.
	 For instance, the
SIMSCRIPT statement "SCHEDULE A FAILURE GIVING TYPE AND UNIT IN
EXPONENTIAL. F(MTBF(MEMORY),3) HOURS" selects a random sample of time to
failure from an exponential distribution with a mean = MTBF for component of type
MEMORY using a random number generator with a seed of 3. 	 Using this technique, it
is possible to build a model that simulates the stochastic processes associated with
operating the FTFCS with considerable fidelity and economy.
	
Two programs were
developed to gain experience in the use of SIMSCRIPT and to assist in a preliminary
FTFCS sensitivity study. 	 They are described in Appendixes VII and VIII.
5 Appendix Vill illustrates the relative economy of developing a simulation, compared to
the complexity of the closed-form solution that seems to be typ=cal of fault-tolerant
systems.	 Appendix VIII provides an example of the use of simulation for reliability
^x
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analysis that had not been contemplated at the beginning of this program and is flow
considered to be a viable analysis method.
5.1.3 Economic Analysis
Information generated by the O&M simulation (such as labor hoursp delay hours, and
spares required) will be translated into dollars. They will then be combined with Input
cost data (such as the equipment and installation investment costs or weight or drag
savings and penalties) so that cumulative cash flows and profit can be generated for
the configuration of system and operating conditions being evaluated. The costs and
benefits to be included in the analysis are listed below.
0	 Benef i ts
•	 Increased range
•	 Increased payload
•	 Better ride quality
0	 Investments
0	 Installed equipment
6	 Rotatable spares
6
	
	
Expjandable spares
Ground equipment
•	 Special tools
•	 Test equipment
•	 Training equipment
•	
Other
0	 Operating costs
0	 Mal0enance labor
0	 Mailitenance, material
0	 Ma4itenance burden
0	 Spwes holding
0	 Maihtet)ance training
0	 Vuel/weight/drag
6	 Delays/cancellations
0	 Airplane insurance
0	 Debt financing0
0	 Other
0	 Retirement
0	 Salvage costs
0	 Salvage credits
0	 Taxation
•	 Investment tax credit
0	 Depreciation credit
•	 Income taK payments
17
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for Rig given configuration or, in the case of a design comparison, by using differential
costs and benefits between alternatives. The Airline Cost Estimating System (ACES)
computer program described in Appendix 1. 1  provides the capability to perform most of
the economic analysis required. Modifications to ACES to make it compatible with
CBDOM requirements are provided in Section 5.3, along with details of algorithms
already programmed.
5.1.4 Optimization
`rhe variables to be optimized for maximum airline profit consist of two groups. The
first group is those variables that produeo maximum profit for a given FTFCS config-
uration, including:
•	 Number of mechanics with specified skill levels
•	 Number of spares
•	 Quantity and effectiveness of automatic test equipment
•	 Number of test benches
•	 Locations of the above items
The second group of variables to be optimized are characteristics of the FTFCS design
and could consist of:
•	 The number of replicated components, stages, LRUs, and software packages
• Packaging alternatives (ranging from everything packaged in a single L1tU to
individual packaging at a physically indivisible level or down to a noneconomical
level.)
•	 Time between inspection and scheduled replacements
u
In addition to the optimizable FTFCS characteristics, the user always has the option of
changing' input to the model for such things as:
•	 Remove, replace, and repair time
•	 Component, stage, and LRU investment cost
•	 Weight, drag, and fuel price
With user control of these variables, the sensitivity to errors in inputs estimated can
be established,
i
Several methods of optimization were considered, including:
•
	
	 Heuristic search--Repeated guesses at input values are made until a good
solution is found.
Complete
beenperformed
enumeration--This
   cons dered impractical
to reducetilenumber and range o 
until
	 c
	 work
fvariable
sufficient
involvedwith
F FTFCS.
A	 •	 Nonlinear simplex search--This is an iterative way of efficiently seeking
optimum values of the input variables.
i
., t (g
FC.)
The nonlinear simpler technique, developed by Nclder and Mead( 13), appears to be the	 1
only satisfactory approach (sec. 5.4). It provides an effective way to reduce the
number of Input variable design points to be simulated and permits efficient optimiza-
tion. As a result of using this technique, the analysis is controlled by theoptimization
routine shown in Figure 4,
Initial value of variables 	 Fsult
.lolerant	 Solutionfor fault-tolerant flight
	 flight n 	  X n	 ncontrol system
	 control systltm
	 Xt ' X " 3	
,,X
X t °, X 0,... xi°	
simulation
Now search points
f W
	 Xtk, XZkI — Xjk
Economic
	
Response functionia) 	 Optimization
analysis	 (profit)	 routine
t
(a) For continuous variables, a response hypersurfece In  + I dimensions Is generated,
u-	 and for discrete variables, a i + t dimensional lattice is produced
Figure 4. The Analysis and Optimization ,0othod
5.1.5 Model Simplification
Until some realistic FTFCS configurations have been analyzed and different mainten-
ance strategies examined, it is difficult to determine if all the features that could be
built into the CBDOM are justified. However, it is proposed that, in the interests of
economy, some simplifications be made initially. The model incorporates the follow-
ing simplifications that might be removed subsequently in Phase 11 or III, if considered
desirable:
•	 The proposed CBDOM provides for simulation of a fined fleet size.
Rationale--Fleet buildup generally takes less than a third of the fleet life.
Developing a scheduling model for a fleet that builds up at a realistic rate would
probably entail substantial work and could be accomplished later if it is consider-
ed necessary to prove that buildup is a second-order effect. Buildup is consid-
ered a second-order effect because maintenance labor costs per flight hot ► r,
which generally peak in the second or third year of operation, occur when the
fleet size is relatively small (table 0. Therefore, a solution is to assume that
mature and stable costs apply to all years.
The O&M simulation will be structured so that it can be expanded to allow for a
varying fleet-size calculation. The provision would necessitate changing several
inputs yearly, including:
•	 P lee t size
•	 Route structuret	 a	 Cities served
ss	 Schedules
•	 Station characteristics
19
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Table 1. Multiplier Factors to Convent Stable Matntenance Costs
During Each Year (ret. k)
Year since start of operation
1 2 3 4 6 6 7 and on
Airframe
Labor 0,70 1.06 1.18 1.14 1.00 1,06 1.00
Material 0.98 1,21 1.16 1.06 . 1100 1.00 1100
Powerplant
Labor 1.46 1.68 1.60 1,32 1.14 1.00 1.00
Material 0.98 2.06 1.96 1.83 1,60 1,31 1.00
Accidents will not be simulated.
Rationale--Although flight diversions and accidents are high-cost events, they
are infrequent on today 's airplanes and should be less so with '1TFCS airplanes.
For instance, if the FTFCS is designed to achieve a failure probability of less
than 10-9 for a 10-hr flight, then for an accident with cost consequences includ-
ing litigation of $1 billion, the effect is as little as $0.10/flight hour and can be
neglected.
Realistic simulation of events following a cancellation or diversion is difficult.
However, their economic effect will be approximated using a cost penalty,
calculated as shown under CN and DT in Section 5.3.3, based on the loss of the
discrepant flight and all subsequent flights to the end of the day. The simulation
schedule of flights then will be completed as though no interruption had occured.
Rationale--In practice, the decision to use a substitute airplane or cancel a flight
involves complex decision logic based on the experience and intuition of teams of
airline schedulers. An unknown, but certainly large, amoulll of work would be
required to establish and model the rescheduling logto to account for
cancellations or diversions an., would entail an ability to dynamically reschedule
airplanes in the CBDOM.
Software and firmware will be assumed to have reliability and maintainability
characteristics similar to hardware.
Rationale--The analyst will be able to treat software- packages and modules as
though they were hardware by providing failure rates and "repair times," along
with a statement of dependencies that can include hardware or other software,
as provided for in Section 5.2.4. If future failure models for software evolve
that are significantly different from the failure generator described in Section
5.2.5 1
 the CBDOM could be changed to accommodate this evolution.
Spares pooling and borrowing will not be included in the model.
•
0
•
0
i
^	 a
r
Y
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Rationale—The development of it spares pooling and borrowing model is a major
task, In Its own right. For Pon American Airways, only 8 percent of flight control
system spares used by line stations are pooled items. The extent of borrowing
has not been established, but Is known to be no-cost reciprocal agreement
among several airlines. floweverp the maximum benef its obtainable from pooling
may be established by using the CODOM for a fleet and route structure equal to
the pool-size fleet. This would assume pooling of 1..00 percent of the spares
stocked.
5.2 OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE SIMULATION
No O&M model was found that was suitable for use In the FTFCS, and the model
specified in this section must, therefore, be created. The Monte Carlo simulation of
O&M generates the cost statistics, in terms of personnel, materialsp spares, airplane
downtime, delay time, and ground-support facilities used to operate and maintain a
given configuration of FTFCS. The simulated functions will Include:
•	 Operations
•	 Airplane selection for dispatch
•	 Preparation for flight
•	 Flight and failure generation
*	 Maintenance
•	 Maintenance after flight
•	 Equipment repair and replacement
•	 Postmaintenance validation
Tile FTFCS Is allowed to impact the airline's scheduled service by superimposing
FTFCS failures on a simulated airplane fleet.
The user I can investigate alternative operations, maintenance, and repair scenarios by
specifying model inputs that characterize "he airline configuration of interest. Inputs
specified by the user for airline operatiLa and maintenance include:
•	 Route structure
•	 Existing station characteristics
•	 Potential location of FTFCS resources
0	 Scheduled maintenance policies
0	 Unscheduled maintenance and repair characteristics- 
•	 Probability of isolating failures by testing
•	 Removal rates for repairable and expendable units
The configuration of an airlitle's operating and maintenance system is to be specified
by selecting aj)propriate values and options for the available inputs. For example f the
location of maintenance facilities within a selected city network and tile staffing
policy for each facility impact tile eventual airline performance resulting from a
simulation run. Similarly, the impact of delays within the system and the ability to
mitigate their consequences are heavily dependent upon the flexibility of the particu-
lar schedule chosen and the choice of logic options for handlin g
 airplane substitutions.
To ensure the reasonableness or compatibility of user-supplied inputs to the model,
data check and verification procedures will be incorporated.
21
r_
Since it would be unrealistic to consider the downtime and delays attributable only to t
the FTFCS, the whole airplane will be divided into three areas of interest:
• The FTFCS
•	 Other avionic systems
•	 The remainder of the airplane
Dividing the airplane in this way allows the FTFCS and other avionics to contend for
the same resources and permits the masking of delays due to the FTFCS with other
delays of the airplane and vice versa.
'timely repair and repositioning of serviceable avionics equipment impact the overall
effectiveness of. the airline to meet schedules and, ultimately, total system operating
cost. Repair of avionics equipment, including FTFCS components, is to be simulated
in detail in the O&M model. The intent is to duplicate the procedural flow of repair
tasks conducted by a commercial airline. Repairable components and LRUs are sent
to the most appropriate repair shop from field locations where they are judged faulty.
The O&M model provides output of the resources used in conjunction with each given
configuration of airborne equipment. Typical output data produced by the model will
consist of:
•	 Maintenance labor hours by equipment and skill level
•	 Expendable materials used
•	 Number of spares required for different LRUs and repairable components by
station
a	 Frequency, length, and cause of airplane delays
•	 Unsebbduled airplane downtime due to cancellations
•	 Equipment utilization hours
^r
t
^ m^ a
•	 Equipment transportation between stations and supplier repair facilities
5.2.1 Airplane Scheduling
Before running the O&M simulation model, the user selects an "airline itinerary": a
set of cities for air service, the route structure for connecting each city, and a flight
schedule for each airplane in the fleet. The user has two options for accomplishing the
input of an airline itinerary in the O&M model. An airline itinerary model may be
selected from an itinerary in use by an existing airline or the user can manually enter
data for a network of his own choice.. The latter option can be a tedious task for a
large, interconnected network. Nevertheless, the option is available for users having a
specific network in mind and the detail necessary to describe it. To facilitate use of
the O&M model, a set of psespecified airline itineraries will be provided. These
itineraries are internal to the model and selected to represent a spectrum of domestic
and U.S. flag carriers, both passenger and fre}'^ht, produced by extraction and edit of
data from the Official Airline Guide (OAG)`i5).
1
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The OAG is used to develop airline itineraries and schedules for the simulation model.
The primary data file, PATH BASE, is maintained by Reuben A. Donnelley
Corporation, a Dunn and Bradstreet company. The OAG defines monthly airline
schedules, which are easily accessed from magnetic tape, providing a current and
complete source of flight information for all airlines and airplane types.
The process of assembling airline routes and schedules from the information contained
in the OAG tapes is illustrated in Figure 5. The first step is to extract all flight
records for the airline and airplane type specified in the input. This is done by the
Edit Program, which also checks data integrity and, if some schedule inconsistency is
discovered, provides diagnostic printouts to facilitate manual data editing. Then, the
Itinerary Reconstruction Program continues the process by assembling individual flight
legs into airplane itineraries, using the appropriate flight leg designations in the OAG
code. The next step is to connect itineraries into partial tours, using the Routing
Program, which creates sequences of itineraries characterized by relatively short.
turnaround times between successive itineraries. A sample of the output is shown in
Figure 6.
F
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	 EDIT	 DIAGNOSTIC
AIRPLANE TYPE'	 PROGRAM	 PRINTOUT
ITINERARY
FLIGHT	 RECONSTRUC	 FLIGHT	 ROUTING	 PARTIAL
LEGS FILE	 TION	 ITINERARIES ­0 PROGRAM	 TOURSPROGRAM	 F I t,E
Figure & Production of Simulation Itineraries and Schedules
To complete the airplane routing process; an additional 'route cycle generation pro-
gram must be developed. This program will assemble partial tours into complete tours
in which each airplane's path can be traced from the beginning to the end of its route
cycle. The algorithm to be used will be similar to the Airline Crew Scheduling
Program subroutine described in Reference 16 The basic approach is to prepare lists
of partial tour arrivals and departures, organized according to arrival and departure
times. This organization ensures that arrivals can be linked to successive departures
in a way that satisfies the input constraints and the objective of the minimum possible
total airplanes.
1
1
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Itinerary	 Successive arrival and
numbers	 departure time (time-
Cities	 week, 0,01 hr)
V
3
DTW ORD SEA PDX HNL
5900 5998	 125	 191 62a3 652 ►
L PDX SEA ORD OTW
67741 7816 7881 8108 8664 8733 9928
k	 95 DTW ORD SEA PDX HNL
81.00 8100 8200 8398 8523 8591 8683 5924
94 NNL ITO PDX S A ORD QTJ
a	 9193 9274 9350 10150 10216 10251 10585 11064
11133 11328
95 DTW ORD SEA PDX HNL
10500-10500 10600 10748 10925 10991 11083 11324
94 HNL PDX SEA ORD DTW
11733 12541 12615 12681 12908 13454 13533 13728
't
95 OTW ORO SEA PDX HNL
15300 15300 15400 15598 15725 15791 15883 16124
94 HNL PDX SFA ORD DTW
16533
	
541	 616	 681
	
908 1464 1533 1728
95 OTW ORD SEA PDX ITO HNL
12900 12900 13000 13198 13325 13391 13483 13716
`'	 13791 13874
94 HNL PDX SEA ORD DTW
14133 14941 15016 15081 15308 15864 15933 16128
Figure 6. Sample of Partial Tours in Output From Route Generator
The computational procedure for the Route Cycle Generator is outlined in Figure 7.
The first step is to prepare for each city a list of partial tours that originate and
terminate at that city. These lists are sorted in ascending order of time (departure
times for originating tours and arrival-plus-turnaround times for terminating tours).
	
Generate arrival Sort in	 Link arriving toursPartial	 and departure ascending	 to departing tourstours	 list for each
	 by first ire, first
airport	 order of time	 out algorithm
C
i
Write	 Trace	 Compute in
simulation
	 completed 	 airplanes requiredinput file	 tours	 P	 4
Figure 7.. Computational Procedure for Route Cycle Generation
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The next step is to link arriving tours to subsequent departing tours at each city by
means of the algorithm shown in Figure 8. This algorithm is based upon the first-in-
first-out (FIFO) rule, and the results are consistent with the requirement for minimum
fleet size.
The method used to relate the number of airplanes required to departure schedules is
based on the assumption that the schedules are cyclic either on a daily or weekly basis..
This method is described in the rest of this section.
:Let the number of airplanes stationed at airport (i) at time (t) be represented by Ni(t),
and let M(t) represent the number of airplanes en route between airports. The total
i	 number of airplanes in the fleet is ^;Ni(t) + M(t). It may be assumed that at t 0,
which is the beginning of the schedule cycle, all airplanes are on the ground and M(0)
0. Thus, the problem of determining fleet size is equivalent to evaluating the sum
^N,(0).
The function Ni(t) will be referred to as the "airport activity function." The relation-
ship between this function arid the departure and arrival times can be described by the
following equation:
Ni(t2) - Ni(tl) = Ai(tl,t2) - Di(tl,t2), t2 > tl
where Ai(tl,t2) and Di(tl,t2) are the numbers of arrivals and departures, respectively, a
in the time span from t1 to t2.
{^	 f; The flowchart of an algorithm to determine numerically the value of Ni(0) for a given{ set of arrival and departure times is shown in Figure 9. 	 First, a list of flight numbers
f Fi • is prepared at each airport in which the minus sign indicates departures, while the
•lact of a minus sign indicates arrivals. 	 Let Ti	 represent the departure time for
i outgoing flights and arrival-plus-turnaround time or incoming flight	 The set	 (Fib•)is ordered in increasing time sequence so that Ti,j+l > Ti tj..	 Let Ni^j represent tte
f number of airplanes lust prior to the j-th flight. 	 Then,
f Ni,j = Ni,j-1 + 1, if Fi ,l > 0
j Ni,j = Ni ,j-1 - 1, if Fi,j < 0
Starting with an arbitrary initial value Ki 1, the recursive use of these equations will
yield a set of values qCi). Let K* represent the minimum value in the set (Ki j). By
setting Ni	 _ Ki,j - Ki, the resulting set (Nip •) will satisfy the condition that all of its
'
j
members are non-negative; that is, Ni ,j > d.	 Thus, the initial value of the airport
activity function is given by
Ni(0) = K i,l - K
t	 ' By the summation of Ni(0) over all cities in the network, the minimum number of
l airplanes required to satisfy the schedule is obtained:
The last step in the computational procedure outlined in Figure 7 is to assemble the
completed tours.
	 This is done by tracing partial tour linkages from city to city until
' each tour cycle is identified.	 Output from the route cycle generation enables the
FTFCS
s
xconfigurations to be evaluated and optimized by the CBDOM. i
t
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LIST OF "n"
ARRIVALS
AND
DEPARTURES
COMPUTE FOR EACH PARTIAL TOUR,
READY-TO-DEPART (RTD) TIME =
ARRIVAL TIME + MINIMUM TURN
Tlf;!,c
PREPARE TWO LISTS OF PARTIAL TOURS(1)ARRIVALS SORTED BY RTD TIMES (R)(2)DEPARTURES SORTED BY DEPARTUA
TIMES (D•)
SET k=0, m=0,1=1
COMPARE i-th ELEMENT R I IN LIST (1) WITH 1-th
ELEMENT D i IN LIST (2), WHERE j = i + k +m
101
Dj > Ri	 NO	 k = k+1i-1?'
YES	 a(
LINK i-th PARTIAL TOUR IN LIST(1) TO j-th PARTIAL TOUR IN
LIST (2)
	
7<J 
NO	 NO
 j>n
 YES
SET rn =-n
)
Figure $ Algorithm for Linking Partial Tours
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Figure 9. Algorithm for Determining Fleet Size N i (0)
5.2.2 Substitution and Cancellations
Interchanging the position of the airplaneswithin the airline itinerary is allowed in the
0&M model only at the day's end or before daily flight operations begin. To be candi-
dates for interchange, both airplanes must be located at the same city; i.e., they both
remain overnight at the same location.
A primary reason for allowing interchange is to expedite maintenance actions on one
or more airplanes. For example, assume that some maintenance action is required on
Airplane 4 in Table 2. Also assume that the maintenance must be undertaken at
Chicago (ORD), but is deferrable for 1 day. Airplane 4 could interchange itinerary
positions with Airplane 8 to facilitate the required repair. The model logic determines
interchange possibilities and executes them if necessary and feasible.
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Table 2 Sample Airplane l tinerary for Day 1
Airplane
number Itinerary
1 LGA ORD TOL ORD LGA ORD TOL
2 TOL ORD LGA ORD TOL- ORD LGA
3 LGA ORD MBS ORD LGA ORD DTT
4 DTT ORD LGA ORD DTT ORD LGA
6 LGA ORD CID ORD CID ORD SFO ORD
	 LGA
6 LGA ORD DTT ORD MBS ORD LGA ORD	 LGA
7 LGA ORD MBS ORD LGA ORD DTT
8 DTT ORD LGA ORD CID ORD SFO ORD
9 Two nights at ORD
10 ORD CLE ORD DEN ORD DEN ORD CLE
11 CLE DEN SLC DEN CLE ORD DEN ORD
12 ORD CLE ORD DEN ORD DEN ORD CLE
13 CITE ORD LGA DEN ORD
14 ORD CLE ORD DEN ORD DEN ORD CLE
15 CLE ORD LGA DEN ORD
16 ORD CLE ORD DEN ORD DEN ORD CLE
17 CLE ORD LGA DEN SFO DEN ORD
18 Two nights at ORD
19 ORD TOL ORD DEN LGA
20 LGA ORD SFO ORD DEN ORD
21 ORD TOOL ORD DEN LGA
22 LGA ORD SFO ORD DEN ORD
23 ORD TOL ORD DEN LGA
24 LGA ORD DEN ORD DEN
26 DEN ORD DEN ORD LGA
26 LGA ORD LGA ORD DEN
27 DEN ORD DEN ORD LGA ORD
28 ORD LAS ORD CID ORD LAS
29 LAS ORD LGA ORD LGA ORD
30 ORD LAS ORD CID
31 CID ORD LGA ORD DEN SLC
32 SLC DEN ORD SFO ORD LGA ORD
It has not been possible to develop a method of simulating the events following a flight
cancellation. In the real world, schedules for a number of airplanes may be changed to
close the gap left by a failure that results in cancelled flights. Also in the real world,
one or more nonrevenue repositioning flights may be required following a cancellation.
Further work is required in the proposed Phase II of this program to establish the cost
consequences of cancellations and a recovery method, so that the correct cost penalty
can be applied to a simulation model cancellation. In the interim, a cost penalty will
be based upon loss of all flights from the cancelled flight to the end of the day. The
cost penalty will be calculated using the expression for CN described in Section 5.3.
The airalane than will continue as though- no cancellation had occurred.
E 5.2.3 Line Maintenance and Repair
As each airplane cycles the airline ^ . nerary, opportunities for maintenance are encoun-
tered. Scheduled maintenance actions are built into the itinerary. For example, note
the entry for Airplane 9 in Table 2. It is scheduled to spend 2 days and nights at ORD.
During this time, maintenance actions are undertaken to make all airplane systems
current and operable.
Unscheduled maintenance is performed as necessary, depending on the resources and
time available. The user is required to select, as input, the types of maintenance
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conducted at each airport in the network, the available manpower by skill level, and
the location and staffing of the repair facility.
Line Maintenance--Three
 
levels of station maintenance resource are to be selected by
the CBDOM user and allocated to each city on the route according to the following
definitions:
•
	
	 Type 1--Has no maintenance resources. Maintenance at Type 1 stations is
accomplished_ by requesting assistance from the nearest Type 2 or 3 station. Re-
`
	
	 placement parts, personnel, and equipment will be flown in from the nearest
station with available resources.
•	 Type 2--Has a single personnel resource pool with mechanics capable of perform-
I t h	 ing all unscheduled line maintenance and scheduled work for T-checks (transit)
f	 and A-checks (see appendix I for definitions).
• Type 3--Has one personnel resource pool for gate positions and one for the
hangar, each operating independently. Gate personnel perform unscheduled work
and all checks through A. Hangar personnel perform 13- and C-checks.
The logic for operation of a typical Type 2 or 3 station is shown in Figure 10.
The user may specify the skill levels to be provided at each Type 2 or 3 station by
combinations of the following options:
• Skill 1 mechanics are capable of performing any maintenance on the airplane
associated with replacement or adjustment of avionic equipment, including
FTFCS.
•
	
	
Skill 2 mechanics are capable of performing any maintenance oil 	 airplane
associated with replacement or adjustment of mechanical equipment.
•
	
	 Skill 3 mechanics are required for testing, inspection, and repair of unserviceable	 i
avionic equipment except specified FTFCS equipment.
• Skill 4 technician/programmers can accomplish Skill 1 and 3 work. in addition,
they are required for changes to software, firmware, and checkout of changed or
modified FTFCS equipment. Skill 4 personnel will receive recurrent training
every 6 months on FTFCS maintenance. (However, it remains to be seen if the
FAA will permit airlines to perform such changes.)
Line maintenance actions are generated for each FTFCS LRU as shown in Section
5.2.5. I£ a nondeferrable fault is detected at a city with insufficient resources to
rectify the fault, appropriate resources are flown to that city. in actual practice;
airlines accomplish this using other scheduled carriers, chartering a flight, or relying
upon their own flight schedule for delivering the necessary resources. Charter and
competitive airlines are not included in the O&M model. Consequently, to simulate
expedient repair of such a disabled airplane, a time distribution sample is used to
determine the length of time it takes to position the required resources where needed.
All resources used in this way are accounted for and Oeir availability is tracked. For
example, if two mechanics are repositioned from Ch, sago to some remote location,
the model decrements Chicago's number of available mechanics by two until the work
t
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MScheduled maintenance of an airplane is conducted in the O&M model during T-, A-,
B-, and C-checks. The maintenance activities covered by each of these checks are
described in Appendix 3. T-checks are conducted daily and are short checks made on
an airplane whenever it stops at an airport that has maintenance manpower. A-, B-,
and C-checks are conducted as a function of elapsed flight hours for each airplane.
The model user will be able to specify the form of these functions as input to the
model. For example,, the user can specify that A-checks can occur sometime between
50 to 100 flight hours after any previous letter check. The model then schedules each
airplane's A-check within this time frame.
The time required to complete each letter check is a random variable and is deter-
mined in the roodel by a draw (a random sample drawn from a characteristic proba-
bility distribution). The type of draw will depend on the resources available for
conducting the letter check. For example, if four qualified mechanics are available to
conduct an A-check on a particular airplane, the duration of the task will be longer
than a situation in which six mechanics are available to conduct the A-check. The
model will track resource availability and allocate manpower to minimize delay.
B-checks are made less frequently than A-checks, but are more extensive, taking
longer to complete. However, A and B-checks can be completed during an overnight
layover if sufficient manpower is available. C-checks take longer than overnight to
complete. The airline itinerary allows for this by including an extended layover at
appropriate maintenance facilities. As each airplane in the fleet cycles through the
airline itinerary, it has a maintenance opportunity when this layover is encountered.
Unscheduled maintenance requirements occur in the O&M model when previously gen-
erated faults to the airplane are detected. The procedure for generating, detecting,
and recording faults to the airplane is discussed in Sections 5.2.4 and 5.2.5. In general,
repair to some detected faults is deferrable until a maintenance opportunity, e.g., a
scheduled letter check or overnight at a qualified maintenance facility. Deferrable
faults are corrected at the first opportunity to complete the required maintenance
action. Workload requirements for correcting these faults are in addition to any
scheduled maintenance actions. The faults generated by the model are repaired either
in series with, or parallel to, ongoing maintenance activities,, For example, if qualified
mechanics are available in addition to those making an A-reheek on the airplane, the
model-generated faults are repaired during the time an A-check is under way. if
sufficient mechanics are not available, then the A-check schedule time is exceeded.
Nondeferrable faults must be repaired before an airplane can resume service. Non-
deferrable faults have repair priority over other repairs if schedule delays are
imminent. If nondeferrable faults are detected at a location not staffed with qualified
mechanics, mechanics are transferred to repair the defect. Mechanics sent to put an
airplane back in service are dispatched on a priority basis with respect to the current
workload.
Repair Shop Maintenance--The repair shop model simulates the test and repair of the
avionic equipment used aboard an airline's fleet.
Two classifications of repairable avionic equipment are modeled. One classification is
used to represent the FTFCS components that have failed in the O&M model. These
FTFCS components are individually tracked from the time they are removed from the
airplane to the dine they arrive at the repair shop.
i
k `'
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A_secoM classification, termed "ail other avionics," represents additional components
that ar cs repaired in tine modeled shop. This collective category contributes most of
the workload in the rep_ air shop. Arrivals of all other avionic components at the repair
shop are generated in the model by a draw from a user-selected distribution. ,Draws
from additional distributions establish individual repair characteristics of avionle
components arriving for repair.
The repair model is governed by repair shop input data and will be based upon line
station simulation, actual airline operational data, and estimates for FTPCS oquip
ment. These include items such as frequency distributions for arrivals of repairable
components at the repair shop, repair time distributions, working hours and shifts, and
overtime rules. Figure 11 illustrates the generalized logic flow of the model's avionic
equipment repair tasks.
Repair priority is another characteristic influencing any component's flow through the
repair shop. Three repair priorities are used in the model:
•	 P3—highest priority (used for airplanes on the ground)
•	 P2--intermediate priority (used for interrupted tasks)
0	 P1--lowest priority
FTI CS components receive a repair priority based on line station demand.
When each non-FTFCS component arrives, it is assigned a repair priority by a draw.
The value of a component's repair priority is used in the model to establish its position
within any queue. P2 components queue ahead of P1 components and behind P3
components. Repair priority P3 is used for components requiring immediate repair. A
P3 value allows the component to interrupt an ongoing test or repair of a component
with lesser priority. Any component interrupted by a P3 component is assigned a P2
value for the remainder of its time in the repair shop.
In addition to repair priority, each arrival is assigned a prerepair test time, a repair
time, and a postrepair test time by draws from separate distributions. 	 Two additional
draws are used to describe the individual components. 	 The first draw determines if
the component's fault is confirmed upon pretest. The second draw establishes whether
the fault was repaired after the component had passed through the repair cycle.
Components with faults that are unconfirmed at pretest are treated as being repaired
and fully functional. 	 Components failing the postrepair test are treated like new
arrivals and are required to undergo an additional cycle through the repair shop.
Two types of test equipment are used by the repair shop:	 automatic test equipment
(ATE) and manual test equipment. 	 input to the model specifies which type of test
equipment is required by each FTFCS component.
	 Some components, notably those
represented by the category "all other avionics," can use either type of test equip-
ment. in these cases, the applicable test equipment is decided in the model by means
of a draw.
	
The outcome of the draw determines if an individual component requires
ATE.	 This information then accompanies the component as it passes through the
repair shop.
Two contrasting repair flows are distinguished in the model, depending on the type of
test procedure (ATE or manual).
	 Equipment is not repaired while on ATE.	 Rather,
faulty equipment is transferred to a repair bench, which contains a modest amount of
manual test equipment, and most of the necessary parts for isolation and repair of
faults uncovered by tine ATE.
	 This procedure frees the ATE bench and is adopted
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because of the relatively high investment cost of ATE. An exception to this procedure
occurs when a component's repair time is small. In this case, the repair is conducted
at the ATE bench, followed immediately by an ATE postrepair test on the component.
Components not using ATE are tested and repaired at dedicated test benches that
contain the test equipment necessary for manual test and repair of avionic
components.
Overtime labor is used to alleviate repair backlog, component stockout, or P3 repairs.
The repair task is completed when the component is dispatched to a specified location
or placed in inventory.
5.2.9 FTFCS Equipment Definition and Failure Statue Recording
i
This section describes the method to provide formal computer-compatible descriptors
of the candidate FTFCS. The descriptors can be used to input and to track failure
status of equipment in the O&M simulation. In addition, the descriptors provide
storage for some data used only in the economic analysis.
For purposes of definition, the FTFCS will be divided into physical. and functional parts
and groups of parts. The fundamental FTFCS building block is called at "component."
The collection of all FTFCS components will be called the '-"system." Within the
system, similar components will be members of sets to be referred to as "stages."
Finally, the current collective condition of all components within the system shall be
known as the system "state." A component (or components) that may be easily re-
placed by line-station mechanics is called a "line-replaceable unit" (LRU). Definitions
of the above terms as they apply to the cost optimization are as follows:
• Component--An FTFCS component is a repairable or replaceable part or a group
of parts. Its fundamental characteristic is that the CBDOM user determines it
to be one of the basic FTFCS units, from a cost-optimizing paint of view. Thus,
an FTFCS component is an important, definable part (or indivisible collection of
parts) with a known failure rate and failure effect. Examples of possible FTFCS
components are: processor, memory, clock, sensor, actuator, bus, display,
software, and firmware.
•	 Stage--Identical interchangeable components are called stages. Identical means
that all members of a stage are the same type of component and have the same 	 x
failure rate.
System--The system is composed of a series of all of the stages, each stage
containing similar components.
•	 State--The system state consists of a current "snapshot" of the system. This
"snapshot" reveals;
0	 The arrangement of components into stages
•	 The number of failed components per stage
•	 The components that have failed
•	 Each stage's dispatch-critical complement
R	 •	 The LR'Us in which the failed components are located
g •	 The components That are due for regularly scheduled maintenance
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•	 Line-Replaceable Unit (LRU)--A unit that cao be readily changed on an aircraft
during line maintenance operations.
The physical and functional parts of the FTFCS can be represented using a linked-list
data structure. This enables a record to be kept of functional failures and physical
LRUs or components that are replaced or repaired by maintenance. Figure 12 Illus-
trates typical physical and functional groups.
During simulation of the FTFCS operation, component failures are generated and the
stage failures are recorded. For example, the system shown in Figure 12 might allow
dispatch with up to two failures in any stage. A further failure in this stage necessi-
tates maintenance. Maintenance takes place on an LRU, not a stage, unless the stage
is packaged as an LRU.
A PASCAL program was produced during this study to gain experience with linked-list
data structures. Figure 13 shows a typical record output from the program in which
Power Supply 9 of Stage 5 In LRU 2 fails, causing a number of dependent components
to fail as well, including Processor 9 of Stage 1 in LRU 2.
The model checks the FTFCS status to determine if the dispatch requirements for the
particular station can be met, as shown in Figure 14. As well as recording FTFCS
status, additional Input data are required to simulate maintenance and perform eco-
nomic analysis. The data for each component may be Interactively built Into an Input
file and include:
• Type
•	 Quitntity
•	 Weight
•	 Package type (card, chip, box, etc.)
s	 Cost
•	 Dispatch-critical complement
•	 Turnback and diversion complement
0	 Failure rate
•	 Fixed overhaul letter-check code and frequency (e.g., 313 equals every third 5
check)
0	 Percentage of failures detectable (by letter-check
6	 Test-time distribution
0	 Removal time
•	 Repair-time distribution
•	 Replacement time
i	 r
i
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Figure 13. Example of Simulation Record Keeping
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After developing the PASCAL program, it was found that the declaration of set
relationships and data structures for FTFCS equipment definition and status recording
is relatively simple using SIMSCRIPT. For instance, relationships can be established
by means of SIMSCRIPT statements such as:
THE AIRPLANE OWNS THE FTFCS
EVERY LRU OWNS A GROUP.OF.STAGES
EVERY STAGE HAS AN IDENTIFICATION.NUMBER,
A DISPATCH. MINIMUM.COMPLEMENT,
A TOTAL.FAILED, OWNS A PROCESSOR AND A POWER SUPPLY
AND BELONGS TO A GROUP. OF.STAGES,
AND AN FTFCS
The declaration defines classes of objects having similar properties and permits data
retrieval from computer program variables such as IDENTIFICATION.NUMBER
	
^1
(STAGE). The value of IDEN 1'IFICATION.NUMBER will be found in Word 1 of a
STAGE record. TOTAL.FAILED(STAGE) would be updated as the simulation proceeds
and failures are ,generated as described in Section 5.2.5.
	 1
t'
5.2.5 Removal-Generator for the Operations and Maintenance Simulation
One method of simulating removals of FTFCS LRUs is to provide a failure generator
based on a simple arrangement with components of a given type, in parallel, forming a
stage and with stages connected in series.
Rationale—Until a better reliability model is developed, the O&M simulation will
	 -j
approximate realistic maintenance demands and queues for resources. Simplification
in this manner means that the dispatch-critical: complement of equipment required for
flight must be determined in some other way, probably using CARE 1II, when it is fully
developed. {
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The probability of removing an LRU can be established using terms of a binomial
expansion as follows:
If N i 	 = full dispatch complement of Component 1' 1.,pe i (user input or model
l
variable)
G and Ki	 = minimum dispatch complement of Component Type i (user input)then Ri = probability that a dispatch can be made after a total of t flight hours
! without repair to any Type i components is given by:
. NW
'	
€ R(l) 	 N(i)!	 (P	 W)	 q•.(Nil)	 -	 x)
j x=KW	 x!
	 (N (i)
	
x)!
8
A
where: rw
p = reliability of one Type i component
t
e**(
—
 fa(t)dt)
9_1_p
a = hazard function
t = flight time
{ e = 2.71828
The combinatorial expression for Ri is valid only when all components of an LRU start
out with zero time after repair or the hazard rate is constant.
It	 :' If R(SYS) is the probability that a dispatch is possible without maintenance to the !
system, then for J different stages where a stage consists of identical components of
Type i, R(SYS) is given by:{
J
^
R(SYS)	
_ 7r
	
fl (1)
i and the probability of removal is given by 1 - R(SYS).
The combinatorial failure generator provides a method of simulating LRU removals, j
r	 t; but does not provide a method of simulating repairs or replacement of components
within the LRU.	 This problem is addressed in Appendix VIII, where a closed-form
solution and a SIMSCRIPT simulation solution are provided and are in good agreement.
As a result of these comparisons, a failure generator of the type provided in the
!
SIMSCRIPT program of Appendix VIII is proposed.
5.3	 ANALYSIS OF INVESTMENT AND OPERATING ECONOMICS
The parameters to be used by the model for purposes of optimization are the present
equivalent value of total costs and benefits (TCB) and return on investment (ROI),
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which are defined in Section 5.3.1. Total costs and benefits, simply statrd, are the
result of procuring, operating, obtaining benefits from, and disposing of it product and
are expressed as follows:
TC13 = IC + OC + TA + RCC + OB
where:
TcB
	
total costs and benefits (sec. 5.3.0
IC	 investment costs (sec. 5.3.2)
OC	 operating costs (sec. 5.3.3)
TA = tax adjustments (sec. 5.3.4)
RCC = retirement costs And credits (see. 5.3.5)
OB = operating benefits ( sec. 5.3.6)
The convention is adopted that money received is positive (+) and money paid out is
negative (-).
5.3.1 Cost and Benefit Measurement Parameters
Investment opportunities may be mutually exclusive (choosing one option rules out all
others) or independent. For example, optimization of FTFCS eliminates all but the
best alternative, which is the mutually exclusive choice. Possible use of surplus
VTFCS computer capacity for add-on functions, such as engine monitoring or
navigation, presents independent choices.
For mutually exclusive alternatives produced by different sets of optimization input
variables, the scheme selected should be the one that meets a minimum attractive
rate of return (MARR) criterion and has the maximum present equivalentvalue of
TCB. Where one of the mutually exclusive alternatives must be chosen, such as fauit-
tolerant or conventional flight controls, the question to be answered is "for which
scheme is an investment difference from a chosen baseline scheme most justified?"
For mutually exclusive alternatives, the selection will, therefore, be on the basis of
the cost/benefit differences from the baseline scheme ( the one with minimum invest-
ment cost). In this case, consideration of the costs and benefits of a single scheme is
not appropriate, but the differential ROI must exceed the MARK.
For independent alternatives, the alternatives that meet the MARRs are ranked in
order of descending ROL Selections then are made from the top of the list until the
desired amount of capital has been invested. Selection criteria are shown in Table 3.
Y
Table 3 Investment Decision Alternatives
Study type
Absolute costs and benefits Cost differences from baseline
Select minimum investment scheme
unless additional investment in alter.
Mutually exclusive alternatives (not appropriate) natives exceed minimum attractive
Ominimum
rate of return, in which case choose
total cost scheme	 O
Rank by decreasing return on invest-
Independent alternatives ment and select off the top until las for Ocapital is exhausted or minimum
1attractive rate of return is reached O O
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Rationale--The primary purpose of the CBDOM is to optimize design by evaluating a
AI series of mutually exclusive alternatives. However, the ability to assess the desirabil-
ity of the optimized design compared with other independent uses for investment
capital also is required by an airline making investment decisions and, therefore, is
. included in this discussion.
f
IE.
The steps in performing the economic analysis are as follows:
g Step 1--Using the details for given FTFCS configurations, calculate the cash paid out
i or received for each year the equipment is owned.
Step 2--Add	 the	 for	 keeping eachup	 costs and revenues	 each year,	 year separate.
a	 . Step 3—Calculate the present equivalent value for each year's payments and receipts
from the formulae
E^
PEVTCB (J) = TCB(J)/(1 + MARR(J)/100)**J
where:
MARK	 = percent minimum acceptable rate of return (the rate that
just meets the investor's threshold of acceptability)
PEVTCB(J)
	 = present equivalent value of all payments, benefits, and
receipts in the Jth year of operation defined in Section 5.3
4 TCB(J)	 - total costs and benefits for year J
J	 number of years from start of operation (J = 0 is the
f^
first year of investment and operation)
Step 4-Steps 1 through 3 are repeated for each design alternative. 	 If subscript K is
F
used to denote the design alternative (e.g., K = 1 is the first design scheme, K = 2 is
the second), then: E	
a
PEVTCB (J,K) = the present equivalent value of cost of ownership or the sum of v
all receipts and payments in the Jth year for the Kth design
E alternative
PEVIC(J,K)
	 = the present equivalent value of investments made in the Jth
year for the Kth design Alternative
PEVIC(J,K)
	
= IC(J,K)/((1 + MARR(J))**J)
E Step 5—As a basis for comparison, choose the design alternative with the lowest
present equivalent value of investment cost.
	 For this design alternative, let K = 3
KMIN.	 For the case where cash benefits are not separately identified, the costs of
each scheme can be compared. If the scheme with the lowest present equivalent value
of total investment cost is denoted by KMIN, then:
t
E
{
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NY	 NY,
PEVTCO (J,KMIN)-I; PEVTCO(J,K)
EROI(NY,K) -100	 J-0	 J=0	 +1 -^NY	 NY
PEVIC (J,K) F, PEVIC (J,KMIN)
J=0
	 J-0
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1
where:
r
E1101 ( N Y,K) = the extra return on investment (the amount by which ROI
exceeds MARR) through a period of NY years (expressed as a
percent) for Scheme K compared with the scheme requiring the
minimum investment (Scheme KMIN)
Note that if the numerical value of the inner term of this equation is between 0 and
1.0, the EROI is negative, and if the inner term is negative, the NYth root is
imaginary.	 For both cases, the EROI (NY,K) must be calculated from the expression
below where NY is a positive integer:
1
NY	 NY	 NY
T	 PEVTCO 0, KMIN) -1: PEVTCO (J,K)
EROI (NY,K) _ -100 	 ,1=0	 J=0	 -1	 -1 o ^---(2)NY	 NY
1	 PEVIC OA -1	 PEVIC (J, KMIN)
J=0
	
J=0
1
Rationale--It is not always clear from examining the input data if a given design will
produce a positive EROI or, for that matter, a positive net terminal return. 	 There-
fore, provisions for calculating negative EROIs has been made by assuming a symmet-
rical relationship for positive or negative ROI for the same absolute value of cash
flow.	 Equations (l.) and (2) also can be used to determine the internal rate of return 1
(equal to the value of MARR for which the EROI = 0). The formula also can be used to
determine the net terminal return on investment by making MARR = 0 	 With a coin-
parison of independent alternatives, those with the highest EROI are chosen until an
investment of the desired size has been made.	 For mutually exclusive alternatives,
the preferred scheme is the one with an EROI greater than 0 and the highest value of
net terminal cash: k
NY	 NY
PEVTCB	 (J,KMIN)
	 -	
PEVTCB (J,K)
J=O	 J=0
When cumulative benefits are separately identified for each case, then an EROI can be `y
calculated using Equations (1) and (2), with all terms involving Scheme K set to zero.
Step 6—The payback point (PP) is calculated by incrementing J from its starting value
until the year JX is found in which the EROI changes sign from its last negative value.
PP	 =	 (JX	 -	 1)	 -ERO1	 OX	 -	 1)
EROI	 (JX)
	
-	
EROI	 UX	 -	 1)
42
i(s,
1
{
ii
t
where:
PP	 payback point in years from the start of operation
JX	 the year in which the extra return on investment changes sign
from its last negative value
EROI (JX - 1) = the last negative value of EROI
EROI (JX)	 the next positive value after the (JX -1) th value of EROL.
At the start of the first year of operation, the EROI =
-100%.)
It is possible that, within the study period (NY), there are multiple payback points. If
the maximum EROI does not occur after the last payback point, a study should be
made to determine replacement costs and a replacement strategy. i
Rationale--Several airlines use payback point. 	 After reviewing the draft model
requirements by the airlines, payback point was offered as an alternative decision 1
criteria. The use of MARK= 0 also can be used to provide a payback point in terms of
number of years required to recover the investment in actual cash rather than present
equivalent value cash.
5.3.2	 Investment Cost Definitions
Investment cost (IC) is the cost of all properties and funds required for an airline to
i	 set up a business.	 Investment costs (IC) provided for FTFCS evaluation consist of:
IC = ICAP + ICRS + ICES + ICGS + ICST + ICTM + OTHER
where:
f
ICAP	 = airplane parts procurement and installation
ICRS	 = rotatable spares investment
ICES	 = expendable spares initial stock
ICGS	 = ground support equipment
ICST	 = special tools and test equipment
ICTM = training equipment
Inflation or deflation of any IC not specified by means of a lookup table will be at a
G?	 standard user-supplied rate (default value = 8 percent per year).
ICAP--`i'he cost of procuring and installing parts on an airplane consists of the price
e	 charged by the parts supplier plus the installation costs multiplied by a profit markup
E
{
factor for the airplane manufacturer. 9
In addition to the profit markup, new airplanes are subject to a 5 percent progress _ia
C payment schedule for each of seven quarters before delivery.	 Thus, the prepaymentshave the effect of increasing the airplane price by a factor of 1.06 when progress i
payments are converted to a present value at 15 percent MARK.
	
With the ACES, the
user can change the default values of profit markup and prepayment factors.
	
The
ACES takes the price per part and quantity per airplane from the data provided as part
of the FTFCS component, stage, and system description (sec. 5.2.4).
	 The installation
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cost per part, in first year of operation dollars, also is provided by the user as part of
the FTF CS description. Prices are inflated to other years in which investment takes
place using Table 4 or an inflation factor supplied by the CBDOM user.
Table 4. Material Inflation Percentage
Year
Material increase
over the previous
year 196)
Year
Material Increase
over the previous
year 196)
1959 -- 1969 4.4
1960 0 1970 6.1
1961 OA 1971 2.8
1962 -0.4 1972 2.9
1963 0.1 1973 5.4
1964 1.7 1974 10.0
1965 2.0 1975 15.0
1966 2.8 1976 7.5
1967 2.3 1977 5.2
1968 Z9 1978 8.6
ICRS—The cost of rotatable spares is the product of the cost per unit in a given year
times the quantity required. Quantity will be derived from the O&M simulation, which
will be initialized by a spares-provisioning program in the ACES. The pares-
provisioning program uses a technique developed by G. Black and F. Proschan , under
Signal Corps Contract DA-36-039-8C-75012. This program produces the minimum IC
quantities of spares from the possible alternatives to achieve a user-specified
probability of no stockout of any item in the kit. However, the provisioning routine
contains no allocation logic to determine how the quantities of spares provisioned
should be distributed around an airline network. In addition, the cost penalty of a
stockout is not included in the method of optimization.
In the CBDOM, the existing ACES spares routine will provide a good first estimate of
the spares required. The spares quantity then will be optimized for maximum airline
profit by allocating spares in quantities determined by the CBDOM response surface
exploration described in Section 5.4. Thus, spares will be positioned at stations
specified by the model user in optimum quantitiesdefined by the CBDOM. Locations
for spares will normally match those used by the airline being represented. If FTFCS
spares are located at a new location, the user must supply estimates of IC associated
with setting up the new location and any cost incremental to the standard spares
holding cost (see sec. 5.3.3—Operating Costs). Table 4 is used by ACES for inflation or
deflation' of spares from specified year prices.
ICES—This is the cost of providing an initial stock of expendable spares. Materials
that are consumed are charged as an operating cost and accounted for under
Maintenance Material Operating Cost (MM). It is necessary to invest in a sufficient
stock of expendable materials to take care of periods of heavy demand and to take
	 }
care of the time ^etween placing a replacement order and receiving a delivery. An
empirical method lt$)
 that is used by several airlines and has been used in ACES is as
follows:
i
To calculate expendable spares investment, perform the following steps:
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{ Step 1--Calculate the annual. usage cost (MM) in dollars as shown below.
Step 2--Inflate or deflate MM to 1977 dollars.
Step 3--Enter Table 5 and determine the number of months of supply (NMS) to be
initially provisioned.
,E
Step 4--Arrive dt the investment cost, ICES, by applying the following formulas
ICES = MM x NMS/12
k
ei
where:
r
s .;.
	
	 MM = maintenance material cost per year per fleet
NMS = number of months stock from Table 5
Table & Material Stack Levels
1977 dollars Number of monthsstock (NMS)
$	 0	 —	 199 12-month stock
$ 200	 —	 499 6-month stock
$ 500	 —	 999 4-month stock
$1000-
	 3000 1-month  stock
Over $3000 1-month stock
Annual usage cost can be calculated from the formula;
MM = (NA. x UTIL x QPA x FR/1000) x CU
where:
i
MM = maintenance material cost per year per fleet
NA	 number of airplanes in the fleet
UTIL = utilization in flight hours/year/airplane
QPA	 quantity of the item per airplane
FR	 = unit throwaway rate per 1000 flight hours for the average flight
length being considered
CU	 = cost per unit or item
For the CBDOM, ACES will be modified to allow the user to override the values in
Table 5. i
Rationale—Table 5 is based on work b R. H. Wilson( 19 )y and c nsiders the cost of
replenishment and the cost of holding stock to determine an economic order quantity.
If a significant number of FTFCS parts turn out to be expendable, amore appropriate
algorithm would have to be developed to include penalties of stockout. Optimization
	
1
of stock would be effected by determining the maximum profit stock level using the
nntlmiv.ntinn tPohninnP riacnrihnri in Rototinn 5 d
IICGS -The cost of ground support equipment includes the procurement cost of stands,
slings, jigs, fixtures, tools, gages, jacks, servicing rigs, test equipment, vehicles, and
anything used for maintaining, overhauling, repairing and testing airplanes, engines and
rigging flight controls. Such items Are designed for use with any airplane type, or they
become special items and should be included in ICST below. Thus, ICGS would include
general-purpose automatic test equipment (ATE).
ICST--The cost of special tools and test equipment includes equipment that can be
used only on one airplane or equipment type. General-purpose equipment is to be
included in ICES.
ICTM —`Chis is the investment cost in training equipment for such items as students'
notes, models, movies, and training aids. Flight simulators may require modification
for different configurations of fault-tolerant systems, and modifications are included
as a part of 1CTM in such a case.
Provision in ACES for including investment costs for buildings, ramp equipment, and
maintenance manuals will be eliminated. The first two items are irrelevant for F'TFCS
and the last item is normally included in the purchase price, ICAP.
5.3.3 Operating Cost Definitions
Operating costa (OC) consist of all costs associated with operating an airline. Several
new cost categories will be provided in ACES to accommodate the detail provided by
the O&M simulation output. The definitions below identify costs that are design
dependent. Costs such as spares holding, delays, and cancellations do not correspond
to the Civil aeronautics Board (CAD) Form 41 cost breakdown. Operating costs are
defined as the sum of the cost entities below:
OC= MLL + MSL + MM + SSC + M13 + OS + MT + FCT + Sli + FCR +
DC + CN + DT + CDS + OLP + TCE + TCP + OTHER
where
•	 Labor-related operating costs
MLL = maintenance line labor
MSL = maintenance shop labor
MM = maintenance materials
SSC = shop and servicing supplies
M13 = maintenance burden
•	 Other operating costs
OS = outside services
MT = maintenance training
FCT = flight crew training
SH = spares holding 'cost
FCR = fuel cost reductions
DC = delay costs
CN - cancellation costs
DT' - diversion and turnback costs
CDS = debt servicing
CLP lease payments
r	 a
TCE = equipment transportation costs
TCP = personnel transportation costs
Inflation or deflation of any operating costs not specified by means of a lookup table
will be tit a standard user-supplied inflation rate (default = 8 percent).
Labor-Related Operating Costs--Include MLL, MSL, MM, SSC, and MB as discussed
below.
MLL--Maintenance line labor cost consists of the compensation paid to all personnel
engaged in line maintenance of any type, plus the employee insurance, fringe benefits,
and pensions that are not directly included in compensation. Subroutine MLABOR of
ACES requires modification to accept output from the O&M model instead of input
from the user. Maintenance line labor is to be calculated as follows:
RAGE
MLL	 1; ((ML (J) x MLBF x MPW) + (MLOT(J) x MLOR)) x BPMH (J)
Ja0
NS
ML (J)	 2; (MHL (4) x SLF (S))
SR1
NS
MLOT (J)	
.1 (MHLOT WA x SLF (S))
SA1
where:
MLL	 = maintenance line labor cost in dollars for all J years
summed from J 0 to the retirement age (RAGE) in
years
ML(J)
	 = maintenance line labor for the Jth year for regular time
in hours (simulation output)
MLOT(J)	 = maintenance line labor overtime for the Jth year
(simulation output)
BPMH(J)	 = base pay/labor hour for year J (see table 6)(20), dollars k
MLBF	 = maintenance labor fringe benefit factor
= 1.0 (to be included in burden, MB)
MPW	 = maintenance hours paid to worked ratio
= 1.0 (to be included in burden, MB)
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Tsbfe 6. Rew Pay par Labor Hour
Year
Base S/labor hour(BPMH) Year Base $/labor hour(BPMH)
1962 3,28 1971 6.97
1963 3.43 1972 6,54
1964 3.67 1973 7,10
1986 3.72 1974 7.62
1966 3.83 1976 8.46
1967 4.19 1976 9,10
1968 4.31 (1977) 9.99
1969 4.71 (1978) 10.87
1970 6169 (1979) 11.64
Note: Reference CAB Schedule P10 Form 41. Years In parentheses are estimates, since
reporting stopped in the third quarter of 1977,
MLOR	 ratio of overtime to base pay BPMH(J)
MHL(J,S)	 = labor hours line in the Jth year for the Sth skill level
obtained as output from the 1me maintenance simulation.
MHL(J,S) for fractions of a year must be multiplied by
365/days simulated.
SLF(S)
	 = skill level compensation ratio for skill level S of NS
compensation for skill level, S(J=O)
compensation base rate, CPMH J=0
MHLOT(J,S) = overtime labor hours line in the Jth year for the Sth skill
level obtained as output from the line maintenance
simulation. MHLOT(J S) for fractions of a year must
be multiplied by 365/days simulated.
MHLOTF(J,S) = MHLOT(J,S) x overtime compensation rat
regular time compensation rate
M--Maintenance shop labor is calculated in the same way as MLL, except that
MHL(J,S) and MHLOT(J,S) are changed to MHS(J,S) and MHSOT(J,S) wherever they
appear and are obtained from the repair shop simulation. These changes affect
subroutine MLABOR of ACES.
MM--Maintenance materials is the total cost of maintenance materials plus expend-
able parts purchased in a given year to replace those consumed. ' ' aintenance material
usage is generated only in the simulated repair shops. Input to ACES from the O&M
simulation will be directly in units of dollars material cost per fleet per year in a
specified year's dollars. Subroutine MMATER of ACES must be changed to accom-
modate the alternative input, and inflation or deflation of specified year's dollar input
will be in accordance with Table 7. Further work is required to validate and extend
Table 7 for flight control system maintenance materials.
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Table Z Materfol Inflation factors
Year
Inflation
factor
Material
increases
i	 1 Year
Inflation
factor
Material
Increase
M
1069 0.6696 1969 0.8883 4.4
1960 0.5696 0 1970 0.7090 8,1
1961 0.5719 0.4 1971 0.7289 2.8
1962 0.6696 -0.4 1972 0.7500 2.9
1963 0,6702 0.1 1973 0.7906 5.4
1964 0.6799 1.7 1974 0.8696 10.0
1966 0.5915 2.0 1975 1.0000 15,0
1966 0.6081 2,8 1976 - 1.0760 7.5
1967 0.6221 2.3 1977 1,1309 5.2
1968 0.6400 2:9 1978 1.2282 8.6
30ver the previous year
SSC--Shop and servicing supplies cover the cost of supplies and expendable small tools
and equipment used in maintaining, servicing, and cleaning property and equipment
that cannot be directly assigned to a specific job or type of work. Because a cost-
estimating relationship is not available for SSG, the analyst must estimate it using the
"Other" cost category provided in ACES for input.
MB--Maintenance burden (or overhead) is a total airline system-related cost that tads
been allocated back to airplane types. It is not an airplane--and engine-originating cost
Tike fuel consumption or direct maintenance material consumption and is not a proper-
ty of an airplane type as reported to the CAB.
Total maintenance costs are divided according to CAB Form 41 into three direct
charge accounts for airframe, engines, and other. An indirect account, burden, is
further subdivided into a number of accounts, comprised as follows:
•	 Labor for ground property and equipment
•	 MaterEJ for ground property and equipment
•	 Maintenance trainees and instructors
•	 Unallocated labor
0	 Communications personnel
•	 ltecordkeeping and statistical personnel`
•	 Purchasing personnel
•	 Other personnel
•	 Utilities (heat, light, power, water)
•	 Outside services
•	 Rentals
Shop, servicing supplies
•	 Employee benefits
•	 Payroll taxes
CAB-reported burden is, in fact, an inseparable mixture of airline-sensitive and
airplane-sensitive elements. Airline-sensitive elements include a very large number of
Independent and interdependent elements, among them being:
1
i
49
a
i
i
•	 The mix of airplane types
•	 Route structure
•	 Geography and climate
•	 Maintenance philosophy
•	 Labor union contractual provisions
•	 Efficiency
•	 Management intrastructure
To compound the analytical problem, a great deal of latitude is inherent in CAB
reporting requirements, so that tremendous differences exist among various airlines
flying identical equipment. As deregulation continues, even this flawed (from the
standpoint of making airplane comparisons) data base is likely to disappear. Given this
environment, it would be tempting to ignore burden altogether. Yet, to do so would
bias comparisons. For example, a maintenance scheme that relies on rotatable spares
and is, therefore, labor-intensive, would not be correctly compared with one that
relies upon replaceable spares and is material intensive. In other words, one
recognizes that there is a design-sensitive burden to be compared among designs, and
this entity is what CBDOM attempts to handle. Design-sensitive burden, then, and
CAB Form 41 burden are distinct entities. The former is 'appropriate to design
comparisons; the latter is useful for assessing financial aspects of particular airline
operations. Users of CBDOMare cautioned that these two types of burden are related
only because they share some common terminology. This does not preclude the use of
CAB data inferences where , appropriate, such as labor fringe benefit factors and the
ratio of support personnel to direct labor.
Design-sensitive burden includes two major elements:
•	 Labor burden
•	 Labor and material for maintenance of ground property and equipment
Spares holding cost, outside services, and shop and servicing supplies, which also are
design-sensitive and normally included as burden in CAB Form 41, are separated out in
the CBD04M under SH, OS, and SSC.
Use of design-sensitive burden represents an improvement of the method currently
used in ACES. The subroutine MBURDEN of ACES must be changed to replace
maintenance burden by design-sensitive burden.
I
Design-sensitive burden elements consist of:
•	 Payroll taxes
•	 Fringe benefits
•	 Insurance
•	 Pensions
•	 Educational reimbursement
•	 Nonproductive time
•	 Vacations
•	 Sick leave
•	 Holidays
la
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•	 Support personnel
•	 Guards
•	 Custodians
•	 Building tradesmen
•	 Tool crib attendants
•	 Administration
•	 'Timekeeping
•	 Payroll
Algorithms for labor burden follow, in the same order.
• Payroll Taxes--Federal payroll taxes (FICA) will be applied to direct wages at
the 1979 rate of 6.13 percent, escalating at an additive rate of 03 percent/year
after 1979. The State rate will be computed at 50 percent of the Federal rate.
For a composite rate of 9.2 percent, escalating at 0.15 percent/year, the
multiplicative factor is 1 .092 + 0.0015/year aft e r 1979.
•	 Fringe Benefits According to CAB Statistics--The 1979 fringe benefit factor is
1.23 x direct wages, escalating at 1 percent per annum, additive.
•	 Nonproductive Time--The ratio of total time to productive time is 2080/1870
1.113.
• Support Personnel---The best estimate of this is obtained from CAB Form 41
data, which show that unalloc^ted shop labor is equal to 20.0 percent of total
burden. Since the average ratio of total burden to direct labor is 2.7:1, this
category is equal to 2.7 x 20 percent = 54 percent of direct labor. The
multiplicative factor is, therefore, 1.54.
h	 Administration--Administrative costs are esth ated as 1/2 percent of payroll
As an example, for 1979 the overall multiplicative factor applied to direct labor is:
1.092 x 1.23 x 1.113 x 1.54 x 1.005	 2.314
For 1980 the overall factor would be:
(1.092 + 0.0015) x (1.23 + 0.01) x 1.113 x 1.54 x 1.005 	 2.335
This implies that the labor -related charges account for ( 2.314 /2.7) x 100 = 86 percent
of total burden.
Labor and Material for Maintenance of Ground Property and Equipment- -The labor
component comes to 3.75 percent of total burden, which averages 2.7 times direct
labor; 2.7 x 3.75 percent = 10.1 percent of direct labor. This figure is supplied to guide
the analyst who must input this cash flow for FTFCS into the CBDOM.
• OS—Outside services will be used as a separate cost category for FTFCS
equipment repaired by an associated or nonassoci 'ated company. Input to ACES
will be from the O&M simulation in terms of ORPY, the number of total outside
repairs by year; Oi1MII, the average outside repair mail
	 hours per repair•,
k	
51
s	
y:
••
•
ORMM, the average outside material cost per repair; and the year dollars
associated with the material cost. A new subroutine is required in ACES for
handling OS as follows:
OS(J) = C(ORMH x BPMl•i(J) x OSB) + (G tMM(B) x MMF(J)1 x
ORPY(J) x OSPM
f
where:
OS(J)	 = outside services cost in dollars for year J for the fleet
ORMH	 = average outside repair man (labor) hours per repair
B P M H (J)	 base pay per mail (labor) hour ( see table 6) for year J
ORMM(B) = average outside repair material cost per repair for the
user-specified base year 'B
MMF(J) = inflation/deflation factor to convert maintenance
material costs from year B to year J. Factors are
provided in Table 6.
ORPY{J) = the number of outside repairs for the fleet in year J
0813	 outside services burden factor (default = 2.335 for 1980)
(see MB)
OSPM
	 = outside services profit markup factor (assumed default
1.15)	 Further work is required to validate this value.
Rationale--Outside services are included as a new element of ACES to permit
determination of the optimum repair level for equipment. While outside service
expenditure for the larger airlines is small, the use of outside services and
facilities may avoid investment in infrequently used equipment or avoid
shortages and delays due to an inability to handle peak work loads.
MT--Maintenance training consists of nonrecurrent and recurrent training
associated with the introduction of new equipment. A method of estimating
maintenance training cost has not been developed.
FCT--Flight crew training consists of nonrecurrent and recurrent training
associated with the introduction of new or modified airplanes. A method of
estimating flight crew training cost has not been developed.
SH,--Spares holding cost is the annual cost of holding rotatable and expendable
spares and materials in stock, consisting of:
•	 Warehousing
•	 Recordkeeping
•	 Administration of stocks and stores
•	 Inventory taxes
•	 Insurance
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Sparos holding cost can be estimated from the formula:
$il = Sli p x ([CRS + ICES) x MMF/100
where:
Sil
	
= spares holding dollars per year per fleet
Sli p = spares holding cost percentage of inventory
= 10 percent (a user override for SHP will be provided for
the CBDOM)
LCRS = rotatable spares investment
ICES = expendable spares and material investment
MMF	 maintenance material inflation factor
In the above expression, SHP (the holding cost as a percentage of inventory) is
based on an industry-accepted figure of 25 percent, which includes "cost of
capital." Since "cost of capital" is accounted for in the CBDOM by using present
equivalent value accounting with an MARR of 15 pe.-cent, the residual holding
cost is 10 percent. Of this 10 percent, approximately 25 percent is recordkeep
ing and administration. Recordkeeping and administration are included in
maintenance burden in CAB Form 41 reports, but for design analysis have been
separated out as a function of spares inventory value. Further work is required
to verify the industry-accepted spares holding costs.
• FCR—Fuel cost reductions due to eliminated weight or drag are to be separated
from fuel cost penalties (FCP) resulting from weight and drag increases, but are
calculated in the same manner. ACES does not currently provide for separation
of costs and benefits, and a subroutine for this purpose will be added. Incre-
mental fuel saved or burned is determined by the CBDOM user from airplane
aerodynamic and engine performance data in units of weight of fuel burned per
unit of incremental weight change per flight hour. Typical mission summaries
are shown in Table 7, and the resultant incremental reduction or cost of weight
are provided in Table 8 for the average flight lengths of Table 9.
The fuel used/flight hour in Table 8 is accurate only for the average flight of
Table 7. The exact determination of error in applying fuel used/flight hour based
upon average flights to shorter or longer flights has not been established.
FCR is currently calculated as shown below. User inputs can be changed to
metric (KMS) units if preferred by NASA.
FCR = FCPA x WIC x UTIL x NA x DG/PG
where
i
FCR = fuel dollars change/fleet/year
WIC	 weight increment change, pounds
UTIL = utilization in flight hours /airplane /year
i
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Table bt Cost of Additional Airplane Weight, Based on 3000 Flight Hours/Year
Airplane model 707.3208 727.100 727.200 737.200 747.200 747SP
Kilograms of fuel/
flight hr/kg of weight 0.05636 0.03707 0.03964 0.04688 0.04978 0.04969
Weight of fuel/
additional weight/yr ikg) 169,1 111.2 118,9 140.6 149.4 149,1
Cost of 1.0 kg
weight/year
30j/gal 16.69 10.98 11.75 13.89 14.75 14.75
4(Wgal 22.26 14.64 15.65 11152 19.66 19,66
5Wgal 27.82 11129 19.58 23.13 24,58 24.58
6041gal 33.37 21.95 23.47 27.76 29.49 29.49
f 
NA	 = number of airplanes in the fleet
DG	 = fuel price, dollars/gallon
PG	 = pounds/gallon of fuel (equals 6.7)
FCPA pounds of fuel consumed/pound of added weight
(or saved/pound of reduced weight)/airplane/flight hour
Fuel consumed because of drag (FCD) can be derived from the expression below.
However, ACES requires the user to convert drag to a weight equivalent for use
in the algorithm for FCR.
FCD = FCPD x DIC x UTIL x NA x DG/PG
where:
FCD = fuel dollars change/fleet/year
DIC = drag increment percent change
UTIL = utilization in flight hours/airplane/year
NA	 = number of airplanes in the fleet
DG	 = fuel price, dollars/gallon
PG	 = pounds /gallon of fuel (equals 6,.7)
FCPD fuel consumed/1 percent increase in drag in kilograms of
	 ifuel/flight hour
	
._ R
36.28 kg of fuel/flight hour for a 707-320B with 3.23 hours
average flight length	 ii}
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kTable Vii.  Minion Summary
Model 707.3208 727.100 727.200 737200 747.200 747SP
Engines JT31) JT8D•7 JT8D•9 JT8D•9 JT9D•7A JT9D•7A
Average flight (hr) 3.23 1.16 1.11 0.80 5.38 7,55
Average flight (km) a 2 576 793 734 526 4 637 6 618
Payload (kg) 8 437b 5 307b 7 575b 6 214b 44 920c 30 402c
Reserves (kg) 6 468 4 536 4 536 3 175 16 284 14 515
DEW (kg) 64 864 40 370 45 359 28 576 170 006 144 923
Fuel consumed 13 376 3 931 4 073 1960 57 565 65 771
per flight (kg)
Brake release. 93 145 54 143 61 543 39 925 288 485 255 372
gross weight (kg)
Climb speed Schedule
U.S. rules No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
KEAS/Mach 300/0.78 280/0.75 280/0.75 280/0.65 320/0.81 320/0.81
Cruise Mach 0.78 0.80 0.80 0.72 0.84 0.85
Cruise altitude (m) 1 887 10668 10668 9144 10668 12497
Descent speed schedul
U.S. rules No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
KEAS/Mach 260/0,78 280/0.80 280/0.80 280/0.75 320/0.81 320/0.81
Temperature Standard Standard Standard Standard Standard Standard
day day day day day day
Winds 0 0 0 0 0 0
abased on scheduled carrier data, cumulative through July 1974 for 707, 727, 737 and based
on September 1974, September 1975 and September 1976 for the 747
bNominal 55% passenger load factor +cargo
c55% Ioad factor with volume limit of cargo
t	 24.04 kg of fuel/flight hour for a 727-100 with 1.16 hours`
f	 average flight lengthf
27.22 kg of fuel/flight hour for a 727-200 with 1.11 hours
average flight lengthi	
i
I ,	 = 20.41 kg of fuel/flight hour for a 737-200 with 0.8 hour
	 {
average flight length
107.96 kg of fuel/flight hour for a 747-200 with 5.38 hours
average flight length
88.00 kg of fuel/flight hour for a 747SP with 7.55 hours
	 j
average flight length
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ACES will be modified to accept weights and fuel cost in KMS or foot, pound,
second (FPS) systems. As with the formula for fuel burned due to added weight,
the drag cost-estimating relationship is provided as an approximate guide.	 In
studies where a more accurate answer is required or where drag represents a
significant portion of total cost, a detailed performance analysis is required.
DC--Delay costs for the airplane are calculated in ACES by evaluating three
tangible costs consisting of:
•	 Passenger handling costs
•	 Extra crew costs
•	 Lost passenger revenue
During Phase lI, an airline survey is proposed to determine the values placed by #'
airlines on loss of goodwill due to delays and to determine more exactly the loss
of passenger revenue.	 In the interim, the following method is currently used by
ACES:
DC = (PHC + ECG + LP,R) x SQA x DPC x ADM x UTIL x NA
x DRC/(AFLH x 6000)
where-
DC	 = delay cost dollars/year/fleet
PHC	 = passenger handling cost, dollars/seat delay hour
PHC(76) = 0.2171
ECC
	 = extra crew cost, dollars/seat delay hour
ECC(76) = 2.442 - 0.0038 SQS ._
LPR	 = lost passenger revenue, dollars/seat delay hour
LPR(76) = (LF x (27.5689 AFLH - 1.373)
x 0.8712 EXP( 0.0454 - 0.2271 AFLH)) /
(1 + 1.3877 AFLH)
SQS	 = seat quantity, standard for airplane type (see table 10)
Table 1 a Standard Airplane Seating
•
Airplane Standard-qualityseating (SOS)
737.200/DC9 .40 115
727.200 131
DC10. 10 270
L-1011 268
707/DCB 143
747 385
t
1
1
LFR = load factor (decimal, not percent)
SQA = seat quantity, actual
DPC = delays/100 flights
ADM = average delay tithe/delay ( minutes)
UTIL = utilization in hours/year/airplane
NA = number of airplanes in the fleet
AFLH = average flight length (hours)
DRC = delay rate correction factor
FxAFLH+I - F
_Fx DAFL+1 -F
DAFL = average flight length (hours) associated with DPC
F flight hour/flight cycle factor for 1-hour flight from
Table 11
Table 11. Flight Hour/Flight Cycle Failure Factors by ATA System for a 1-hr Flight
System
-
Factor System Factor
21 Air conditioning 0.58 52 Door 0.51
22 Automatic flight Q,59 53 fuselage 0.50
23 Communications 0.66 54 Nacelle and pylon 0.90
24 Electrical 0.74 55 Stabilizers 0.49
25 Equipment and furnishings 0.38 56 Window 0.90
26 Fire protection 0.25 57 Wing	 - 0.49
27 Flight control 0.92 71 Powerplant 0.98
28 Fuel 0.94 72 Engine 0.89
29 Hydraulics 0.96 73 Engine fuel 1.00
30 Ice and rain removal 0.97 74 Ignition 1.00
31 Instruments 0.65 75 Engine air 0.29
32 Landing gear 0.18 76 Engine control 1.00
33 Lighting 0.78 77 Engine indicators 0.85
34 Navigation 0.67 78 Exhaust 0.45
35 Oxygen 0.55 79 Engine oil 0.57
36 Pneumatics 0.26 80 Starting 0.67
38 Water and waste 0.33 82 Water injection 0.45
49 APU 0.90 1	 99 Overall airplane 0.78
i
'_ 1^
Since DPC is no longer a user prediction based on historical delay data for a
given historical flight length, but is derived from the O&M simulation, the delay
rate correction factor DRC Is not required and should be set 1 .0 in ACES.
The derivation of the above formulas is detailed in D6-40895-1(21 . An abstract
of Reference 21 is provided in Appendix XI, which shows the method of deriva-
tion of delay and cancellation costs. The formulas in Reference 21 have been
transposed to the forms above using the following relationships and appropriate
inflation factors:
S = (AFLH - 0.2)/1.93
d = 0.4277 + 0.5867 x AFHL
where:
S = flight length in 10006 of statute miles
d = hours after which a delay becomes a cancellation
Inflation and deflation - factors necessary to convert delay costs to other years
are provided in Table 12 and are derived from CAB Form 41 reported pilots' and
copilots' pay (Account 23) for major domestic carriers.
Table 12 Pilot and Copilot Pay Inflation Factors
f	
1 i^
1
1. -, i
i170^
Year FlIght crew factor
1967 064847
1968 0.5485
1969 0.5960
1970 0.6570
1971 0.7040
1972 0.7370
1973 0.7737
1974 0.8436
1976 0.9439
1976 1.0000
Inflation factors for 1977 and on are calculated as shown below:
FCF(J) = flight crew inflation factor for the Jth year of operation
FCF(J) (1 + (FCINF/100))**(YEAR + J - 1976)
where:
FCINF	 flight crew annual inflation rate as a percentage
8.0 percent for design studies
YEAR	 calendar year for the start of operation
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•	 CN--Cancellation costs consist of all the costs of a delay up to the time the
flight is cancelled talus costs associated with loss of airplane use for the flight
hours it is out of service. Calculation of the delay cost portion of cancellations
is based on the average delay time preceding a cancellation, ADMC.
CN = (CNDC + CNOb) x CNPM x UTIL x NA/(1000 x AFLH)
where
CN	 cancellation dollars/year/fleet
CNDC = cancellation delay, dollars/ cancellation (see below)
CNDL	 cancellation downtime, dollars/cancellation (see below)
CNPM = cancellations/ 1000 departures/ airplane
UTIL = utilization, ;flight hours/year/airplane
NA	 = number of airplanes in the fleet
AFLH
	
average flight length in hours
•
	 Cancellation, Delay Cost Contribution--For the above expression for CN:
•
CNDC = (PHC + ECC + LPR) x SQA x ADMC x DRC/60
where:
ADMC = average delay minutes preceding cancellation
25 + 35.2 x AFLH
AFLH	 average flight length in hours
See DC (delay cost) for all other quantities.
ACES requires changing to accept CNPM and ADMC as outputs of the
O&M simulation. The algorithm for determining the value of ADMC as a
function of flight length is no longer required and will become a user input
for each station type.
Cancellation Downtime Loss Contribution--For the above expression for
CN:
CNDL(1972) 0.003 x OEW x FHL
where:
OEW operating empty weight, pounds
FHL = flight hours lost
It should be noted that the above does not include the costs of eliminating
problems that cause the cancellation. Such problems, when mechanical,
will be included in maintenance labor and material, ML and MM. ACE.'
will be changed to accept OEW in both KMS and FPS units.
• DT--Diversions and turnbacks will be simulated in the O&M simulation when
equipment drops to a turnback-critical complement of components. A new
subroutine is to be added to ACES to accommodate diversions and turnback costs
as follows:
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•D'r(1977) = 0.0067 x (517 AFLU -- 103) x SQA x DTY x. NA
where:
DT	 = diversions and turnback dollars/year/fleet (1977 dollars)
AFLH = average flight length, hours
SQA	 seat quantity/airplane, actual
DTY	 number of diversions and turnbacks/ airplane/ year obtained
from the simulation
NA = number of airplanes in the fleet
CDS—The cash flow due to servicing, obtaining, and repaying debt is to be
included in ACES. CDS includes all cash flows associated with debt, namely,
receipt of a sum at time J = 0 equivalent to all investments made, interest
payments (CIP) on the debt, and repayment of debt in the final year J DEBTL.
Since CIP can be deducted from income before taxes, it must be included as a
term in XITAXP in ACES subroutine TAXCD and its present equivalent value
calculated in subroutine CUMPEX. The income from unallocated debt funding
will be neglected since it is nonexistent with a mature fleet size at the J = 0
year and small for the more realistic fleet build-up case, For simplicity, a single
debt repayment is assumed to be effected in the DEBTLth year.
The following additional, inputs to ACES are required:
DEBTL = the term of the debt in ,years. The retirement age of equipment
(RAGE) is to be used as a default for DEBTL.
DEBTI = the percentage annual interest paid on the debt (default = 9)
Interest payments in the Jth year are given by:
CIP = ICSUM x DEBTI/100
where
RAGE
ICSUM _
	
([CAP M + ICRS(J ►
J=0
where
ICSUM
	 sum of all. investment costs
i
CIP	 = interest payments (of equal size) for each year
CDS(J) = debt cash flow in year J
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•CUS(J) = -ICSUM + CIP; for J = it
= CIP; for J = I to (DE-13rb - 1)
= ICSUM 4• CIP- for J = DEBTL
where:
DEOTL
CDS n 	 CDS(J)
Jn0
CDS = cumulative debt servicing cost
Present equivalent value of debt servicing cost PEVCDS(J) is calculated as
follows:
PEVCDS (J) -	 CDS (J)
0 + MARR M / IM -*J
DEBTL
PEVCDS	 Z PEVCDS (J)
J-0
CLP—This is the negative cash flow of lease payment, made for a defined period
of time by a lessee airline operator to the lessor who is the ac
equipment. All investment tax credits and depreciation are to
lessor; therefore the lessee's payments are treated as a pure ex
deducted from the gross income (or savings) generated by the
Recall that savings and benefits have the same tax conseq
income. Because leases are not investments, competing leas
.not be ranked using the investment criterion of EROI; instead t
of the various alternatives should be used for ranking. This wot
those alternatives that are not leases.
,Since CLP is deducted from income before taxes, it must be ir
in XITAXP in ACES subroutine TAXCD, and its present equival(
calculated using CUMPEN.
For simplicity, only equal lease payments will be treated,
purchase options will not be included. This simplification, how
to contemporary reality, in which variations on equal paym
encountered.
The following additional inputs are required: annual lease
(default 12) and the final year of the lease (FINb). While d(
made in arrears (i.e. after use of the money), lease payments
made in advance.
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tual owner of the
the benefit of the
pense item that is
leased equipment.
uences as actual
e schemes should
he present values
Id apply even for
eluded as a term
nt value must be
and the value of
ever, corresponds
ents are seldom
ercentage (ALP)
bt payments are
are customarily
The annual lease payment is a complex function of the lessor's cost of capital,
the lessor's tax situation, the duration of the lease, the residual value of the
equipment at lease end, and the requirements of lessor, lessee, and (frequently)
the lender.	 In the 1970 business environment, a reasonable default value for a
long-term lease will be ALP = 12 percent of the value of the leased item's
ICSUM.
	
Other percentage values may be input at the option of the analyst. i.
Lease payments in the Jth year are given by;
CLP(d) = ICSUM x APL/1.00
where.
ICSUM
	 -=	 all investments (also see debt servicing CDS) r-
I RAGE
ICSUM	 OCAP 4 + ICRS M ... • .. •)
,e
J=o
FINL
CLP	 CLP(J)
,-o
` CLP	 -	 cumulative lease payments f
Present equivalent values of lease payments are calculated as follows:
PEVCLP(J)	 CLP(J)/((1 + MARR(J))**J)
FIN1_
PEVCLP	 PEVCLP (J)
J-0
When lease is used in ACES, the input will be made in the same manner as for
investments. After ICSUMhas been used to calculate CLP, the investment costs
and associated investment tax and depreciation allowance will be zeroed out
,
•	 TCE—Transportation costs for equipment are the costs for packing and shipping -
rotatables and components between stations and vendors.
TOE = SC + PO
where:
TCE = transportation cost in 1979 dollars/shipment in the continental
U.S.
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SC	 shipping cost (air freight)/one-way shipment, $35.00 minimum
i	 plus $0.4536/kg ($1.00/lb) for excess weight over 15.88 kg(35 lb), in 1979 dollars
PC = packing and unpacking cost at 30 minutes for each operation($30.00, burdened 1979 dollars)
E 
The calculation of TCE requires anew subroutine In ACES, and packaged weight
Should be: taken as component weight times 1.25. Component weight is a user
input.
0
	
	 TCP--Transportation costs for personnel are the costs of flying mechanics to and
from stations requiring support and are given by the expression:
To p = (TFHC x RSV T) + (TSHC x TST)
where t
TCP = cost per round trip, 1984 dollars
WHO = charter flight cost per hour multiplied by jet-to-charter
flight speed ratio of 4
400 (in 1980 dollars)
RSFT = round trip jet scheduled flight time in hears
TSHC	 transportation standby cost in dollars/hour
20 (in 1980 dollars)
TST = transportation standby time in hours
5.3.4 Tax Adjustments
Tax adjustments (TA) that apply to fault-tolerant flight control systems may consist
of three tax entities as shown below. The following paragraphs describe ITC, TDA,
and INC.
TA = ITC + TDA + INC
For airlines that are not in a position to take advantage of tax credits because of
Inadequate income, a new provision is required for ACES to eliminat: all tax adjust-
ments. Selecting the alternative to a lease (sec. 5.2.3, CLP) eliminates ITC and TDA.
ITC--Investment tax credit for airplanes and capitalized equipment (except
F buildings) procured between January 25, 1975 and January 1, 1981, a U.S. credit
of 10 percent of the basis value may be deducted from tax that would otherwise
be paid. The 1978 Congressional tax bill makes the 10 percent ITC permanent for
1931 (and on) subject to the limitations detailed with the formula for ITC. The ITC
can be derived from the formula:
1TC = IT£' x (ICAP + MRS + ICGS + ICST + ICTNI + OTHER)
where;
ITF = investment tax credit factor (0.1 from Jan. 25, 1975)
I
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ICAP, IC 2S, ICGS, [CST, ICRE, and ICTM are defined under investment costs (sec.
5.3.2). The amount of investment tax credit that can be claimed is limited to $25,000
60 percent of tax in excess of $25,000 during 1979, and the percentage increases
each year as shown below:
•	 1979--60 percent
•	 1980-70 percent
•	 1981--80 percent
•	 1982--90 percent
The assumption is made that sufficient tax is paid to take advantage of all credits as
they occur except for the two new options detailed under TA above.
TDA—Tax Depreciation Allowance--Under Advanced Revision P oceduee 76-37 (IRS-
1690)( 22), air transport equipment used in commercial and contract carrying of
pµssengers and freight may be depreciated in as little as 9.5 years for equipment
purchased after April 15, 1976. For design study purposes, a tax depreciation life of
10 years will be used. Each years depreciation may be treated as an expense that is
deductible from pretax income. Since corporate tax on U.S. income consists of 46
percent Federal taxes plus approximately 2 percent State taxes, the tax depreciation
allowance is equivalent to a 48-percent credit of each year's depreciation. For design
studies, tax depreciation allowance is calculated from the formula.
TDA = TDF x 0.48 x (ICAP + ICRS + ICGS + ICST + ICTM + OTHER)
x,
where the tax depreciation factor, TDF, is obtained from Table 13 and ICAP, etc., can
be obtained from preceding definitions under IC (investment cost).
For those airlines unable to take advantage of the fastest allowable depreciation
because of tax carryovers or anticipated losses, provision will be made for the user to
provide his own values for Table 13 for up to 15 years. Note that Table 13 depreciates
equipment to a zero residual value and any cash received on retirement will be taxed
as regular income
Table 13. Tax Depreciation Schedule
Year Tax depreciation factor
1 0.2000
2 0.1600
3 0.1422
4 0.1244
5 0.1067
6 0.0889
7 0.0711
8 0,0533
9 0.0356
10 0.0178
1b,
Note: With double declining balence and	 j
switch to sum of the years' digits
in the third year,
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iNote ,also that ordinary and necessary expenditures paid or incurred during the year for
repairs to depreciable property are allowable expenses and are deductible for the
curror a year. Expenditures during the year that substantially prolong the life of the
property, or that increase its value or adapt it to a different use, are ordinarily
classified as capital expenditures and are recovered through annual depreciation
deductions over the useful We of the property. For example, after 50,000 flight hours
an airplane undergoes a major structural overhaul that extends its Life for another
30,000 hours. The depreciated value of the airplane then would be increased by th-,
cost of the work and treated as an investment under ICAP,
INC—Federal and State income taxes for design studies are at 48 percent of gross
Income less allowable expenses. It may be assumed that all costs included in OC (sec.
5.3.$3 are allowable. Therefore, by subtracting allowable expenses before calculating
income tax, the impact of operating costs is reduced and can be treated as a credit on
costs and a debit on benefits. ACES requires no change.
5.3.5 Retirement Costs and Credits
Equipment retirement may be planned to take place at the end of its useful life, or it
may be premature as a result of obsolescence or failure. Both costs and income may
result from retirement. Standard accounting practice assumes that net salvage
receipts at the end of the planned life (RAGE) will be 10 percent of the original
equipment price after all retirement expenses have been paid. However, further work
is required to check the validity of the 10 percent assumption, and it is clearly
inappropriate to use it for equipment prematurely surplused before obsolescence or
wearout.
NRC--Net retirement credit may be estimated from the formula:
NRC = RS + RP
where:
RC = retirement net dollars/fleet in the year of retirement
RS = retirement sales income, dollars /fleet for the year of retirement
RP = retirement preparation cost for overhaul, refurbishing, and
inspection, dollars/fleet in the year of occurrence
If, at the time of retirement, the value of NRGexceeds the depreciated value used for
depreciation tax credit, the net. difference is taxed as a benefit. ACES does not have
a subroutine to calculate NRC.
5.3.6 Operating Benefits (OB)
Positive cash flows produced by a given FTFCS are defined as operating benefits.
Positive cash flows might be generated as a result of:
•	 Increased payload for a specified range
•	 Increased range for a specified payload
	
a
•	 Increased passenger appeal (and demand) as a result of improved ride quality and
dispatch reliability
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Provision will be made for the analyst to input benefits of a ; : cific fault-tolerant
system configuration into the CBDOM in units of dollars (of a specified year) per
flight hour for flights of a given length. In addition, the ratio of flight hour-to-flight
cycle benefit must be specified so that a benefit per flight hour for flights of any
length can be calculated. Thus, the assessment of benefits will be external to the
CBDOM, at least until the proposed Phase Ill of this study, when consideration could
be given to incorporating features for evaluation of increased payload, range, and ride
quality.
Entities that decrease costs, such as reduced weight, reduced drag, improved flight
plan scheduling, reduced maintenance, or fewer delays, are normally included as
operating costs (OC).
5.3.7 Economic Risk Analysis
For the CBDOM, risk is defined as the probability that the ROI is less than the MARR.
The ability to perform sensitivity analyses and risk analyses will be provided for the
combination of the O&M simulation and the modified ACES economic analysis. The
method entails two steps:
Step 1--punning the CBDOM until the optimum FTFCS configuration has been identi-
fied based on point estimates for user-supplied input.
Step 2--Varying component reliability, repair time, and purchase price about their
average value to produce probability distributions for ROI and after--tax disposable
Income.
The above procedure might well produce the situation illustrated in Figure 15, where
the configuration with the greatest ROI also has the greatest probability of being less
than the MARR. The CBDOM user must make the final selection.
• Configuration (1)
	
. Configuration (2)
Return on
investment
MOO M
Minimum attractive
rate a return
0
• Probability density for ROI (1)
	 .Probability donsit for AOi (2)
..	 Y
Figure 15 Risk Analysis
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5.4 OPTIMIZATION
IncorDorating all optimization method is an essential featu
the number of design variables possible with FTFCS.
5.4.1 The Optimization Problem
The FTFCS simusintion output can be viewed as a response function, whereby feasible
input variable values are converted into output or response variable values. However?
this function cannot be defined analytically due to the complex nature of the
simulation. Very little is known about its mathematical form (i.e., the shape of the
functional surface in multi-dimensional space). However, some general observations
can be made.
It is reasonable to infer that the functional relationship between FTFCS simulation
output variables and input variables is both nonlinear and discontinuous. Consider any
cost benefit measurement variables (outputs) that are optimization candidates, such as
profit, ROI, risk (the probability of achieving less than the MARR), and payback point.
According to the simulation, the cost benefit measurement variables are functions of
configuration variables (inputs) such as labor, maintenance equipment, and FTFCS
components; i.e., clocks, memories, processors, sensors, etc. Due to the complex
iL nature of the simulation logic, the explicit form of these functional relationships is
unknown. The prudent a priori assumption is to expect the simulation response surface
to be quite irregular; i.e., highly nonlinear. Moreover, many of the configuration
variables can assume only integer values (e.g., the number of actuators, sensors, and
computers in an FTFCS configuration). This means that the functional relation
between simulation inputs and outputs is inherently discontinuous.
The selection of an optimization procedure must be guided by these response surface
characteristics. Success requires building carefully on a simple, robust optimization
method that can provide results in a variety of simulation environments. As discussed
in Section 5.4.3, the Nelder and Mead method appears to provide the required capabil-
ity and is a point of departure for optimization methods development in Phase 11.
To solve for optimum FTFCS design parameters, the method minimizes or maximizes
one cost benefit response function (such as profit) subject to constraints oil tile others
(such as payback point or risk). The optimization is an iterative process, with the
optimizer interrogating the simulator for performance estimates at revised values ofi
the configuration variables. Figure 4 depicts the general optimization procedure.
The ability of the optimizing procedure to effectively handle a discontinuous and
nonlinear response surface is of little consequence, unless it has a credible response
surface to explore. The issue of response surface credibility originates from two
sources: the model variability and the model sensitivity or conditionin g.0
The issue of model variability is inherent to the type of simulation model. The
CBDOM is a stochastic or Monte Carlo simulation, meaning that model outputs
depend, in part, on the outcome of probabilistic phenomena simulated by the model
logic. Consequently, for any f ixed set of model input assumptions, a range of resultant
values is possible for each cost benefit measurement variable (output).
For clarification, consider that faults to FTFCS components occur within the model as
the result of a sampling from specified probability distributions. Total system
operating cost, and thus profit, depend on FTFCS component failures. Therefore, in
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statistical parlance, total system cost is a random variable since it is a function of
FTFCS component failure, which is itself a random variable. This means that total
systenroperating cost for aseries of equal time increments (such as a series of yearly
observations) will not be equal, even though all input values are initialized to identical
values at the start of each simulated year. At issue here is the question of which
output value, from the realm of possibilities, to use for defining the response surface
which will be optimized. The answer is provided by running the CBDOM a number of
times under identical input assumptions and using the sequoce of resultant values to
estimate the "expected" value of each cost benefit measurement variable; e.g.,
expected total system operating cost. The estimated "expected" value is computed by
means of a statistical average.
The issue of response surface credibility due to the inherent model variability concerns
the number of observations that must be taken for each fixed-input scenario to obtain
a credible estimate of each cost benefit measurement variable's expected value. The
intent of this discussion is not to explore solutions to this question, which is largely
influenced by two current unknowns: the cost per computer run and the magnitude of
variation in the observed output values. Rather, it is to stress that confidence in a
computed optimal solution to the CBDOM is highly dependent on having a credible
response surface for the optimizing procedure to explore, albeit discontinuous and
nonlinear. Thus, it is important that the simulation represents the real world in
sufficient detail to produce confidence in its validity, since the model may subsequent-
ly be used for experiments that the real world would be unwilling to perform.
5.4.2 Response Surfkz---e Conditioning
The kited of model instability in parametric analyses that might impact the optimi-
zation can be illustrated with a simple example. Suppose the model calculates a value
for a performance measure y = f(x) for any value x of an input design variable. For
example, y could be a cost benefit measure for FTFCS designs and x could be the
number of computer memory units used in a design. Further, suppose that the proce-
dure for calculating y = Ax) values incorporates a major branch in the logical pathway
through the calculations. An example of this would be the choice of paths in the
computational flow of the repair shop model. For each value of x input to the model,
the computations proceed to a certain point. At this point, the simulation program
logic must decide which of two computational paths it must follow to complete the
calculation of f(x). The choice of which paths (Al or Al t for example) to follow may
strongly affect the outcome of the simulation and, thus, the calculated f(x) value..
Let the path designation be represented by the logical variable A, -which takes on the
value Al or A2 depending on the computational path to be followed. Since this choice
is a function of the input variable x, A can be represented by a functional relationship
A=g(x), where g(x) ranges over the two values Al and A2. The question arises: How
systematic is this variation between Al
 and A2 as x varies over its allowed range of
values of, say, 1 to 10? Since g(x) is assumed to have a large effect on f(x) and the
overall parametric relationship y = f(x) is to be explored ex post facto by the
optimization method, then, hopefully, g(x) varies between its two values in a well-
behaved, systematic way.
Suppose Path Al tends to produce high f(x) values and Path A2 tends to produce low
f(x) values. A potentially good situation is for the choice g(x) = A2 to occur over some
small range of consecutive values of x (say, x = 3, 4, and 5) and for g(x) = Al to occur
for all other values (in this case, x = 1 1 21
 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10). This would be ideal (and
probably lucky) if the effects of all the other logic in the simulation correlated
1
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Figure 16. Separate Effects of g (x) and h (x)
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positively with the effect that the g(x) choice had on f(x). In this case, a systematic
overall variation is. attained, with f(x) varying through uniformly high values for x = 1
and 2, then through high values again for x 6, ?, 8, 9, and 10. This is illustrated in
Figures 16 and 17.
Cost benefit
effects of x
qix)=Al
Al
,, h (x)
Cost benefit
effects of x
	
i	 s
0	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 g	 9
x
Figure 17. Combined Effects of f (x) = g (x) + h (x)
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Figure 16 illustrates the two hypothetical effects mentioned. The g(x) effect on f(x) is 1,	 +
represented by two horizontal 'lines corresponding to the differing magnitudes of Ox)
values that the paths Al and A2 tend to produce. The actual dependence relationship
of Ox) on A= g(x) will actually be quite compiicated, and the figure merely illustrates
the overall effect oil For example, the horizontal lines could represent
the average f(x) value resulting from the corresponding choice. The effect of all other
logic paths through computations independent of A are grouped together into the h(x)
curve shown. The Ax) value at each x is a function of the g(x) effect together with the
h(x) value, and a hypothetical "resultant" curve for y = f(x) is shown in Figure 17. In
this example, the g(x) and h(x) effects are positively correlated, and the composite
relationship in Figure 17 appears systematic (regardless of the large jumps in f(x))
thanks to the systematic behavior of g(x).
In practice, not one, but several, design variables x1, x2, x3 9 etc. are to be varied
simultaneously in a parametric study that may involve more than one dependent output
variable fl(xl, x2, x3, - * .), f2(Xl, X2, x3r . • .), etc. Furthermore, the logic, includingPathways Al and A2, may be rerun many times in a Monte Carlo fashion to produce an
expectation value for f(x), and this value is to be optimized. This means that the
anticipation of ill effects, such as nonsystematic behavior of an effect like g(x), can,
in general, be difficult and may be prohibitive. The point is that these phenomena
must be controlled as much as possible during design of the simulation model.
Consideration of the parametric effects during the simulation model design and testing
phases will contribute valuable insights to help produce a reliable model. Over-
emphasis on isolated design-point simulation objectives can result in a model that
contains computational instabilities. Parametrically, these instabilities appear as
erratic behavior when input parameters such as x are exercised over some range of
values.
The operation of the parameter optimization procedure on the computer is illustrated
in Figure 18. The complexity of the simulation logic indicates that a fully automatic
optimization may not be possible and is probably not desirable for the envisioned
simulator model. Each simulation at a single design _point will produce a great deal of
information other than the performance function values f(x). Engineering screening
analysis of these data may be necessary to judge the quality of the simulation and may
be helpful in running the optimization program. For example, it may be desirable to
use manual screening to eliminate infeasible or poorly performing designs, thereby
perhaps augmenting the optimization method.
The optimization procedure on the computer is illustrated in Figure 18 as an inter
-active process alternating between the simulation and optimization programs to carry
out the iterative optimization toward a solution. The output from each simulation is
screened manually, then transmitted to the optimization program via a shared data
base. The optimization program then computes a candidate design point to be eval-
uated by the simulator in the next iteration. With manual screening of the simulator
output and interactive transmission of data between the two programs, it may be
useful to have the optimization program provide a list of more than one candidate
design. The engineering analyst then can select the design most likely to succeed from
an engineering standpoint. Thus, the optimization program carries out the routine
computations and serves as an aid to economical engineering.
5.4.3 Simplex
The nonlinear simplex minimization method advanced by Spendley et al. (12) and
modified by Nelder and Mead(13 ) is the baseline optimization model for this analysis.'
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Figure 18. Optimization Procedure
Further investigation will add to this model or replace it if the model structure reveals
a better method. Simplex is illustrated by the flow diagram in Figure 19 and the
Figure 20 illustration that shows its search pattern options in a configuration space of
two dimensions. The method illustrated in these figures is meant for optimization
over a configuration space where the independent configuration design variables X can
take on real values and are not restricted to integer values. Thus, it will have to be
modified somewhat.
A simplex is a polygon having the fewest number n + 1 of vertices in n-dimensional
space. In two dimensions, it is a triangle and in three dimensions, it is a tetrahedron.
Function values f(X) can be found for each of the n + 1 vertices by evaluating f at each
	
I
of the corresponding sets of configuration variables. Linear interpolation- or
extrapolation is a valid procedure in a configuration space region containing the
current simplex, because the vertices provide just enough sample points to fit a linear
model in the n variables X. The nonlinear simplex method uses what is, perhaps, the
safest strategy in difficult minimization problems. This strategy is to reflect a vertex
X having the maximum function value f = f(X) through the centroid X of the opposite
face of the current simplex. Should the new vertex X*, obtained by reflection, have a
lower function value f*, it could be retained to form a new simplex. Thus, an undesir-
able vertex is discarded and a new simplex is formed by using the other n vertices(which also were used to define the centroid X) together with the new vertex. This is
the basic si[nplex search step.
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The method goes on to the various other options (see fig. 19 and 20)--expansion,
contraction, or slits inkage--depending on how the value f* compares with f and the
other n f-values. However, the imposition of constraints and the requirement that the
search steps use only vertices from the n-dimensional grid where the X variables take
on integer values will bring about further modifications.
5.4.4 Application of Simplex
Stability and adaptability are important when selecting a simplex as a baseline optimi-
zation method. The simplex is stable in that, to a_large degree, it responds well to
difficult problems that have badly conditioned variables. It is adaptable in that it
responds relatively well to having its basic unconstrained search pattern modified;
e.g., to obey constraints on the solution variables. It is felt that this adaptability
extends to restricting its search to a grid in configuration space where the configura-
tion variables X1 i X2 f X3, . . . (e.g., X1 = number of processors, X2 number of
memories, X3 = number of clocks, . . . ) can have only non-negative integer values (see
fig. 21).
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Suppose there are n configuration variables X and they each have m possible values.
An optimum (minimum, maximum) value for the objective function f(Xi, X2, . .
(for exam ple, f = profit) must be found. Were the search process to be by simple
enumeration, all of the m n conceivable grid points representin g
 combinations of
integral X values would have to be searched. Thus, for n = 10 configuration para
meters having, for example, m = 4 values each, f would have to be evaluated (i.e., the
simulator would have to be rerun) at 4 10 design 'points, clearly an astronomical
number. If the simplex is at all successful in making progress toward an optimum, it
should be possible to make reasonable progress toward an optimum with comparatively
few evaluations, t,npefull y on the order of A If n 10, this would mean some mu lti
-ple of 100 evaluations via the simulation program, clearly an improvement over the
astronomical 4
The important point for an optimization problem like this is that simplex is robust (it
will make some 'progress toward an optimum under a wide range of conditions). This
makes it a good choice for problems that may cause most optimization algorithms to
fail outright.
There is still one cautionary point: no algorithm exists for finding a global optimum in
ti	 obiem (except si : :,ple enumeration of m n values
k'.
L
the general nonlinear opt miza on pr
tt
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In thegrid search mentioned above). Thus, simplex Is (like all known Iterative
methods) really a local search method. Unless the optimization problem is known to
be convex, there may well be local optima, and the presence of constraints makes this
doubly likely. Again, exploring the problem structure by further analyzing the
simulation model may help to guarantee a global optimum. Currently, it Is thought
possible that local optima will have to be accepted, depending on how much computer
run time can be allotted to exploring the possible different local optima in the searael)
for a global solution.
5.4.5 Sensitivity Analysis
Locating isolated optima may not be as important in FTFCS configuration exploration
as detet-mining the overall parametric behavior of cost benefit functions over the
space of configuration variables. Simplex has logical extensions to aidin exploring
parametric trends around an optimum. For a good discussion of the 
I 
ruicaneif'	 e ofty
A inplex and the types of analysis It makes possible, see Spendley et al
.Z 
M. The final
form of a sensitivity analysis for FTFCS parametric studies will be closely tied to the
results of optimization methods development.
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6.0 AIRLINE REVIEW
During this study, United and Delta Airlines reviewed the preliminary drafts of the
Cost and benefit 'Design Optimization Model (CEDOM) requirements and specification
and provided a number- of comments and suggestions. Most of these comments are now
reflected in this document; the comments not incorporated in preceding sections
express concerns that are answered below. Airline comments are shown in quotation
marks.
6.1 DELTA AIRLINES' REVIEW
The CIDOM concepts were reviewed by four members of Delta's Engineering
Performance and Analysis Group, who critiqued the model as follows;
1. "The scope of the economic model, like the cost/benefit optimization model in
toto, is ambitious In trying to represent accurately the real world. The economic
modeling procedures appear to be both accurate and sufficient. If the underlying
assumptions for much of the input were not so subjective by nature, the model
could be excellent. 	 However, that subjectiveness and the current lack of
documentation for such factors as risk and inflation make the modeling highly
susceptible to distortion." '=
Answer:	 It Is agreed that factors such as inflation can significantly bias
operating costs and affect the optimization results, particularly for design
features that can be made either capital- or labor-intensive.	 None of the
econometric models, which might be used as a source for inflation rates, have
performed satisfactorily in recent years. 	 For instance, in 1978 ) Chaset23^
predicted a 1979 Comsumer Price Index increase of 6.4 percent, which was in
error by a factor of two.	 About the best that can be done is to use different
inflation rate assumptions and use "judgment" to select one of the optimized i
configurations that result.
2. "Methods of financing do not appear to be relevant to the decision criterion." -'`a1
t
Answer:	 Different methods of financing affect the tax credits that can be
claimed, as well as cash flow timing.
	
Like inflation, they can perturb the
optimized design by changing the present equivalent ratio of capital- and labor-
dependent cash flows. 	 Apart from their possibly important influence, little 1
additional complexity results from including debt and lease funding as analyst J
options.
3. "Cancellation penalty should be defined.	 Substantiation is required for chart
showing "passengers lost through cancellation (Appendix XXI); 	 A delay would
incur definable cost quantities such as additional fuel burn and Crew pay time,
but these
ld 	
ubjective
and goodwill.
	
Frankly obtain n
y
g au
	
within a osinpgle sa rline
re
netiley ►
appropriate economic penalty would be remote, much less within the industry.
Further, there can be a benefit to a flight delay, for whatever reason, which
accommodates connecting passengers who might otherwise have missed a flight;
if the cost of a delay/cancellation is to be considered by Boeing, then this 'Y
tradeoff should also be explored."
Answer: Appendix ,XI now provides details of the current method of calculating
both delay` and cancellation costs. 	 An updating of the delay and cancellation k
cost method has been suggested as a Phase 11 project (sec. 7.4) and would include
an assessment of passengers gained as well as lost.
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4. TAU cost reporting criteria should be the baseline with capability for the user
to modify the input quickly and easily to reflect Its own operatloop as for
aircraft life, residual value."
Answer: CAB Form 41 cost entities are not conveniently defined for design
optimization purposes. For instance, delay costs, as defined in this documento
consist of costs that would be reported in several CAB Form 41 accounts. Spares
holding cost, which Is important for design optimization, is lost in CAB accounts
for Burden. It would be possible, for airline convenience, to reformat cost
entities In the CBDOM to look more like CAB Form 41 entities, and such a task
could be reconsidered for Phase III work.
6.2 UNITED AIRLINES' REVIEW
The United review team consisted of the Director of Maintenance Analysis and
representatives o
'
the Controller's Offioe and Maintenance Engineering. Comments
from United not incorporated elsewhere in this document are as follows:
I. "The overall cost analysis shown in Appendix IX Is acceptable for illustration
purposes only. It has at least two problems that need treatment before such an
analysis carries a persuasive Impact:
a# The selling point of tho Fault Tolerant project is the rate of return on
investment, as covered in Appendix IX. The problem with the exhibited
analysis Is that it is a fractionel. approach. Our experience is that when
only a part of a program is considered it is difficult to keep costs and
savings synchronized. Also, frequently savings in one part may accompany
added costs in another. The acknowledgement of this fact is made in the
comments of Appendix IX, and perhaps the final package will be accept-
able. However, to emphasize our point, when benefits or costs are being
used relating to Fuel/Weight ratios, Delay/Cancellations, airplane insur-
ance, and these factors are the principal areas of economic value, one is
always suspicious as to whether be would agree wil th the method of appor-
tioning the costs and savings. We would certainly want to see a total
analysis."
Answer: Appendix IX was Intended as an example of the type of economic
analysis intended for the CBDOM and contains many approximations and
assumptions that will be eliminated by the CBDOM simulation. Concern
over cost estimating relationships, also expressed by Delta Airlines in
Sections 6.1, items 1 and 3, should be alleviated by the work proposed in
Section 7.4 for delays and cancellations. Developin g
 cost-estimating
relationships for fuel burned is a simple task by comparison with that for
delays. Errors incurred by using fuel costs from Table 8 might be
eliminated by More detailed methods of performance analysis, possibly in
the proposed Phase III of this study.
b. "Frequently when basic changes in unit reliability are made the removal
rate undergoes a change, but not as great as was anticipated . . ..I would
like to see some test cases performed before a commitment is made to
accept results of this model."
Answer- Considerable emphasis will be placed upon model validation in the
Phase Ii study. Economic sensitivity to errors in reliability prediction also
will be possible (sec. 5.3.6).
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2. "The use of 'present equivalent value' as the basis for economic comparison
alternatives is a valid procedure and should give adequate results in this
particular model. The various parameters of the economic evaluation program
used in the model are comprehensive and reasonable, as far as we can determine,
Overhead costs and the application of overhead rates to direct labor dollars are
acceptable to United. However, the use of a standard 25 percent invento ►y
carrying cost would not be acceptable to United for other than as illustration of
method--as in the model description."
Answer; The spares holding cost detailed in Section 5.3.3 under SH was based
upon a survey of domestic airlines made by the Contractor in 1975, for which all
responses except one were in the range of 22 to 25 percent. Confirmation of this
result could be considered as a Phase lI or III task of this study.
3. "This is an ambitious project, considering the level of detail that will be
modeled. Hopefully the cost of computer run time can b y held to a level that
would permit use of the model by the airlines. If the program is to be transport-
able to airline, airframe, avionic manufacturers, exotic extensions to FORTRAN
should be avoided."
Answer: The economic analysis routine and optimization routine are modifica-
tions of existing FORTRAN programs. however, development of an operations
and maintenance simulation with adequate detail would be an almost impossible
task in FORTRAN. SIMSCRIPT, the language chosen for the simulation, permits
structured, well documented programs to be written. In addition, it has been the
intent to specify a simulation model that can be tailored to most airline
environments without programming changes.
E
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7.0 PHASE II
7.1 PHASE H OBJECTIVES
The requested objectives for Phase II were as follows:
"This phase will refine the model requirements and specifications to reflect
current knowledge and experience. Data required, but not available, will be
collected. A computer program implementing the model specifications will be
generated and validated using information on current conventional flight control
systems in accordance with Exhibit B. (Exhibit B is Langley Research Center's
Computer Programming and Documentation Specification, October 7, 1376.)
These and perhaps additional computer runs will be structured to provide a
preliminary sensitivity analysis."
The work performed during Phase I of this study does not indicate any change to the
objectives of Phase II, except that Exhibit 3 calls for the use of FORTRAN. The
programming effort will be substantially reduced by using SIMSCRIPT (whieh is also
available to NASA Langley). SIMSCRIPT is, therefore, We recommended programming
language for Phase 1;1.
72 PHASE II, FTFCS OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE SIMULATION
The primary concern for Phase II is the unknown cost of running a computer simulation
of fault-tolerant flight control system(FTFCS) operation and maintenance. While the
SIMSCRIPT simulations produced in Phase I were inexpensive in terms of computer
time, this may not be the case for the comprehensive Phase II simulation that is
initially required for validation. A secondary concern is the impossibility of
optimizing FTFCS packaging without applying constraints to the possible packaging
combinations. This secondary concern also arises from the cost of repeatedly running
the computer simulation for FTFCS packaging alternatives.
With these two concerns in mind, the first task for Phase II is to program and validate
the O&M simulation so that its running cost can be established. Sections 7.2.1, 7.2.2,
7.2.3, and 7.2.4 provide details of the proposed work.
7.2.1 Computer System Design (Simulation and Economic Analysis)
•	 Develop system data flow diagrams for the new and existing computer programs
required for the model.
•	 Produ-- progra in structure definitions and hierarchical input, process, and output
charts.
•	 Develop a model test plan:
7.2.2 Computer Program Design
•	 Produce a data dictionary and program psuedocode for new and changed
programs.
•
•
Design input and output formats.
Define the ran a of variables and roaram Ain nosticsg	 p	 g
r
t
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!	 e	 Code and document the program.
•	 Develop a test data stream for model testing.
7.2.3	 Program Testing
'	 •	 Exercise each module of the model over the range of each variable and compare
the result with the expected output.
•	 Check the sequencing, control, and data transfer to and from each module of the
t	 model and trace events and processes in the simulation. i
7.2.4
	 First Model Validation
•	 Using data collected, oil 	 NAS1.-15588( 24) and -13654( 25), show that the t
model produces dispatch reliability, investment, and operating costs that agree
with one airline's B747 aetuals. Validation inputs shall consist of route structure,
itinerary, fleet size, and resource quantities such as mechanics, test equipment,
and spares.
5
s	 Analyse discrepancies and modify the requirements, specification, and program:
as necessary.
I	 7.3	 OPTIMIZATION
i
The nonlinear simplex method developed by Nelder and Mead (12) will be the baseline
method for optimization. 	 A FORTRAN program already exists for Nelder and Mead
optimization.
	 However, the optimization of such FTFCS features as packaging may
well require development of a method of imposing constraints to reduce the number of
configurations that require evaluation (and simulation). 	 In addition, the very discrete
► 	 nature of variables, such asquantity of test equipment, entails the use of integer value y
vertices from a multidimensional 	 r_..^g	 instead of the continuous variables. normally
used with the Nelder and Mead method. 	 The proposed Phase II work to develop an
optimization routine for the Cost and Benefit Design Optimization Model (CBDOM)
that handles integer, constrained problems is provided in Sections 7.3.1 through 7.3.3.
7.3.1	 Exploratory Studies
•	 Examine bounds, range and types of variables, possible constraints, and methods
of restructuring the CBDOM to simplify the optimization.
•	 In parallel with system and computer program design, modify and test the
effectiveness of the optimization method using a limited portion of the CBDOM
consisting of the repair shop simulation and ACES provisioning routine.
a
•	 Investigate and document potential techniques for reducing simulation variance
and select an appropriate method for the CBDOM.
•	 When	 the	 CBDOM sensitivity studies have 	 been completed,	 reassess' the
effectiveness	 of the	 optimization	 method used and recommend justifiable
improvements.
.x
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7.3.2	 Final Programming
Provide details required for documentation of the finalized design as specified in
Sections 7.2.1 1 7.2.2, and 7.2.3.
7.3.3	 Second Model Validation
{
Using the validation case(s) from Sections 7.2.4, perform an optimization and check the
results for validity with airline personnel.
7.4	 DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS
E
Much of the data regyyit d for model validation has been collected as part of NASA
Contract NAS1-15588( 25).	 Additional data are required to determine avionic repair
shop work load and to obtain a better resolution of the cost of delays and cancella-
tions.	 It also is possible that additional data might be needed if differences occur
during model validation.
7.4.1	 Delay and Cancellation Data Collection
•	 Obtain data on the number of passengers lost or gained as a result of delays and
cancellations and determine the correlation with delay length, time of day, type a
of flight (business or discretionary), station traffic density, and station type (hub,
through stop or satellite).
•	 Determine the extent of the disruption in schedules following a cancellation and
method of recovery.
t (Depending upon the success of the Phase II model, further work on less tangible l
aspects of delay and cancellation costs might be accomplished as part of Phase III.)
7.4.2	 Repair Shop Data{
Obtain avionic and hydraulic repair shop statistics for model validation.
7.4.3	 Retirement Costs and Credits
Obtain data on the retirement costs and credits for flight control or other relevant
r	
equipment that is surplused as a result of design improvements.
4	 7.5	 PRELIMINARY SENSITIVITY STUDY
0	 Determine the effect on airline profit of independontiy changing design control-
lable input parameters using the validation case input data as a baseline.
•	 Perform a B747 WLA Cost Benefit Analysis and compare these results with
previous estimates.
	 Modify the requirements, program, and specification a3
r	 necessary. i
7.6	 MODEL IMPLEMENTATION
S
#
Install, test and demonstrate the CBDOM program,c,n Langley Researoh Center's
Cyber, CDC-6000 series computers.
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rAPPENDIX I
LETTER-CHECK DEFINITIONS
The description of the work content associated with letter checks has been included to
explain the scenario for accomplishing FTFCS maintenance and inspection at
opportunities that occur for the rest of the airplane. The checks at which scheduled
and unscheduled maintenance may occur are PF, AF, T-check, A-check, B-check, and
C-check, and are defined as follows:
PREFLIGHT CHECK (PF)
A preflight check is accomplished by the flight crew prior to departure using a
preflight checklist.
AFTER FLIGHT (AF)
Crew debriefing occurs at each station with maintenance resources, immediately after
flight, and consists of the administration time for establishing the work to be
accomplished on failures that are visible to the crew since the last debriefing.
T-CHECK (TRANSIT)
Transit checks include:
•	 Nonroutine maintenance, chronic items, deferred ; rork, and special callouts
•
	
	
Visual check from the ground of the fuselage, empennage, wings, and engines for
obvious damage or irregularities
ij
•
	
	 Check of tire pressure and tire wear if not previously accomplished on the same 	 a
calendar day
•	 Check of fire extinguisher discharge discs
A-CHECK
A-checks include all transit checks plus:
•	 Check oil levels and service if required
•	 Check brake wear and change if required
•	 Check oxygen and replenish as necessary
•	 Check and clean static vents
B-CHUCK 1
A B-check consists of all work accomplished during a T-check and A-check and, in
addition, contains the following:
G ;'	 •	 Check of engine and APU inlets, guide vanes, compressor,, chip detectors,
w
	
	 tailpipe interior, and thrust reverser. Inspection for cracks, damage or other
irregularities
a	 Check of interior for obvious irregularities
C	 ,
•	 Check oxygen system
•	 Detailed check of landing bear and brakes
I-1
Y
•	 Check of interior for obvious irregularities
•	 Check oxygen system
•	 Detailed check of landing gear and brakes
•	 Check emergency lights, pneumatic and fu
•	 Check for fuel and oil leaks
•	 Remove and check filters
•	 Check INS battery charger
•	 Check VOR/ILS calibration
•	 Voice recorder audit, check
•	 Flight recorder tape readout check
•	 Lubricate controls
Some of the above items are not included in every B-check.
C-CHECK
C-checks provide time in the hangar for accomplishing all types of maintenance. Ten
C-checks will encompass every kind of planned, scheduled maintenance.
r t
J
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jAPPENDIX It
AIRLINE COST ESTIMATION SYSTEM (ACES)
The Airline Cost Estimation System is a system of programs for determining tike costs
to an airline of owning and operating parts, assemblies, or subsystems on airplanes. It
is a tool for designers of airplane equipment to compare the airline life-cycle costs of
design alternatives,
`l'he system takes as input:.
•	 Cost and reliability data of parts comprising the design alternatives
•	 Time frame of the fleet operation
•	 Airplane and fleet operating characteristics
•	 Airline operational and economic parameters
•	 Financial climate during the fleet operating period
Output of the results of a typical analysis is shown in Figurer, B-1 and B-2.
Figure B-1 is the summary of costs for one design alternative. (The numbers in
p^rentheses refer to the circles in the figures,)
(1) Selected input parameters
(2) Investments (itemized)
(3) Operating costs (itemized)
(4) Retirement costs
(5) Tax adjustments
(6) Totat cost of ownership
Figure B-2 shows the results of comparing the costs for nine design alternatives:
(7) Baseline alternative that has the minimum investment(8) Sum of the present equivalent values of the total yearly costs(9) Sum of the present equivalent values of the total yearly investments(10) Extra return on investment (EROI) relative to the baseline alternative(11) Payback years for alternatives costing less than the baseline
Other outputs of cost results that are not shown in Figures B -1 and B-2 include, for
each design alternative, a yearly itemization of:
•	 Total costs (both tabular and graphical)
•	 Investments
•	 Operating costs
•	 Retirement costs
•	 Investment tax credits
•	 Tax allowance for depreciation
Outputs comparing cumulative cash flows and cumulative present equivalent values of
total costs of each design alternative with the baseline alternative are available in
tabular and graphical forms.
The system programs are designed to be used with the CDC standard operating system,
specifically the Network Operating System (NOS), They were developed using the
Boeing CDC 6600 and CYBER computers. The programs may be used interactively
from remote keyboard terminals,
(l1
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Input data may be assembled by the user on forms provided. Output is Printed at the
user's terminal immediately after input is completed.
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ANALYST	 M J OHARE OP-27.
	
AIRPLANE MODEL 727
INVESTMENT ASSUMPTIONS FOR CASE VEN-F-VSC/ OF DESIGN V$Cr-VS-IC
RASE YEAR FOR EQUIVALENT VALUE
	 1977.
TAX RATE	 $0.00 PER CENT
INVESTMENT TAX CREDIT RATE
	 10.00 PER CENT
TAX DEPRECIATION LIFE
	
10 YEARS
USEFUL LIFC OF PROJECT
	 15 YEARS
EQUIPMENT LIFE	 15 YEARS
FLEET SIZE/YEAH
	 30.	 30.	 30.30.
INFLATION RATE/YEAR
	
8.00	 6.00	 8.00...	 6.00
MIN. ATTR. RATC or RET./YCAR. 15.00 15.00 15.00 ... 	 15.00
COST ANALYSIS - (SEE 06-42875 FOR DEFINITIONS)
CNTITY	 CUMULATIVE CUM. PRESENT PCXOF DOLLARS/
CASH FLOW E0. VAL(PEX) IC#OC FLT. HR.
INVESTMENTS•
` AIRPLANE S
	-2616885.	 -2816#63.	 49.1	 -2.04
NOTABLE SPARES
	 -2190614	 -219061.	 3.8	 -.16
EXPENDABLE SPARES
	 -57929.	 T32264.	 .4	 -.02
GROUND EQUIPMENT	 0.	 0.	 0.0	 0.00
SPECIAL TOOLS
	 -10000.	 -10000.	 .2	 -.01,
BUILDINGS
	 0.	 0.	 0.0	 0.00
RAMP EQUIPMENT	 0.	 0.	 0.0	 0.00
TRAINING EQUIPMENT
	 0.	 0.	 0.0	 0.00
MAINTENANCE MANUALS
	 176055.	 176055.	 3.1	 -.^3
OTHER	 0.	 0.	 0.0	 0. 0
OPERATING COSTSs
MAINT1 1A14CE LABOR
	 -211666.	 -79594.	 1.4	 -,06
MAINTENANCE MATERIAL
	 -695142.	 -267166.	 4.7	 -.19
MAINTENANCE BURDEN
	 852727.	 -326414.	 5.7	 -.24
SPARES HOLOtNG
	 -605021.	 223153.
	 3.9	 -.16
MAINTENANCE TRAINING
	 0.	 0.	 0.0	 0.00
FUEL/WEIGHT	 3108314.	 -11.72396.	 20.5	 -.85
DELAYS/CANCELLATIONS
	 -762338.	 317272.	 5.3	 -.23
AIRPLANE INSUNANCE
	 -211266.	 -94710.	 1.7
	
-.01
OTHER	
-17622.	 -6$06.
	 .1	 -.00
RETIREMENT COST:
NET CREDIT
	 0.	 0.	 0.00
TAXATION:
INVEST, TAX CREDIT	 322200.	 322200.	 .2J
DEPRECIATION CREDIT	 1522973.
	
1067798.	 .77
INCOME TAX PAYMENTS
	 0.	 0.	 0.00
TOTAL	
-7698153.	 -4341467.
	
100.0
The table output provides details of actual cash and present equivalent value (PE X)
of cash for various cost entities
j
Figure B-1
	
Example of Airline Cost Estimation System Output
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MINIMUM INVESTMENT COSTS OCCUR FOR CASE VCN-L+IDG
CASE PEXTCO PEXIC CR01 Pr
NAME SUM SUM, PERCENT YEARS
VCN-A-IOC 5316674. 3499371. -10.53 66.00'0000
VLN-^DG 7697161_. 5339011160 -8.42 66.6.*0046
VEti-C=1
-I
DG 6355405: 3616942. -10.92 061'•00•.6
VCN-0-IDG 4637164. 3163!42. +0.56 ••0010666•
VC1:-E-IDG 4756150. 3033105.1 0066600094 •••••••••'
VCN-r-IDO 4456670. 3245464.. 2.33 3.12
VCN-a-VSCr 61S).000. $741676. -6.36 •••••44••'
VLN-L-VSC► 9435122. 5227566. -9.92 •6600'6•'•
VLN-r-vscr 4341467. 3244265. 4,61 3.71
This example shows a cost of ownership comparison of a number of design alternatives for an electrncal
power generation system, Each case is compared to the case vM^ith the least investment cost and a
percent equivalent return on investment IERai) is calculated Us an increment above or below a 1540
minimum attractive rate of return WARR).
Figure B-2	 Example of Airline Cosc Estimation System Output
Two of the system programs may be executed alone.
The Spares Provisioning Program yields costs and quantities of economically repairable
spare parts and the probability of no stock-out during fleet operation.
The Delays and Cancellations Program computes the cost elements associated with
schedule interruptions caused by the parts comprising a design option.
The User's Guide for the system contains instructions, input forms, examples, a sample
S
i
run, and two complete airplane lists of economically repairable spares including cost
and reliability data.
I1-3
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APPENDIX III
AIRLINE OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE MODEL AS3031
PROGRAM DESCRIPTION
The Airline Operations and Maintenance Model has been developed and successfully
applied to several airlines for evaluating the effect of new or modified operational
and/or maintenance concepts and/or equipment on the overall performance of the
airline systems. The model simulates in detail the movements, of up to three types of
airplanes, as constrained by system geography, flight schedules, and operational and
maintenance policies. The model can be readily modified to closely simulate many
different airline systems. During a simulation run, the model generates statistical
distributions on pertinent parameters such as service delay times at system stations,
flight times between stations, and malfunction types. For each airplane type, the
i model is given the system failure retes, standard cumulative flight times between A,
B, C, and D routine maintenance, personnel requirements for routine maintenance and
for each subsystem malfunction repair, and mean repair times for each subsystem. To
assure a close approach to reality, each simulation run is made for a simulated time
period of 1, 2, or more years. System sensitivity to changes in operational and/or
maintenance variables can be evaluated by a series of parametric simulation runs. For
i '
	
	
a given. fleet, flight schedule configuration, and operational and maintenance policy,
the model produce, simulation results indicating airline operational performance in
V	 terms of:
•	 Mean flight departure delay times and distributions of delay times
0	 Airplane substitutions for scheduled flights 	 i
•	 Flight cancellations
•	 Airplane utilizations
•	 Maintenance personnel at each system station
•	 maintenance equipment at each system station 1
PROGRAM APPLICATIONS
The Airline Operations and Maintenance Model can be exercised in numerous ways to
evaluate the impact of different levels of system reliability and maintainability under
existing or proposed configurations of equipment, personnel, and policy. Basic model
	
5
applications include the evaluation of:
•	 Flight schedules
Maintenance policy
•	 Maintenance logistics
0	 Airline route analysis 	 3
•	 Airplane type comparisons
ROUTE/SCHEDULE STRUCTURES
Alternative flight routes and schedules may be evaluated for the impact they have on
dispatch reliability, flight deviations, airplane utilization, and maintenance personnel
and equipment utilization.
MAINTENANCE POLICY
Scheduled maintenance policy, as embodied in the definition of tasks to be accomplish-
ed during routine A, B, C, or D checks of airplanes in the fleet, can have a significant
effect on overall system reliability, maintainability, and profitability. Variations in-
q 1-1
LA
the task splits among the A t B, C, and D checks, or in the operational time periods
r	 between routine cheeks, can be tested in the model for impact on dispatch reliability.
AIRLINE ROUTE ANALYSIS
New routes, new schedules, additional airplanes, and additional 'maintenance personnel
and equipment can be integrated into the model to evaluate the impact on airplane
utilization, availability, and maintenance resources. 	 A series of simulation runs could
supply information relating to optimal additional airplanes, maintenance personnel and
equipment required, together with improved flight schedules for the expanded system.
AIRPLANE TYPE COMPARISON
Comparison of the system-wide effectiveness of two or three different types of
airplanes can be accomplished with the model. Two different airplane types, or a new
third type with two existing types, can be "flown" over the same route structure with
the same operational and maintenance policies to determine impact on airplane
utilization.	 The model effectively keeps separate statistics for each airplane type.
i	
MODEL INPUT, LOGIC, AND OUTPUT
The model contains a preprocessor to allow for easy input of all data related to the
airline operations.	 The	 model also is constructed in	 modular form
	
to	 make
modification of a given airline system easier.
	
The modules are:
•	 Airplane creation
f	 0	 Flight dispatching
•	 Flight scheduling
01	 A ►rplane operations
•	 Scheduled/routine maintenance
0	 Unscheduled/nonroutine maintenance
Model logic is illustrated in flowchart form in Figures A3-1, A3-2, and A'3-3.
SCHEDULED MAINTENANCE
r
If the airplane is not at the station where its next scheduled flight is to originate, r.
nondeferrable malfunctions are processed and the airplane is deadheaded to the next
flight origin, where routine maintenance, if necessary, is accomplished. If the airplane
"
ientering scheduled maintenance is at its next flight origin, routine maintenance work,
if required at this time, is accomplished.	 At the same time, all nondeferrable, and
"checks"
	
malfunctions	 are	 processed	 as	 unscheduled	 maintenance.	 When	 all
maintenance work .:s complete, the airplane is placed in immediate available status at
the station.
UNSCHEDULED MAINTENANCE g
Malfunction transactions entering this module are assigned to a subsystem that failed,
based upon the class of malfunction and the airplane type.
	
Engine failures at a line
station with no engine replacement capabilities trigger the criterion for a ferry flight =:
a	 and are not processed. Normally, engine failures and other malfunctions are processed
concurrently, unless maintenance personnel are in short supply at the time. 	 Queueing
statistics indicate such bottleneck areas,	 As all malfunctions from an airplane
enter the module, the estimated longest repair time for any one malfunction is used to
update the airplane availability time. 	 After all malfunctions have been processed, the
actual completionp
	 p	 time. TheATA -number
tlongestof the malfunction requir ing thework time
a salability
saved for the report (if it delays ^
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the next flight). if an engine is replaced, the failed engine is overhauled and the
overhauled engine is returned to storage at the station.
VERIFICATION OF RESULT'S
The model is verified for a given airline system by simulation of, and comparison to,
actual airline operations. The collection of data on the system equipment and
geography, system maintenance, and system operations required for such a, verification
run and subsequent experiments is facilitated by the structure of the model data
matrices. The initial verification run detects possible errors in the original data
roundup. Subsequent runs can test sensitivity of the system to changes in critical
operational or maintenance parame crs for comparison with actual system sensitivity
data. Successful completion ofthe verification runs provides assurance that
subsequent studies conducted with the model will be statistically significant.
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G	 APPENDIX IV
AN EVALUATION OF 'tHE MILLER MODEL
The mathematical technique for evaluating the economic impact of new fault
tolerant flight control designs developed by D. R. Miller in Ref. l has been
reviewed. Although this review has indicated that definite conclusions of
me rit are premature, the modeling concepts in Miller's document appear
potentially useful in several contexts and from several points of view.
An evaluation of the quality of the Miller model is inhibited by the fact
that, as the author suggests, it is only the initial result of a piece of
ongoing research. Miller's method is presented in terms of two approximations
that bound the solution to a mathematical abstraction of the real avionics
system problem, To ask the question then, 1' this approach is valid and
useful is to question first of all if the approximations are valid (i e.
sufficiently accurate) in Light of the abstraction and secondly whether
the abstraction represents the essence of the true problem.
No mathematical criteria now exist for evaluating the quality of Miller's
approximations nor are such criteria likely. This makes the simulation of
the mathematical abstraction now being conducted at NASA-LaRC particularly
valuable. The second question is even more difficult to assess quantitatively
unless the results of the LaRC simulation can be compared with the simulation
of a higher level abstraction more closely representing the real world. Since
defining this higher level abstraction is part of the problem of Phase l of
this research with simulations to follow in Phase 2, it is somewhat early to
anticipate quantitative evaluation of the merits of the Miller model.
With this in mind then, the discussion that follows is primarily expository
rather than a detailed review of merit or critique.
i
The two constraining variables influencing the use of the Miller model are
accuracy and size where accuracy must be discussed both in terms of the
F accuracy of the approximation and the extent to which the abstract model
represents the essential features of the avionics system under consideration.
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Early results of :he IaRC simulation of the Miller abstraction summarized in
Ref. 2 seem to indicate that Miller's lower bound is a good measure of
central tendency with regard to the number of groundings per day. At 50,
the percentile rank of the approximation averaged over the 24 cases considered
in Ref. 2 indicates a close approximation to both the mean and median number
of groundings. With regard to incurred costs, the average percentile position
of the approximation is 43, indicating that it is a less effective estimator
of central tendency in this case but still a lower bound. The simulation also
proves that Miller's upper bound is too high to be an effective measure for
the cases considered.
With respect to ,judging for accuracy or validity of an abstraction, any model
of a real world system must be a compromise between model integrity and
mathematical tractability. This rule of thumb is unusually true in the
present context in that the real world problem is very complex. Briefly,
the real system problem includes the interactive effects of a large flight
network with a diversified fleet, a detailed maintenance structure, and a
complex, flight critical hardware system operating in a Wide time frame that
varies from mission lengths in the large to maintenance actions in the small.
The compromise inherent in the Miller model seems highly effective. It
appears to emphasize all of the important structural elements of the problem
without sacrificing the intent of a mathematical solution. Structural
differences between model and reality can be argued but numerical evaluation
of these differences must wait until experience on the model's use and scope
is available through simulation. Since, however, the current detailed study
is based on these structural differences, a brief discussion of some of them
is perhaps useful
It is difficult to argue that the Miller model does not include certain
effects on variables thought to have influence on the answer. Indeed, he has
been extremely successful in including some measure of most effects. Rather
it is the total impact of large numbers of second ordereffects that will
cause differences,_ if any, between Miller's and some higher order real world
model. Some of these second order effects thought to have some economic
impact are:
IV-2
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a highly interactive airline network sharing a fleet of airplanes of
different types and functions rather than a single route of one
airplane type;
a highly fluid maintenance operation capability that depends on many cost
variables as well as demand, rather than a highly styli pd main maintenance
base, three activity level, maintenance concept;
the fault detection capability of the system including the avionics
capability as well as ground based detection and the impact of "false
alarms";
"start-up" time effects and the effects of latent errors, which may causei
differences from the assumptions on which Miller's steady state extrapola-
tions are based;
software repair and maintenance;
the "other carrier" impact coming through shared spares pools;
more complicated responses to emergency demand such as the possibility of
borrowing from nearby aircraft, restocking other stages at the same time, etc.;
broader avionic3 structural definitions than k-out-of-n decoupled stages
in series;
stricter and more extensive cost accounting, less cost averaging;
more complicated interaction between demand and spares pools levels.
The impact of the size constraint is more difficult to determine. Experience
in the past suggests that a straightforward state count that yields astronomical
levels even for such simple system's as the example described in Miller's paper,
f IV -3
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is not always a valid measure. in a practical situation with real constraints,
the state count is often far less than a simple count of all combinations of
working and failed equipment levels. Miller suggests that it may be possible
to utilize sparse matrix techniques in coding to increase the speed of computa-
tion. Experience too, shows that real gains can be made utilizing these ideas.
If the problem is too large to be coped with efficiently by any of these
means, and size must be faced, the model could be used iteratively by varying
the number of aircraft i n the fleet and spares in the pool, Sequentially.
These sequential solutions might then suggest numerical relationships that
could be used to forecast the behavior of a larger system whose state count
is beyond the feasible range.
The accuracy of the lower bound approximation for the Miller model indicates
that it could be useful in providing a first look at determining the size
and cost of new systems if the state count constraint proves surmountable.
Although a lower boundis not as useful in determing costs asan upper bound,
its potential for approximating system performance should not be overlooked.
E
f	 There are several other possible uses for the Miller model other than thisM
strictly global role in assessing new systems. 	 Some of these have already
been suggested in Ref. 2.	 Perhaps the most important contribution of the
r
a	 simulation to date is in demonstrating that a simulation of the cost impact
of fault tolerant avionics systems is feasible with respect to cost,
computer requirements and the usefulness of the answers it produces. 	 An
interesting second result of this simulation is that the random cost estimates i
v	
- across the replications at steady state have shown fairly pronounced variability.
The ramifications of this information on the current study are twofold. 	 At
the very least it indicates that time probes should be placed across the
replications at regular intervals prior to steady state, to determine if this
variabilit	 is indeed still
	
resent _in the larger si ulation
	
and	 if soy	 p	 h	 g	 m
the nature of i'ts source. 	 Also, it seems possible that this variability
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might be due to a drift away from nominal in some series before steady
state. If this is the case, a more global measure of system performance
might be more realistic to use as an optimization criteria than average
cost -,t  steady state.
The simulation optimization currently under consideration may prove costly to
run due to its size and complexity. Therefore any a priori information with
regard to good operating levels of the variables for a given scenario, or to
heuristic relationships between variables, could be an important factor in
the speed of convergence of the optimization process. The Miller model could
be useful in this capacity. That is, those operating levels and strategies
that seem most optimal, i.e. least costly, in the V.11ler sense, may provide
an efficient initial operating level for the larger Phase I problem.
During the course of developing his model, Miller makes several suggestions
for approximations to the process that might prove fruitful as partial modeling
devices for improving the efficiency of the large simulation. In particular,
such ideas as uncoupling the stages, Poisson emergency demand statistically
distributed over the route structure, use of steady state distributions for
modeling parts of the process and uncoupling portions of the interaction of
the demand and repair process could be incorporated into the simulation for
efficiency if it could be shown that the displaced detail was unimportant.
There appears to be only two methods of providing this proof. One, if
possible, is to simulate portions of problem in great detail in order to
demonstrate the validity of the approximation and another is to build the
greater model, simulate it, and let feedback provide the numerical basis
with which to approximate. Neither approachis contemplated for Phase I
1 th u 
"h 
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dictates improved efficiency.
Mil'ler's model could prove useful in extending short term simulation results
to achieve a steady state answero This will depend of course on the nature
.3	 of the system's steady state. Since the impact of latent faults will be
evaluated in the more detailed simulation, the cost effective solution might
indicate that the system should operate with a gradually increasing failure
rate rather than to incorporate very exhaustive testing for latents on a
scheduled basis. If it could be shown that constant failure rate is a
reasonable assumption, the Miller model might well provide sufficient
insights into steady state behavior when based on short term results obtained
from the detailed simulation.
Although many questions remain as to the nature of the accuracy of Miller's
model, it should be applauded as a careful attempt to develop new methodology
in a very difficult problem area where no other methodology now exists. As
in any compromise dictated by the requirement of mathematical solvability
it can be challenged on the grounds of realism and therefore must be validated.
If validated it has the potential of offering a very satisfactory, less costly
answer for many problems and might be particularly useful for gaining byroad
insight into the general operating levels of a particular s ystem. Other than
validation the only other constraint possibly inhibiting the usefulness of
this technique is the combinatorial growth of state count as the ,system grows
in size and complexity.
Other uses of the Miller concepts have been explored that complement the
detailed simulation optimization of the current study. Providing initial
conditions to the simulation is one such possibility. Others that seem
fruitful include replacing details of the simulation with his analytic models
to improve efficiency and encrapolating a short term simulated history to
steady state. Assessment must wait until the larger simulation is in production
and tradeoffs can be evaluated.
GC
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RELIABILITY CONSIDERATIONS
in surveying available reliability assessment packages for
analyzing digital fault-tolerant avionics it becomes apparent
that their evolution tracks the evolution of the fault-tolerant
architectures they model. Though general purpose claims are
often made, it is usually the case that the analysis is general
purpose only within the generation of architectures they
represent. Consequently the reliability packages that are
available have a wide 1"Axiety of capabil ity and emphasis. In
the following discussion a set of criteria describing the
essential features of the assessment of foreseeable fault_
tolerant avionics systems is developed and the most appXicab]e
of existing reliability programs are reviewed, relative to this
norm.
E	 The coverage of the system, or the chances that it can be
E
„successfully reconfigured to a degraded state after a fault
F.	 occurs, depends on the ability of the system to detect its own
w
errors and to perform the necessary actions leading to continued
operation. Thus with fault-tolerance, reliability is a function
r	
_i
k	 of the system's capacity for self diagnosis and self repair
as well as the usual considerations of structure and redundancy
management. These features imply two basic sources of system
failure, one source coming from the depletion of equipment
u
y.l
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below critical, levels, the other du pe to hack of coverage (the
r
probability the system can be successfully reconfqured after
A
a failure). Therefore the criteria for evaluating reliability
assessment programs must reflect the structure of these two
sources of failure as a function of the performance required
of the 7^ircraf t during flight
A2.1 criteria	 i
The following points form a set of criteria or capabilities 	 F
that would be desirable features in a reliability assessment
grogram. The list can be compromised in certain situations, 	
t
but to model, future systems as they are now envisioned, most
F
	 are important.
A2. 1.1 System Features
Any assessment program must be capable of determining the system
reliability. NASA's goal i s a probability of failure of no
-9
more than 10	 in 10 hours. Since this is a fairly demanding
goal, its execution requires a well considered mathematical
technique that can produce numerical precision with reasonable
efficiency,
As a minimum the program should be sufficiently flexible to
model the operational structure of the ARCS, SIFT, and ETMP
t	 architectures. This implies architectural structures having,
r	
among others, such features as triad operation sin g ly or in
^s
j I
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parallel, fl.exea sparing with dynamic allocation, graceful
degradation, ane^ a k out of n definition of equipment depletion.
f	 In addition, it would be desirable if the proqram included suchE
f
structural effects as dependent staves, substructures which
i,
'	 themselves are redundant or fault-tolerant, ordered failures,
P
i	 or complicated network relationships between stages. (Note,
a stage is a set of like components at a level replaceable by
spares carried either in the ground or in onboard inventory.)
The result of this modeling would be an explicit or implicit
definition of the degraded system states and states of eystem
failure to be used as input to the analysis portion of the
pct e cement program:MRfivV
Many traditional fault-to-l erant systems have included spares
r	 as an integral part of the system design. There are three ways
of modeling spares that have evolved: offline unpowered spares,
online powered but passive spares, and online powered but ar,tive
spares that are constantly flexed as part of the system so that
knowladge of their working state is constantly updated, Both
SIFT and FTMP .&tt any instant of time have spare equipment of
the latter.type. ARCS makes no provision for on-line spares.
	
r	 Since different demands are made on the syste;ii as a :Function
of alight phase, the reliability model should reflect these
t
varying requirements. If phasing cannot be incorporated in
1
7
	
	
the inodelinq, the reliability should be demonstrated for the
entire mission at the equipment le —1 required for the most
demanding phase. V-3
1
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Given that a fault has occurred, the ability of the system to	 {
respond and continue its defined task in a degraded state is
measured by coverage. Tiro quite different types of coverage
models now appear in the literature. One is concerned with s
single point failures from which the computer cannot recover
due to either long time delays in the recovery strategy, or
because the fault belongs to the class of nonrecoverable faults
for that system. Such models frequently model coverage
nonstochastically, at least with regard to the time frame of
the system i s operation.
i
The other type of coverage model assumes categorically that
the system can recover from all single faults, but that fault
simultaneity of certain types causes system failure. Fault
simultaneity in this context can mean either two or more faults
coexisting in a nonreconfigured state or, less conservatively,
two or imre in a detected but nonreconf igured state. This model
implies a stochastic model with emphasis on the vulnerable down
period of the computer. Thus it is necessary to know not only
what type of errors the system can withstand but how many it
can tolerate at one time.
Failures in a fault-tolerant system can have two causes:
permanent or transient, and be in several states reflecting
the self diagnosis and self repair capacity of the computer.
These are summarized below.
V-4
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Permanent faults can be in one of three states as a consequence
of the systems detection, isolation, and recovery (DIR) strategy.
The period of time that a. permanent fault remains latent is
a function of the detectors used in verifying its presence.
Therefore any model of the effects of this fault must reflect
the speed' and ex,ont of the capabilities of these detectors.
Every fault-tolerant computer has a built-in strategy for
isolating a permanent fault once it has been detected. In as
much as some systems use an error report to store_ information
until a decision is possible, there is a potential delay in
the response to the fault in this period. Models of this effect
should at least be responsive to the strategies planned for
the SIFT and FTMP systems.
With their emphasis on the continuity of production, fault
tolerant systems are designed so that reconfiguration time is
very small once a fault has been isolated. Nevertheless, during
reconfiguration the system may be even more vulnerable than	 i
it was during isolation. Therefore a fault in this state
requires careful modeling based on an understanding of the 	 t
processes involved and be flexible enough to respond to the
G
	
	 design of a given system. Since the total vulnerable period
due to both isolation and reconfiguration is likely to be very
short it may be better to combine these effects in*o.a single
variable. This i 's particularly true in situations where there
is insufficient information for modeling each in detail.
t
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Methods of modeling transient faults are not yet well understood.
Despite this deficiency the assessment model should be
k
	
	 sufficiently general to include more detail on this fault
condition as information becomes available. The usual method
is to assume that transient failures are independent with
constant failure and duration rates. There are several possible
difficulties with this approach. There is some evidence that
transients may at times have a spatial impact inducing correlated
response among faults. Another possibility is that failure
rates might be component dependent in the sense that not all
components in a stage would have the same inclination to display
transient behavior. This means that the failure rate, though
f
k
constant for a given component, might vary from component to
component in a random fashion with some parts displaying a
stronger tendency toward >;epeated transient behavior and others
e,
P	 less so. Also, some designers envision an elaborate recovery
mechanism for a transient, while others argue that the
ditterences in response to transients, once detected, are no
different than to permanent faults.
01
4
The designers of the FTMP have stated that the system can recover
4	 from all single point failures-, most double failures but no
I
triple or higher order failures that ist simultaneously in
an unrecovered state. A similar statement is made by the SIFT
architects. Thus programs that define system failure in this
way have stochastic coverage models with features that are
different from single point coverage models. Some of the desired
features of such models are given below.
V-6
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Coverage is defined in terms of simultaneous equipment failures
during the period of isolation and recovery from the triggering
detected fault. Since the chances of simultaneity increases
(with a corresponding decrease in coverage) whenever latent
faults are included in the modeling, the requirement for latent
fault modeling is substantial, for coverage models of this type.
1 The definition of system failure in terms of simultaneous events
z
implies that the coverage model is a function of the amount
of available equipment at the time of :failure. A possble
i-w
`-:
	
	 consequence or this assumption is that the system may reach
a point where increasing redundancy decreases reliability
When coverage is a function of the available equipment, a serious
effort must be made to identify the set of equipment types whose
simultaneous failure will be cause for concern. For some 'systems
this mutual dependence of equipment will only extend within
i
1
	
	
a stage. For other systems, in particular the FTMP, it will
be extensive, and cross -couple equipment across stages.
^. A2.2 Program Review
it
Five reliability asse, ,sment programs have been reviewed for
their suitability in r^*eting the criteria established in the
previous section. Other programs exist for assessing the
reliability of fault-tolerant computer systems that are not
reviewed here. Trie analysis of such systems has grown so in
sophistication during the last few years, particularly with
regard to coverage, and many of the traditional reliability
V-/
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assessment programs no longer seem pert
or techniques are the reliability analynan LuL .0 t: vLV..v^rrc
systems SIFT (Xef. 1) and FTMP (ref .. 2) , and the general programs
ARIES (ref. 3, 4, 5), CARSRA (ref. 6) and CARE II (ref. 7)
CARE III, under development at Raytheon, is also a viable
assessment program candidate but its teatures are not well
defined at this time. Also, the basic assumptions of CAST (ref.	
y
8) , another assessment program, have been for the most, part
-	 s
incorporated into ARIES which obtains a solution with far more
efficiency, obviating the need for a separate review of the t
CAST program. The features of each of the five programs that	 r
are relevant to the outlined criteria are summarized in Tables
I and II. The FTMP and SIFT assessment models were developed
specifically for their individual architectures and since they 	 {
do not exist as general purpose programs, they cannot be judged
accordingly.
1
The five programs can be partitioned by the type of structure 	 Y'
analyzed and the incorporated coverage model. The models for
SIFT and FTMP contain a stochastic, simultaneous failure model	 P
of coverage , ; CARE: II, C:ARSRA, and ARIES treat coverage
nonstochasticly emphasizing recovery from single point failures.
i
CARE II contains a separate coverage model which develops the
F
mathematical interaction of the characteristics of the detectors
used in sensing a fault by introducing the concept of competing
	
F ?
detectors on fault classes. This analysis is then coupled with
a model of the consequences on reconfiguration of time delays
in the isolation and recovery strategies which determines the
	 j
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TABLE I
STRUCTURE FAULT TYPES MATHEMPTICAL MODEL
^ w ww
`^3
w ^
a $ n MODEL SOLUTION
FTIIP PARALLEL ON LINE STOCHASTIC I X MARKOV SEPARATE MODELS
TMR X OUT CONSTAOT AND SUN.MED FAILURE RATES
OF N FLEXING COMBINATORIAL NVICRICAL _INTEGRATION
M STAGES
SIFT K OUT OF N INTEGRATED STOCHASTIC X 1 X MARKOV NUMERICAL
14 STAGES 1117EGRATIOII
CARE 11 2 140DE ACTIVE 6 COMBINED STATE NU14CRICAL
M STAGES STANDBY STOCHASTIC TIME DEPENDENT INTEGRATION
tPPROXIMATIO X X MAPAOV
ARIES STAGES ACTIVE 6 IiON- INCLUDES MARKOV MATRIX METHODS
IN SERIES STANDBY STOCHASTIC RECOVERY BASED ON
K OUT OF N MODEL EIGENVALUES
CARSRA GENERAL ON LINE NON-I
STOCHASTIC X X MARKOV [MATRIX METHODS
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overall coverage parameters for the system under consideration.
These parameters then, feed the CARE II assessment program in
much the same way as do similar parameters in ARIES and CARSRA
where the parameters come in simply as constants with which
to make parametric studies..
The stochastic coverage model of the lTHP is more Ielaborate
than for SIFT. The FTMP model includes a careful analysis of
all potential simultaneous double failures that can cause system
failure plus all higher order simultaneites. This cross-couples
the entire system in _a manner similar to that described in the
previous section on stochastic coverage models. The SIFT model
does not cross-couple across stages and is not as complete in
its analysis of double failures, but in other considerations
is quite similar to the FTMP assessment.
With regard to structure the F1W, SIFT, and ARIES programs
basically model a k out of n gracefully degrading , structure
with some differences in spares utilization. The SIFT program
is the closest to a true k out of n model and does not identify
spares as such. The FTMP identifies spares but because of
constant flexing through reidentitication of the spare as an	 b
active unit, the model. only admits to spares per at in its
odefinition of failure modes. ARIES contains ah spares model
that includes both active and passive spare failure rates as
well as two separate coverage parameters.
The k out of n structure for ARIES is imposed at the subsystem
level and the system itself is assumed to be a serial connection
of these subsystems. Thus system reliability is calculated
by taking the product of the subsystem reliabilities obtained
from ARIES. The FTMP model is really several models whose
failure rates are added. One of these models represents system
failure due to equipment degradation in the same way as ARIES.
The FTMP coverage model, however, couples the entire system.
CARE II includes a k out of n gracetully degrading system that
emphasizes a mode change when equipment levels degrade
sufficiently. The model allows for a complete redefinition
of system operation at this mode change. The time of mode
change is triggered by the first subsystem or stage that degrades
to this level and hence all stages are coupled. CARE II includes
the option of powered or unpowered spares with two separate
failure rates.
The structure model in CARSRA is the most versatile of the five.
Though the final product is a serial connection of independent
subsystems, the subsystems can have dependencies between
components that may be complicated Boolean structures. It is
even possible to model ordered failure relationships in CARSRA.
Once the serial subsystems, the structural relationships within
the subsystem, and the transition rates are defined, CARSRA
produces a solution to the corresponding Markov state model.
V-11
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wAll of the models base their analysi.%o on finite state, constant
rate, continuous tmne Markov processes and save the resultant
system of differential equations with matrix methods or numerical
integration. All seem adequate for their intended purpose if
the number of states does not become too large.
The programs differ most completely in their treatment of the
various error states. With the exception of (:ARE IT and the
latest version of the SIFT assessment, the remaining programs
pay little attention to the possibility of faults in a latent
state or the architecture as isolation stragegy. They concentrate
almost exclusively on the reconfiguration speed so the system
is conditioned on assumed knowledge or the existence and location
of the tault. The SIFT assessment allows faults to be in either
latent, recovery or reconiyured states, and CARE Il includes
the elaborate tault analysis discussed previously.
A2.3 Recommendations
Table I pinpoints two reasons why the evolution of reliability
assessment programs of fault-tolerant systems is difficult:
the wide variety of features thought to be pertinent in assessing
these systems and the lack of agreement about which is the most
important set. The most pronounced difference is with regard
to the modeling of coverage which is also the _primary contributor
j	 to system failure for the mission times under consideration.
F
+¢	 In particular, the assessment programs for the three
t	 architectures*, ARCS, SIFTrt and Y MP; display this difference
V-12
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in their modeling of coverage, although those tot SIFT and FTMp
are relatively, in agreement. Thus, in effect, two separate
coverage models are required to model these three systems.
For the more traditional nonstochastic coverage model both
CA:RSRA and ARIES seem viable alternatives. CARSRA is the most
versatile with respect to structure but is severely size limited
while ARIES can handle more states.
The assessment programs for the SIFT and FTMP architectures
provide the only stochastic models of coverage. Since both
now model the various influences on system failure in terms
of separate models, neither seem suitable as general purpose
programs, which of course was not their intent. Thus, it is
recommended that a single general purpose reliability assessment
program be developed that will incorporate a stochastic coverage
model to evaluate the impact on system failure of „nearl.v
simultaneous f ail,urea" as well as the interaction of the four
tault types; latent, detected but not isolated, isolated but
not reconfigured, and transient.
CARE III, now under development, may well provide this resource.
If not, a straightforward Markov model of these effects seems
quite feasible as large, pure death, Markov processes involving
hundreds of states can be solved quite cheaply using classical
matrix methods for solving systems of differential equations. j
Though the pure death property is violated when transients are
dr
??
	 e
k
included in the model, the deviations are slight and should
not prove unsurmountable
A2.4 Software Reliability
The area of software reliability is in a State of great
transition and although much is hypothesized regarding its
nature, little is known in terms of quantitative results. The
subject is comparatively undeveloped partially because it has
not seen the same degree of expenditure as that devoted to a
similar exercise for hardware but also because it is very
difficult to conceptualize. At present the bulk of t he resources
C
are being spent on the development of methods for producing
more reliable, more easily maintained software such as structured
programming, program processing, and fault -tolerant software
techniques utilizing alternate algorithmns. To a lesser extent
are programs being evaluated in terms of their failures and
.failure characteristics, which is a more difficult question.
Its difficulty lid's partially in the- impracticality of using
standard experimental techniques.
t
	
	 There are three traditional methods for establishing the
reliability of a device: mathematically modeling the dependence
of the device on constituents of known reliability, building
a computer simulation of the device, seeding it with typical
errors and probing for failures or gathering historical
(t^
	
	 experience by introducing a copy or copies of the device to
the working envirojment and recording the failures. The first
l
V-'14 I
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opt these is rarely viable in a sortware context in that
establishing the reliability of constituents is a problem of
the same magnitude as the original, and their interdependence
is often complicated.	 The second method too is difficult in r
that little is known or the structure and relative frequency
t
of typical program errors relative to a given prograM.. 	 Thus
simulation by conditioning on a seeded 'Atypical" error set is
an interesting but extremely premature concept until more i
research has been conducted on predicting program failure modes.
The third method otters some potential and is the method on
T
which most modeling to date has been ba,,^ed. 	 These models
f
a primwrily assume an exponential time to failure with a decreasing
taikure rate that depends on the number of bugs remaining in
the program.	 A recent review and evaluation of the more popular
models (ref. 10) indicates that there is still more work
necessary before predicting software reliability is a reality.
In time J IL is hoped that studies on how programs fail will also
provide some information on features of the program which can
be measured as predictors of failure probability or rate6
t
a
r
1
a
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APPENDIX
Typical SIFT, FTMPM and FTFCS Concepts
This appendix provides a description of typical fault tolerant concepts	
J
as examples of the type of equipment the Cost and Benefit Design Optimi-	 A
zation Model should be capable of optimizing.
s
1.0
	 INTRODUCTION
The technological foundations for fault-tolerant flight control systems
(FTFCS) have been laid and avionics are being built which can be used in
advanced commercial aircraft. The impact of an FTFCS approach is being
studied in terms of advanced navigation, stability augmentation, displays,
and fly-by-wire (references I and 2).
The purpose of this section is to provide overview descriptions of various,
candidate FTFCS architectures which have been studied in the development
of the economic evaluation model.
There are two principal candidate FTFCS architectures. The Software
Implemented Fault-Tolerant (SIFT) system, designed by SRI International, is
being built as an engineering prototype by the Bendix Corporation, The
Fault-Tolerant Multiprocessor (FTMP), designed by Charles Stark Draper
Laboratories, is being built for flight tests by Collins Radio. This report
will contain discussions of each of the two principal systems and will
contain discussions of some alternative approaches to fault-tolerance as
well. It must be understood that only the first two have been designed
specifically for flight control of commercial airplanes so the details of
the other systems involve some internal guesswork with respect to costs,
reliability, etc. The discussions of the alternative systems will be brief
and will depend upon the concepts laid down in the descriptions of SIFT and
FTMP.
The descriptions of FTMP, SIFT, and the alternative fault-tolerant systems
are intended to provide information to the reader not already acquainted
with such fault-tolerant designs; it is not the intent that the following
material should provide formal or entirely accurate system specifications.
With that disclaimer, this discussion will now center on the principle
subjects of comparison; SIFT and FTMP. This report will describe each system
in terms of fault response and reconfiguration. Other detailswill be
provided if they help describe the mechanisms of fault response and recon-
figuration.
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1.1	 SIFT and FTMP Comparison11
4
SIFT a nd FIMP share many redundancy management concepts. An executive program
in each system is responsible for the detection of faults as well as system
reconfiguratian. Both use triple modular redundancy (TMR) in order to detect
faults and to mask the ef fect of the fault to subsequent processes. In this
report, a fault is dokfined as an error in data caused by a malfunction of some
system component. Masking is the act of covering a fault by choosing, by
majority vote, a value to represent the set of redundant outputs (reference 3).
SIFT and FTMP not only identify and mask hardware faults, they also locate
and replace the faulty component with a healthy part as long as spares are
available. Beyond locating their source, no attempt is , made to determine the
nature of the failures that produce faults. When spares are exhausted, both
systems have an identified set of critical tasks which will remain active at
the expense of some of the noncritical tasks. SIFT and FTMP are both multi-
processors and must manage concurrent different tasks, as well as redundant
tasks
'	 l.. ] .1	 Rcctui rcn^^nRts
Both SIFT and FTMP are designed to be extremely survivable, centrally located
FTFCS Computers capable of performing such life critical functions as active
controls, total fly-bv-wire, and total system management.
Specifical ly, both SIFT and FTMP are designed to meet the functional and
reliability requirementsof a flight control computer system. These require
ments are: {
• Reliability goal- .. less than 10' 9 probability of catastrophic failure
during a 10-hour flight.
t	 r
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•	 Fault coverage--all independent ^ermanent and transient
hardware faults.
	
•	 Reliability approach--multiple processors use redundant
computations to mask faults, diagnose malfunctioning
processors, and to reconfigure or reallocate tasks.
	
•	 Computational throughput--an overall processor load of
about 500,000 operations/second.
011
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2.0	 SOFTWARE IMPLEMENTED FAULT-TOLERANCE (SIFT)
As the name implies, SIFT is a fault-tolerant system where reliability results
from software techniques rather than through hardware fault-tolerance and fault
avoidance mechanisms (reference 4). That is, SIFT achieves fault-tolerance
through its task allocation strategies and through voting mechanisms and error
isolation mechanisms built into the operating system.
2.1
	 SIFT Hardware
The hardware architecture to support fault-tolerant operations in SIFT is
remarkably simple. SIFT consists of up to eight processors (six, nominally) con-
nected to each other by a broadcast interface. See figure 1. Each processor has its
own local memory with a copy of every SIFT task. Each processor communicates
serially with external sensors and actuators. Figure 2 depicts the processor
interface for one SIFT module,
E	 There are no built in test devices, error correcting/detecting busses,
f
	
	
component isolation devices, or other special equipment to enhance
reliability or detect malfunctions.
The SIFT processor is a stock Bendix BDX 930 designed primarily for avionic
applications. The main memory contains 30 K_, 16 bit words and contains
both system.and flight applications programs. A 1 K, 16 bit scratch pad or
data file is used to store the temporary results produced by the processor's
tools. A 1 K, 16 bit transaction file is used to control the Configuration
and destinations of task outputs. The external bus is a MIL-STD-1553A serial
half duplex link. Each 1553A can support up to 32 remote terminals with
associated actuators and sensors. The broadcast interface is simply a
write-only area in every processor which any given processor can access.
The destination write areas for each piece of information produced by SIFT
is stored in the transaction file (reference 5). Each processor, memory,
and 1533 bus occupies a standard 1/2 ATR short LRU. See figure 3 for a list
f	 t t h	 tt'	 th SIFT LRUcU impor an	 arac eris i	 fcs o	 e
FT_
ORIGINAL
OF POOR
SIFT REDUNDANCY VIEW
SENSORS, SERVOS	 SENSORS, SERVOS SENSORS, SERVOS
553A 1/0 BUS	 1553A 1/0 BUS 1553A 1/0 BUS
Ml	 P1	 M2	 P2	 • M5	 PS	 PROCESSOR
BROADCAST BUSSES
MODULE COMPLEMENT (EACH PROCESSOR)
MEMORY 1
	
MEMORY INTERFACE & CONTROL
MEMORY 2	 CENTRAL PROCESStt;; 44IT
POWER SUPPLY
	
PROCESSOR INTERFACE
FIGURE t TIMING -f CONTROL	 BROADCAST/RECEIVER
1553A CONTROLLER
SIFT - PROCESSOR COMMUNICATION VIA BROADCAST BUS
MILSTD 1553 BUS
SIFT PROCESSOR
l
PROC 2' 4 . _ ._ PROC 2
PROC 3	 WRITE ONLY PROC 3
PROC 4	 AREA ---- PROC 4
PROC 5 PROC 5
PROC 6 PROC 6
FIGURE, 2
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SiFT LRU CHARACTERISTICS
0	 LRU SIZE., 4,55 x 7.6 X 12,6 IN,
r/ ENVIRONMENT; CABIN CONDITIONED
POWER REOUIREMENTSI 28 v 1 W/BATTERY BACKUP
• ESTIMATED MTBF$ 6500 HR,
• iNTERCONNECTiONSt BROADCAST/WRITE ONLY
INTERFACE TO ALL 5 OTHER PROCESSORS
• COST. $27.000 (1979 DOLLARS)
• THROUGHPUT$ 500 KOPS GIBSON MIX-RAW
• INPUTS. (MiL STD 1553 EXTERNAL DATA BUS/114 HZ BPS /32 PORTS)
• OUT:PUTSI (MIL STD 1553 EXTERNAL DATA BUS/101 HZ BPS /32 PORTS)
• MINIMUM M0, OF THiS COMPONENT REQUIRED FOR SUCCESSFUL OPERATION: 4
• STANDARD NO, OF THIS COMPONENT AVAILABLE: 6
• MAXIMUM NO,. 8
FIGURE 3
2.2	 SIFT Software
The essential characteristic of SIFT is the ability to detect a fault in a
	 x
processor module. A fault is detected by voting, and voting is performed
on the outputsof applications or global executive tasks. Only manfunctions
r	 which cause a disparity among the voters will be detected.
E
I
	
	 With a risk of oversimplifyin some important steps, we will attempt to
describe how and when this voting takes place and what results therefrom.
F
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2.2.1
	 SIFT Scheduling
In SIFT, tasks are scheduled periodically according to the priority strategy
show in figure 4. To illustrate voting, some details of the scheduling
process will be explained. The highest priority frames (approximately 20 ms)
are divided into subframes (about 2 ms) with each task assigned to a specific
subframe depending on its voting dependencies. Prior to scheduling a task,
the executive gathers the task's input data from producing processors, votes
that data, and then releases it to the task about to be scheduled. Lower
priority tasks are voted similarly but are not dependent upon their !'sheduling
sequence within their priority frame. They double buffer their outputs and
use, as inputs, data produced during the previous time frame. Figure 5 shows
this double buffering mechanism. Even with the high priority task scheduling,
SIFT is designed to allow up to 50/-.sec of skew between processors.
SIFT-- PRIORITY SCHEME
l	 l	 j
CLOCK TICKS
[
1	 I	 {	 1	 1	 I	 1
PRIORITY LEVEL 1
FRAMES	 ...^ .	 .^.^.^..
TASKS	 a 	 a	 0	 0W	 ^^	 ^^	 n ^
PRIORITY LEVEL 2
FRAMES	 ........
TASKS........,.
	
.m ..........
	
¢.;.......,
PRIORITY LEVEL 3
FRAMES	 —
TASKS .......................^	 s,..,.
is
a	 <
I
A
DIAGNOSTIC TASK
	
..... ,.	 .........	 ....@, .....,
........
F
PMURF 4.
z
OUTPUT
	 INPUT
BUFFER	 BUFFER
CLOCK TICK
TASK A
	
EVEN
	 JTAS K^TIME FRAME
I
OUTPUT	 INPUT I
 BUFFER I BUFFER
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THE DOUBLE BUFFERING MECHANISM
ODD
TASI(A	 TIME FRAME	 TASK B
INPUT I OUTPUT	 INPUT	 OUTPUT
BUFFER BUFFER
	
DU;FER
	
BUFFER
f IV4 4
2 2 2	 SIFT Vot'.	 ing
When an error is detected by voting, the error is masked and recorded in a
processor error table. The offending processor, however, remains active
until an error count threshhold is reached at which time the processor is
declared faulty and its tasks are reallocated, as shown in figure 6 	 Figure 7
contains a brief algorithmic description of the voting and masking process.
2.2.3	 SIFT Executive
In a system of SIFT processors, no single processor has permanent or temporary
hegemony. Each processor has its own local executive. A global executive also
exists and is run as a triplicated periodic task. The local
rr.
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RECONFIGURABLE VOTING
BEFORE FAULT AFTER FAULT
TASK 1 TASK 2 PROCESSOR TASK t TASK
22
 I V T -,^..	 V	 .,fT
 2 V T V T
iK;
2 %J %# j Y T
V
 4 V T V' T
V T V
II
T 6 V T V T
FIGURE 6
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i	 VOTING ALGORITHM TRANSLATION
LOOK
	 IN THE BUFFER AREA FOR EACH PROCESSOR AND
DO THE FOLLONINGt
• LOOK FOR BUFFER ADDRESS OF DESIRED VALUE
• IF	 BUFFER,OFFSET	 IS ACTIVE
- THEN ASSIGN BUFFER TO SET 'N'
- ELSE
	
ASSI GN BUFFER TO SET
	
'Z'
• READ VALUE AND CHECK FOR CONSENSUS
• IF CONSENSUS EXISTS
-	 THEN
	 BEGIN
IF VALUE - CONSENSUS VALUE
-	 THEN ASS 16N BUFFER
	 TO	 SET
	 'X'
-	 ELSS ASSIGN BUFFER TO SET
	 ''Y'
IF	 BUFFER
	 IN	 SET	 'Y'
` - THEII
	
BEGIN .
SET BUFFER VALUE TO CONSENSUS VALUE
SET FLAG	 IN ERROR TABLE
END
END
' - ELSE FILL ALL BUFFER VALUES 	 IN SET 'W' WITH 
	 'SAFE,V U _T
I
VI-YO
executive;
it Schoduled tasks
0 Votes input data and reports errors
• Handles task output buffers
• Handles errors locally
The global executive:
• Monitors error tables to look for processors with
permanent faults
• Allocates tasks to processors
• Handles reconfigurations due to changes
in flight ,phase
It can be see p, from the above admittedly simplistic discussion of the SIFT
fault -tolerant implementation, that no hardware mechanisms are used to detect
faults or to manage the system reconfiguration. Thus the model definition
of reconfigurable components turns out to be very simple. Essentially there
is only one reconfigurable component the processor. The processor is
used for whatever tasks allocated to it by the global executive until a
permanent fault is detected. In the event of a permanent fault, the
processor's tasks are all allocated to other processors. The faulty
processor is ignored by its fellow processors even though it may write
information into their broad-cast interface. The SIFT design approach is
not restricted to the BOX 930 computer system but could be used with other
processors.
2.3	 SIFTS stem Degradation
In a SIFT system, the amount of redundancy employed is dynamic and is a
E
	
function of the criticality of a given task and the current state of the
system. One implication is that, in the presence of several successive 	 i
failures, a SIFT could be gracefully degraded in steps from a system of
several T.M.R. processing channels to a single nonredundant channel.
However, the clock generator synchronization algorithm employed (see figures	
A
8 and 9) requires that at least four SIFT LRU's with four-nonfailed clocks
E
	
be operational to ensure timing integrity, Thus, the number of failed LRU's
i
	 that should be tolerated in a six processor SIFT is two.
`	
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SIFT CLOCK SCHEME
THREE CLOCKS,(ONE CLOCK FAILED)
CLOCK 'A' SEES:. 	 8	 7	 9
CLOCK 'A'	 CLOCK 'B'	 CLOCK 'Cl
MEDIAN CLOCK . CLOCK 'A'
:CLOCK 'C' SEESt	 8	 10	 9
CLOCK 'A'	 CLOCK 'B' 	 CLOCK 'C'
,MEDIAN CLOCK - CLOCK 'C'
IN THE CASE WHERE A CLOCK FAILS SUCH THAT IT CAUSES TWO GOOD CLOCKS
TO 'SEE' IT DIFFERENTLY, THE MEDIAN CLOCK ALGORITHM MAY FAIL ANO THE
GOOD CLOCKS MAY DIVERGE,
F(GURE 8
SIFT CLOCK SCHEME
FOUR CLOCKS (ONE CLOCK FAILED)
CLOCK 'A' SEESc	 8 NIL 9 10
CLK 'A' CLK 'B' CLK 'C' CLK 'D'
MEDIAN CLOCK - CLOCK 'C'
.CLOCK 'C' SEES;
	
8 NIL 9 19
CLK 'A' CLK 'B' CLK 'C' CLK 'D'
MEDIAN CLOCK = CLOCK 'C'
CLOCK ,D' SEES;	 8 NIL... 9 10
CLK `A' CLK 'B' CLK 'C' CLK 'D'"
MEDIAN CLOCK - CLOCK 'C'
HERE, EACH CLOCK TAKES A MAJORITY VOTE OF THE VALUES 'SEEN` FOR A GIVEN CLOCK BY ALL
OTHER CLOCKS,
IF NO SUCH MAJORITY EXISTS, THEN AVALUE OF'N1L'IS GIVEN TO THE PARTICULAR CLOCK,
THUS, DIFFERING READINGS OF ONE FAILED CLOCK DO NOT DESTROY THE MEDIAN ALGORITHM
! 1	 1
	
3.0	 FAULT-TOLERANT MULTIPROCESSOR  (FTMP)
The FTMP is a fault-tolerant system where reliability results from hardware
fault-tolerance and fault avoidance mechanisms along with software
implemented component reconfiguration mechanisms built into the operating
systems (Reference U).
The FTMP operates from a system view as a highly reliable three-processor
multiprocessor consisting of an independent processor/cache-memory for each
channel; all three communicate, via serial bus lines, with a single three
page mass memory and several task dedicated 1/0 ports. This multiprocessor
viewpoint is shown in Figure 10 The fault-tolerance of FTMP comes from
the fact that TMR is employed for each processor, each memory page,
each data line, and each module's incoming clock signal. Hardware bit-by -bit
voting is performed on all data transfers and all singe errors are masked
by taking a majori ty value (2 out of 3 vote) . An executive program
periodically searches the system for set error-latch registers, reconfigures
the system (by reassigning bus-module associations) to pinpoint disruptive
modules, and takes failed units off line, replacing them with spares.
	
3.1
	 FTMP Hardware
With the exception of bus lines, all components in the FTMP system are
contained in ten identical LRU"s. Each LRU contains:
a
• One CPU/cache
* One 16K main memory module
• One clock generator
• One power supply
e One 1/0 port
• Bus interfaces
• Two bus controllers (8GU's)
e Other hardware
Of these, the CPU/cache, the main memory module, the clock, and the 1/0
port are fully reconfigurable. The LRU itself is not a reconfigurable part.
Figure 11 shoes the FTMP LRU main components:
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ETMP _ MULTIPROCESSOR VIEW
X	 Y	
Z	 CLK CLOCK GENERATOR
PAGE 1 l PAGE 2	 PAGE 3
MASS MEMORY BUS
AB	 C	
PROCESSORS
P/C	 P/C	 P/C
INTERNAL 1/0 BUS
1/0 PORT
1/0.1
FIGURE f0
FTMP LRU MAIN COMPONENTS
C	 P	 0	 I
E
1	 I
BGU A
	
5/ 5/ 5/ 5/	 BGU B
r
BUS INTERFACE
POWER`
SUPPLY
N 
	
28v DC	 CLOCK
	 MEMOTIE1553 a
	
SUPPLY	 GENERATOR
	
CPU/CACNE
	
MODU
LINES	 XTERNAL
BUS
BGU 	 BUS GUARDIAN	 P' POLLING
CPU - CENTRAL PROCESSOR
	 0 - OUTPUT
s	 C - CLOCK	 I - INPUTt
.E
f	 }^
'	 VI=14
Fd
Figures 12 through 16 contain important characteristics of the reconfigurable
components of an FTMP.
	
Characteristics are also supplied in figure 16 for
the FTMP LRU; since all components are contained within it, the LRU's
characteristics provide references for many characteristics of the recon- c
figurable components.
F
Each LRU contains its own power supply, which like the BGU's and the bus
interface, is nonreconfigurable.	 All components within the LRU are supplied
5 VU`C by this power supply.
	
The power supply itself draws 28 VDC from a
quadruple redundant system-wide: main power source. 	 See figure 10.
In addition to those components contained in the FTMP LRU, there are a total
of 20 back-plane mounted bus lines divided into four different types: 	 five
1 0'	 lines for processor to memory data transfers; five 'I' lines for memory
to processor data transfer; five 'C' 	 lines for clock signal transfers; and
five ' P I lines used for bus contention resolution. 	 Each  bus line has its
own dedicated power supply.
i
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PROCESSOR/CACHE
u:r
• SIZE
C
— DIMENSIONs	 8	 1/2 ATR CARDS.
— WEIGHT	 NA	 Y x
ENVIRONMENT: SEE LRU
• POKIER REQUIREMENT
5 VDC
	 a
SOURCE	 LRU'S OWN POWER SUPPLY
• PHYSICAL INTERCONNECTIONS
	 a
- BUS LINES:	 SEE LRU
- INTERFACE TO
10 MEMORY MODULES
10 1/0 PORTS
10 CLOCKS	 t
• RELIABILITY	 MTBF - 20,000 HOURS
COST a CARD COUNT
A
• THROUGHPUT:
	
500 KOPS-(GIBSON MIX)
• INPUT:
	
SEE LRU
a
OUTPUT':
	 SEE LRU
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MEMORY MODULE
I !
• SIZE
— DIMENSION: TWO 1/2 ATR CARDS
— WEIGHT:
	
DNA
ENVIRONMENT:	 SEE LRU	 x
• POWER REQUIREMENTS
—	 5 V,D,C,
- SOURCE:	 LRU'S OWN POWER SUPPLY
	
G
• PHYSICAL INTERCONNECTIONS
— BUS LINES:	 SEE LRU
INTERFACE TO 10 PROCESSOR/EACH MODULES
RELIABILITY:	 NA (APPROX. 20,000 HOURS)
• COST « CARD COUNT	 a
• THROUGHPUT: CYCLE TIME	 NA	
d
INPUT:	 NA	 j
• OUTPUT:
	 NA
r
• COMPLEMENT: 10
• MINIMUM COMPLEMENT: 	 2
FIGURE 13
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CLOCK
^.	 • S17E 9
-	 DIMENSION:
	 ONE-HALF	 1/2	 ATR BOARD
{ -	 WEIGHT:
	
NA
• ENVIRONMENT:	 SEE	 LRU
POWER
	
REQUIREMENTS
F
-	 5 VDC
-	 SOURCE:	 LRU'S OWN
	 POWER	 SUPPLY
• PHYSICAL	 INTERCONNECTIONS
-	 INTERFACE TO	 ALL OTHER
	 SYSTEM MODULESf
VIA
	 5	 'C'	 BUS	 LINES ~'E
r;;
• RELIABILITY:	 MTBF	 = 30 ,000	 HOURS
• COSTa CARD COUNT
0 THROUGHPUT ;	 NA
• I NPUT S 	 NA
t- I
• OUTPUT:	 NA i
• COMPLEMENT:	 10
• MIN'IMUM
	 COMPLEMENT:
	 4
FIGURE	 14'
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BUS LINE
• SI;ZE:
	 NA
• ENVIRONMENT
- COCKPIT
- SYSTEM BACKPLANE
• POWER REQUIREMENTS
28 V.D.C.
SOURCE: OWN POWER SUPPLY
• PHYSICAL INTERCONNECTIONS
ALL TWENTY BUS LINES CONNECTED TO EACH
LRU'S BUS INTERFACE
• RELIABILITY	 NA (DEPENDS ON POWER SUPPLY)
• THROUGHPUT:
	 NA
• INPUT:	 16 MHZ DATA RATE
• OUTPUT: 16 MHZ DATA RATE
• COMPLEMENT: 20
• MINIMUM COMPLEMENT
LOGICAL MINIMUM
5 P' LINES
3 '0' LINES
3 'I' LINES
4 'C
	 LINES
FIGURE 15
V1=19
s
I
rORIGINAL PAGE I"
OF POOR QUALITY
1/0 PORT
• SIZE
DIMENSION: THREE 1/2 ATR CARDS
i	 - HEIGHT:
	
NA
• ENVIRONMENT	 SEE LRU
• POWER REQUIREMENTS
-	 5 'V D C
- SOURCE:
	 LRU'S OWN
	
POWER
	
SUPPLY
• PHYSICAL	 INTERCONNECTIONS
-	
INTERNAL COMMUNICATION:	 SEE
	 LRU	 (BUS
	 LINES)
-	 INTERFACE TO
10 PROCESSOR/CACHE MODULES
SENSORS AND ACTUATORS
• RELIABILITY:	 MTBF	 30,000 HOURS
• COSTocCARD COUNT }
• TRHOUGHTPUT:	 NA
i
• INPUT
- MIL STD
	 1.553 SIMPLEX
- 8 'MHZ	 DATA RATE
• OUTPUT
--	 MIL STD	 1553	 SIMPLEX
iy
- 8 MHZ DATA RATE
1t
• COMPLEMENT:	 10
i
k
a
• MINIMUM COMPLEMENT:	 -1
FIGURE	 16
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A
LRU
• SIZE
DIMENSION: 1/2 ATR LONG STANDARD BOX CONTAINING
21 1/2 ATR CARDS
WEIGHT:	 40 LBS•
• ENVIRONMENT: COCKPIT
POWER REQUIREMENTS
- 28 VDC/150 WATTS
FOUR LINES
- SOURCE: AIRCRAFT GENERATORS= BATTERY BACKUP
• PHYSICAL INTERCONNECTIONS
- 20 BUS LINES
INTERFACE TO ALL NINE OTHER LRU''s
RELIABILITY: MTBF m 2000 HOURS
:
• COST:	 $35,000	 (1919 E's)
• THROUGHPUT:
	 NA
INPUTS
ONE I/O PORT
MIL STD 1553 EXTERNAL BUS
• OUTPUTS
- ONE I/O PORT
- MIL STD 1553 EXTERNAL BUS
• COMPLEMENT: 10
9 MINIMUM COMPLEMENT: 4
f
FIGURE- 17
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3.2	 FTMP Software
While the fault detection and masking of FTMP are implemented by hardware
devices, system configuration, reconfiguration, and task assignment are
software implemented.
i1
1
3.2.1
	
FTMP Executive
The executive program is responsible for maintaining the state of the system.
This includes ini tialization of the system into the following configuration:
• Three processor/cache triads
(Nine of ten processors used)
• Three main memory pages - each a triad.
Page one contains system and applications
programs and is written innon-volatile form
(R.O.M.). Page two contains dynamic variables.
Page three is not needed for fully configured
operation.
(Nine of ten processors used)
• One clock quad.
(Four of ten clocks used)
• Several I/O ports - one per active task.
Figure 18 shows a fully configured system; note that the presence of a failed
module within an LRU does not affect the ability of other modules in that
LRU to be configured into triads or quads.
The module configuration explained above is accomplished by the assignment
of the proper bus lines to active modules.
r	 ^	
1
3.2.1.1
	
FTMP Bus Line Assignments
k	 A fully configured active bus network consists of: 	 r r
• One 'O' line tread - each member of a P/C triad 'talks' to
F	 main memory over one member of the current '0' line triad.
VI-22
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FTMP REDUMANCY VIEW
i	 IM/M
	
Z3i X2
H
	
Z2	 X1	 X3	 Y1 Z1	 Y3I
I	
I
i
I
P/C	 Al
I
I
A2 A3	 B3	 C3	 X	 B2 C1	 C2	 B1
i
CLK
	
j	 i O1	 - A2	 03	 04
i	 I
SPARE
I
I/O PORTS'
	
A X A	 A	 X	 X	 I A	 i
ACTIVE	 FAILED SPAR€
LRU #1
FIGURE
	
18
(Three of five lines used) See figure 19.
e One 'I' line triad - each member of a main memory page sends
data to a P/C over one member of the current '1' line triad.
(Three of five lines used) See figure 20.
1
One 'C' line quad-- four clocks (in phase locked loop) are
necessary to prevent drift; each module selects three out of
four active 'C' lines to form its clock triad.
(Four of five lines used) See figure 21.
• All five 'P' lines are available to 'poll' the current bus
triads and quad for access.
l
The bus assignments above (as determined by the executive) are maintained
by a dual redundant bus controller, called the Bus Guardian Unit (BGU), in
each LRU. Bus assignment consists of the controller's latching of the
VI-23
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SYSTEM CONFIGURATION
FTMP - INTERCONNECTION SCHEME (0 - LINES)	 1'/0 PORT
 C MiEMORY
MOD 1Y
	MOD 2
	 MO
CLK 1
i
b
correct lines in the bus interface. The bus interface and the two BGU's
are not reconfigurable and, thus, must control all data flow to and from	 j
the components in their LRU, no matter how these components are configured
throughout the system.
H
3.2.1.2	 FTMP Task Scheduling
Tasks are scheduled from the common . task pool. Upon successful completion
of a task, a processor triad executes the next available task
from the pool
	 This task will be run to completion, without interrupts,
unless system self testing or error recovery routines require reconfiguration
of the task's particular t iad,"
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SYSTEM CONFIGURATION
FTMP - INTERCONNECTION SCHEME (I - LINES)
I/O PORT
MEMORY MEMORY MEMORY
MOD 1 MOD 2 MOD 3
CLK 1 CLK, 2 CLK 3 OCLK
P/C 1	 P/C 2	 P/C 3
FIGURE 20
SYSTEM CONFIGURATION
FTMP - INTERCONNECTION SCHEME (C - LINES)	 EPORT
MEMORY	 MEMORY	 MEMORY
MOD I
	
MOD ?	 MOD 3
9
l
i
1
UAC CLK 2
	
CLK 3	 CLK 4
 P/G 2	 P/C 3
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3.2.2	 FTMP Fault Recover
Figures 22 and 23 demonstrate what steps the executive program would initiate
in recovering from a faulty processor-to-memory data transmission. In this
example, processor Nl of Triad A is failed and is the source of the erroneous
data. The data disagreement is detected by the hardware voters associated
with the destination main-memory modules (a triad). These voters will
automatically set hardware error-latch registers, indicating which bus line
the faulty data bit was transmitted on. The executive program periodically
scans these registers and, if an error-latch is set, initiates
reconfiguration. This reconfiguration consists of disassociating suspected
data source modules from suspected data busses; further voting discrepancies
will pinpoint the source of faulty data. In addition, an error table is
kept which tabulates the number and rate of faults caused by each of the
reconfigurable modules in the system. This table is used to determine when
a unit should be considered failed and, therefore, be brought off-line.
FTMP RECONFIGURATION ALGORITHM
TRIAD 'A' SENDS DATA ON 0-LINES 1, 2, 3
VOTER._DETECTS DATA DISAGREEMENT AND SETS ERROR
.LATCHES
• A PROCESSOR TRIAD NOTICES ERROR LATCH
• ERROR LATCH LOCALIZES ERROR TO 0-LINE 1 OR ITS
ASSOCIATED PROCESSORS
• TASK LIST WILL LOCALIZE ERROR TO P1
k	 BUS LINE 1
* NEXT MEMORY WRITE OCCURS
• VOTER DETECTS DATA DISAGREEMENT AND SETS
ERROR LATCHES
• ERROR LATCH LOCALIZES ERROR TO O-LINE 2 OR ITS
ASSOCIATED PROCESSORS
• PREVIOUS ERROR EXPOSES (VIA ERROR TABLE) P1
AS FAILED UNIT
F
f
r
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FIMP RECONFIGURATiO11
TRIAD A	 TRIAD 	 TRIAD C
.., .- 
FAPLrn
 ....
	
,.	
0 - I	 I
	
P/C	 P/C	 C
	
-.	 -
4-77  0 - INE 2	 V	 M/M
	
P/C	 P/C	 P/C	
VOTER
	
^^_...._,.J 0 . LINE 3
	 MEMORY MODULE
	
P/C	 P/C	 P!C
FAILED UNIT RESULTS IN VOTING DISCREPANCY
0 - LINE 1
	
, FAPIED(— - LINE^2
	
.	 V	 M/M
O - L I NE 3
AFTER RECOIFIOORATIO1, 'tCXT WING DISCREPANCY EXPOSES FAILED UNiT
t lat 141 43
3.3	 FTMP SYSTEM DEGRADATION
The executive is also responsible for graceful system degradation due to
exhaustion of spares.
In the case of processor/cache modules, this entails dismantling one
triplfa-redundant processor triad and designating its members as spares.
This, of course, cannot be done if there is only one active triad. In this
case, degradation consists of operating as a dual-redundant processor; further
degradation will be catastrophic.
There is no graceful degradation of clock generators; if "-?ss than four clock
generators are available, synchronization cannot be guaranteed. Less than
four clocks can be used but the system will then be susceptible to catastrophic
timing failures.
Because only one I/O _port is necessary for system operation, up to nine failed_
ports can be tolerated. System performance will be degraded, however, in
VI-27	 3
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that active processors and sensors will be competing for access to the remaining
ports.
Memory page degradation consists of the following:
• Since page 3 is not necessary for system operation, it may be dis-
mantled and its members used as spares without degrading performance.
• If a member of the I pge 1' triad fails, it must be replaced with a
volatile spare and thus a degree of protection is lost.
• As paged and page 2 memory modules are not interchangeable, failure of
more than four modules will result in dual redundant configuration of the
affected page.
	
4.0	 SIFT AND FTMP COMPARISONS
The choice of a software approach for voting and for other fault-tolerant
mechanisms in the SIFT system leads to some fundamental operational
differences from the essentially hardware based fault-tolerant mechamisms
of the FTMP. In addition, each system has some design constraints (hardware
and software) which limit or enhance its operational bounds, as well as
serving to further differentiate the two systems. Several such features
are noted-, a;l,o their effects discussed, in the following two sections.
	
4.1	 SIFT Software Approach
The use of non-specialized hardware along with a completely software based
redundancy management scheme has several broad advantages.
• The first and most obvious advantage is the ability to use
various computer architectures in the realization of a SIFT
system. This is possible because, as a software system,
SIFT is a concept relating various pieces of hardware rather
than being the hardware itself.
j
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• The use of a standard microcomputer as the main SIFT component
results in a minimum number of reconfigurable parts. This
has the dual advantage of providing more easily defined
reconfiguration algorithms as well as resulting in a simpler,
more reliable LRU.
o The loose synchronization employed in a SIFT means less
processor to processor data transfers will occur. This should
result in a somewhat lower incidence of data path errors..
• Finally, the system's flexibility is enhanced by its ability
to dynamically control task redundancy.
''
There are also several disadvantages to SIFT's software approach, not the
least of which being the complexity and the inherent non-provability of the
software algorithms themselves. Also, while the loose synchronization
employed in a SIFT does reduce the number of data transfers, it does not
result in less critical long term timing constraints. Four clocks are needed
to meet the loose 51 sec synchronization - the same number as are required
for the tight bit-by-bit synchronization of an FTMP. Finally, the use of
one reconfigurable component type means that the failure of part of an LRU
results in the loss`of that whole LRU.
4.2	 FTMP Hardware Approach
The advantages of an FTMP over a SIFT consist, mainly, of benefits gained
by the several specially designed hardware devices and the functional
discreteness of these components within an LRU.
For example, an FTMP can tolerate a number of failures in several LRU's
without seriously degrading system performance. In particular, the ability
to reconfigure sub-LRU components results in a complex combination of failed
units being necessary to cause a whole LRU to be taken off line.
The tight synchronization employed in FTMP in conjunction with bit-by-bit
voting, exposes faults before they can have a widespread effect. This
Vx 29
Ifeature and the nearly exclusive use of TMR have the additional effect of
making the FTMP at least conceptually more defined and, thus, more easily
provable.
There are, as well, several disadvantages to the FTMP approach. The number
of reconfi gurabl a modules and the interface complexity combine to form what
may be a troublesome source of faults. This same component complexity is
the source of a large amount of hidden software in FTMP. In fact, it is
nrit clear that the reconfiguration and self test algorithms necessary to
maintain the FTMP system integrity are any less complex and numerous than
for the software based SIFT system.
The FTMP is susceptable to two types of electrical failures. As was
mentioned previously, the heavy data transfers necessary for bit-by-bit
voting of all results may itself be a source of data errors. Also, switching
failures may be somewhat common due to the l arge amount of bus latching
required for reconfiguration as well as from the switching and loading
required to bring spare modules on and off line.
5.0
	 MAINTENANCE
Automatic digital test equipment, such as the RCA EQUATE, can be used on an 	 a
FTMP or a SIFT for field repair of components at the integrated circuiti
i
level. This ability is enhanced by the fact that both systems employ a great
degree of physical isolation of functional units. The stumbling block to
field repair is the problem of recertification of the failed component's
LRU once the repair has been made. Field recertification would involve 	 f:k
exercising the repaired system with a complete set of application programs	 l
- a procedure which neither system is currently equipped to perform. The
solution to this problem would be to have available at repair stations a
permanent "SIFT or FTMP into +which repaired LRU's could be inserted for 	 r`
recertification. A complete set of application and system diagnostic tests j
could then be run on the SIFT or FTMP. The loading of the test; programs	
.j
and the evaluation of data would require the use of an external mi nicomputer
system, most likely on the order of a_ DEC PDP 11/70.,
;i
a
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It can be said, then, that an FTFCS system would be field repairable, but
not without a considerable investment in digital test equipment and
minicomputers.	 4
An alternative repair procedure, which would elim;nate the need for field
repair, is that failed LRU's be returned to the manufacturers on a 'flat
rate =
 exchange basis for repair and recertification. This policy would
have to include stringent rules requiring a definite system defined failure
before an LRU may be returned, thus avoiding an excessive repair shop flow
as well as avoiding spurious failure rate data.
6.0	 TRENDS
It is our judgement that SIFT or FTMP implementations, as comprehensive
flight control processors, will not appear in commercial aircraft before
19854 In order for such systems to appear before that time, a crash program,
motivated perhaps by energy conservation, to push it into the 757-767 series
aircraft would have to be implemented. As the 757-767 flight control systems
have already been specified without monolithic fault-tolerance, this is not
too likely.
6.1
	
SIFT Trends
Changes in technology in the late 1980's will probably not affect SIFT
conceptually if it proves practical in the first place. Cheaper memory and
more powerful processors will, up to a point, create a potential for more
powerful individual SIFT processors. Use of more than one SIFT system in
tandem is a possibility. Complexity is-a trap in SIFT because itrequires
proof of concept and implementation to achieve the reliabilities specified
for the project. Hence, changes brought about by 1990 technology will be
incorporated into SIFT if the inherent simplicity of the plan can be
preserved.
One possible use of SIFT in the 1980-1990 period is as a rather cheap method,
in terms of hardware, of implementing a redundant system. A microprocessor
Vt-31
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_
based SIFT would be less expensive than many of the redundant microprocessor
implementations which require fewer processors but more complicated
interfaces, hardware voters, and built in configuration controllers or test
hardware. Therefore, a SIFT might appear as a dedicated avionics computer,
navigation computer, an active control system, engine controller, or ILS
system, serving a narrower set of applications than those envisioned by the
designers.
6.2	 FTMP Trends
As with SIFT, late 1980's technology changes will probably not have a.
significant impact on the FTMP design concept. Changes that are likely to
occur are in the areas of faster memories and processors, and smaller and
more reliable components in general. (In fact, the FTMP LRU card count has
been reduced during this study..) one possibility to be considered
is that complete FTMP LRU's may, in the future, be reduced in size to a
single printed circuit board or even-a single integrated circuit chip.
Integration of components beyond this level is unlikely as the concept of a
separate, repairable LRU would be lost.
E
4 As with the SIFT, several FTMP's might be used as dedicated or parallel
fault- tolerant systems; one concept under consideration is the use of a
parallel pair of FTMP's connected by a Unibus-like data link.
However, unlike the SIFT system, the FTMP architecture is designed around a
set of specialized hardware; hence, the ability to implement FTMP's using
components other than the Collins Radio design is eliminated.'
7.0	 PERIPHERALS
An attempt has been made here to evaluate the effect ofperipheral_ devices 	 _34
(sensors, actuators) on the operation or the reliability of either system.
The reliability of the various peripherals will, for a 'proven' SIFT or FTMP,
be the determinating factor in whether a fault-tolerant flight control system
does or does not meet the required system specifications. While it is the
1Vi-32
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case that a standard fault-tolerant sensor/actuator configuration
at this time exist, we believe that several present design trends
stable throughout the development of fault-tolerant active flight
systems A few of these are:
• The continued use of standard avionics devices for sensors
and actuators - It is believed that the duty cycle for ser
and actuators in fault-tolerant systems will not greatly
exceed the present norm. In addition, the reliability fib
for individual components are high enough to allow the
continued use of 'off-the-shelf' units.
• The continued use of redundancy - Current designs for acti
controlled commercial aircraft make extensive use of
redundancy at the actuator and sensor level. A novel
variation on actuator redundancy is the Bendix dual mode
actuator which operates both as a pneumatic and an electrical
actuator. In the case of electrical or pneumatic signal
failure, there is a smooth transition to single mode operation
(Reference 7).
• The use of 'smart' devices - SIFT and FTMP are designed to
perform sensor and actuator data voting within the central
computer with the enhancement of mechanical voters at the
actuator level. Full active control configured aircraft
will probably employ some small processors at the sensor/
actuator level to perform such tasks as reasonableness of
data checks, voting, and, in certain cases, dedicated data
processing.
8.0
	
^1 D.1 rC Yt:;111^ sYS fl.j1 DISCUSSIONS
As well as reviewing typical SIFT and FTMP_concepts, two
additional fault-tolerant computer designs were studied as example systems.
P,	 The first, the AFTI-16 Digital Flyby-;dire System is a T:IR system dosi-jned
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by Bendix Corporation to replace the present F-16 Quad Analog FBW system.
The second example system is a non-flight control redundant computer, the
C.vmp multiprocessor.
	
8.1.0	 AFTI-16
The A'1rTI-16 flight control computer is a TMR system employing no spares but
including a final analog back-up system (Reference 9). The system is being
designed so as not to rely on the back-up system; therefore, the following
discussion will not include the analog components.
	
8.1.1	 AFTI-16 §ystem Description
From a system point of view, the AFTI-16 appears as in figure 24. Here,
the system does not differ fundamentally from the SIFT or the FTMP; it is
essentially a black-box computer interfacing sensors and actuators.
AFTI--16	 DFCS
CONTROL
DFCS COMPLEX SURFACE
ATORS
•	 3 IDENTICAL
FLT. CONTROL COMPUTERS LEADING EDGE
FLAP
•	 1 ACTUATOR- INTERFACE _ ACTUATION
UNiT
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The fault-tolerant nature of the AFTI-16 is revealed in figure 25. In this
figure, it can be seen that the AFTI-16 shares many features with the SIFT
system:
• Both operate mainly under TMR
• Both communicate internally to ~trite-only areas via 'broadcast
busses.
• Both handle 1/0 (to sensors and actuators) via bus lines from
each channel.
• Both have external 1553 data links--in the case of SIFT, for
1/0; in the case of AFTI-16, for Fire Control communication.
• Both have only one reconfigurable module: a combination of
	
y;
Processor, Memory, and I/O Port.
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The fundamental differences between a SIFT and an AFTI-16 are the number and
thus the configuration of reconfigurable modules, the varying redundancy of
tasks, and the difference in overall complexity. The AFTI-16 relies on three
processor modules with software voting of outputs but incorporates no spares
or multiple channels. Because of }he lack of spares, reconfiguration consists
of system degradation, i.e,,,dropping of processor modules. System degrada-
tion occurs after even one failure, the result being a dual redundant system.
The second failure is tolerated by software 'reasonableness of data' tests
to determine which of the two active modules is failed. In addition, there
is the aforementioned analog back-up system; this back-up is not considered in
the manufacturer's analysis of system reliability and therefore is not considered
necessary for the probability of a successful mission to be within the accepted
bounds.
	
8.1.2	 AFTI-16 Component Characteristics
A fully configured AFTI-16 flight control computer system consist-s of three
reconfigurable Flight Control Computers (FLCC's) and one non-reconfigurable
Actuator Interface Unit (AIU). (The purpose of the AIU is to interface the
FLCC's with the set of nonredundant actuators.) The AFTI-16 FLCC is built
around the RDX 930 processor, another feature shared by the SIFT system.
Figure 26 contains the characteristics of the AFTI-16 reconfigurable module,
the FLCr
	8.2.0	 COMPUTER-VOTED MULTIPROCESSOR (C.vmp)
The C.vmp had as a design motivation industrial applications where
availability, inexperienced users, variable criticality of tasks, and
throughput needs are prime considerations (Reference 10).
	
8.2.1
	 C.vmp System Overview
Figure 27 shows the system view of the C.vmp. Three processors are
connected, via parallel-bit bus lines, to three memories and three disk
drives. The ,processors may run as three separate channels for maximum
throughput (`communicating via Parallel Line Units), or they may be switched,
by operator or program control, into one TMR channel with voting performed
VI-36
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AFTI-16 FLCC Characteristic
• Component size
- Dimensions: 16.00" x B.1" x 4.88"
- Weight: 14 pounds
• Environment: Forward^Avionics Compartment
• Power Requirements: Dual Redundant 28 Volt Line
W/24 V Battery Back-Up
• Estimated MTBF: 2200 hr MTBF
• Interconnections Broadcast/Write Only Interface
to Two Other FLCC's
• Cost: $36,000
• Throughput 500 KOPS Gibson Mix-Raw
• Inputs: Analog Sensor Lines
• Outputs: Analog Sensor Lines
• Minimum Complement: One
• Standard Complement: 3
• Maximum Complement: 3
Figure 26
(by V in figure 27) on all data transfers to and from memory. Figure 28
shows the bus lines and multiplexing units necessary to accomplish parallel
or triad (voted) processing and data transfers.
System degradation, in the event of hard failures, consists of dropping failed
channels and switching to parallel processor mode.
8.2.2	 C •vmp,Hardware
The reconfigurable module in the C.vmp system is the processor/memory module.
The voter is not reconfigurable. The processor is a DEC LSI-11 microcomputer
with seven 4K RAM memories per processor. Figure 29 gives the characteristics
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C.VMP PROCESSOR
• Size: Quad Height Board
• Environment: Control Room
• Power Requirements: 14 amps
• Physical Interconnections: DEC LSI-11 QBUS, Interface to two
other processors, voter, and disk
drive
• Reliability: 7,000 hours MTBF
• Cost: $2,500
• Throughput: 250 KOPS
• Inputs Parallel Bit, Voted DEC LSI-11 QBUS
• Output: Parallel Bit, Voted DEC LSI-11 QBUS
• Complement: 3
• Minimum Complement: 1
FIGURE 29
}
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APPENDIX VII
REPAIR SHOP SIMULATION
This appendix contains details of a typical repair shop simulation that was developed
to gain experience with SIMSCRIPT programming and to form a part of the phase II
CBDOM program.
The data flow diagram illustrates the processes performed and the interfaces between
various processes. On the data flow diagram:
Circles: represent SIMSCRIPT PROCESSES, EVENTS, or 'ROUTINES
Arrows; represents jobs flowing through the system
-	 represent files or storage areas
A sample program execution and a listing of repair shop codes also are provided.
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SAMPLE APAIR SHOP SIMULATION RUN
aslgo
I	 AVIONICS JOB SHOP SIMULATION
INPUT NUMBER OF ATE, REPAIR BENCHES, AND TEST BENCHES
I>2 2 2
INPUT K1, K2, K3, K4, AND K5
I>30 30 30 30 30
INPUT RUN TIME IN DAYS
I>60
INPUT 18 EQUIPMENT TYPES (1=ATE,2=TB,3=EITHER)
I>1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3
INPUT MEAN NUMBER OF ARRIVALS PER DAY
I i
INPUT PROB. FAULTS CONFIRMED, PROS. REPAIR IS GOOD
I>.9 .9
INPUT RANDOM STEP VARIABLES (TERMINATE WITH ASTERISKS)
INPUT COMPONENT TYPE DISTR.
I>.l 1_ .1 3 .1 5 .1 7 .1 9 .1 11 .1 13 .1 15
I>.2 18 *
INPUT PRIORITY DISTRIBUTION
I>.S 1 .2 3 *
INPUT EQ.TYPE DIST. FOR COMPONENT TYPE 18
I>.4 1 .4 2 .2 3
TRACE OPTION ? (YES OR NO)
I> no
LIST INPUT DATA ? (YES OR NO)
Y>yes
F_
I
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SAMPLE OF OUTPUT FOR REPAIR SHOP SIMULATION
NUMBER OF
ATE = 2
RB - 2
TB = 2
K1 - MAX P3 DELAY TIME BEFORE INTERRUPT OF ATE = 30 MIN
K2 - MAX P3 DELAY TIME BEFORE INTERRUPT OF TB	 = 30 MIN
K3	 - MAX OVERTIME AUTHORIZED FOR ACTIVE JOBS 	 = 30 MIN
K4 - MAX TIME FOR REPAIR AT ATE	 = 30 MIN
K5 - MAX TIME FOR POST REPAIR TEST AT ATE 	 = 30 MIN
s <j
COMPONENT EQ. TYPE
	1 	 1
	
4	 1
	
7	 2
	
10	 2
	
13	 3
	
16	 3
COMPONENT EQ.TYPE
	
2	 1
	
5	 1
	
8	 2
	
11	 2
	
14	 3
	
17	 3
COMPONENT EQ.TYPE
	
3	 1
	
6	 1
	
9	 2
	
12	 2
	
15	 3
	
18	 3
E
MEAN INTERARRIVAL TIME = 12.00 HOURS Cj
PROB. FAULT CONFIRMED = .90 PROB. FAULT REPAIRED	 .90
I
DISTRIBUTION OF COMPONENT TYPES (CUM)
PROBABILITY	 TYPE
-----------
	 ----
.10	 1
.20	 3
.30	 5
.40	 7
.50	 9
.60	 11 .
.70	 13
.80	 15
1.00	 18
R DISTRIBUTION OF PRIORITIES (CUM)
)
PROBABILITY
	 PRIORITY
-----------
	 ------ i
t .80	 1
1.00	 3
DISTRIBUTION OF EQ.TYPE FOR COMPONENT TYPE 18
—i
P.ROBABI,LITY
	 EQ.TYPE
-----------	
-_ -
.40	 _	 -1
.80	 2
1.00	 3
! V11-4
ORIGINAL PAGE IS
OF POOR QUALITY
SIMULATION ENDED AT 60- 0: 0	 NO. JOBS _ iA0
1
HISTOGRAM OF THROUGHPUT TIMES BY COMPONENT TYPE
COMPONENT TYPE	 1 2 3	 4	 5 6 7 8 9
HOURS_ ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -----
4 0 0 0	 0	 1 0 0 0 0
8 0- 0 1	 0	 1 0 0 0 0
a.2 1 0 0	 0	 0 0 0 0 0
16 1 0 3	 0	 2 0 0 0 0
20 1 0 0	 0	 1 0 0 0 0
24 1 0 1	 0	 1 0 0 0 0
28 0 0 1	 0	 0 0 0 0 0
32 0 0 0	 0	 0 0 0 0 1
36 0 0 2	 0	 0 0 0 0 0
40 0 0 1	 0	 0 0 0 0 1
44 0 0 0	 0	 1 0 0 0 0
48 0 0 1	 0	 2 0 0 0 -1
52 1 0 0	 0	 0 0 0 0 0
56 0 0 0	 0	 1 0 0 0 0
60 0 0 2	 0	 0 0 0 0 0
64 1 0 0	 0	 1 0 0 0 0
68 0 0 0	 0	 0 0 0 0 0
72 0 0 1	 0	 0 0 0 0 0
76 0 0 0	 0	 0 0 2 0 0
80 0 0 0	 0	 0 0 0 0 0
84 0 0 0	 0	 0 0 0 0 0
88 1 0 0	 0	 0 0 0 0 0
92 0 0 0	 0	 1 0 1 0 0
96 0 0 0	 0	 0 0 1 0 0-
100 0 0 0	 0	 0
-
0
-
3 0 4
AVERAGE
-----
37.4
-----
0.
----- -
	
--	 ----
33.0	 0.	 34.5
-- -
0.
-----
122.4
----
0.
-----
120.2
VARIANCE 689.7 0. 369.6	 0.	 642.6 0.	 2202.4 0. 5180.0
MAXIMUM 86.2 0. 68.0	 0.	 88.1 0. 188.8 0. 195.8
NUMBER 7 0 13	 0	 12 0 7 0 7
i
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HISTOGRAM OF THROUGHPUT TIMES BY COMPONENT TYPE
COMPONENT TYPE 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
HOURS----- ----- ----- ----- - ---- ----- - ---- ----- -----
4 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
8 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
12 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1
16 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
20 0 1 0 4 0 1 0 0 0
24 0 0 0 4 0 2 0 0 0
28' 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0
32 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
36 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
40 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 1
44 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
48 i^ 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
52 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
56 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
60 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
64 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
68 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
72 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
75 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
80 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
84 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
88 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
92 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
96 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
100 0 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 7
AVERAGE 0. 114.3 0. 21.5 0. 31.6 0. 0. 84.5
VARIANCE 0 7605.0 0. 171.0 0. 560.7 0. 0. 3874.7
MAXIMUM 0. 337.9 0. 63.9 0. 88.4 0. 0. 203.9
NUMBER 0 14 0 16 0 9 0 0 17
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HISTOGRAM OF MANHOURS BY COMPONENT TYPE
COMPONENT TYPE 1 2 3	 4	 5 6 7 8 9 4
HOURS----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -----
2 1 0 0	 0	 2 0 0 0 0
4 0 0 1	 0	 1 0 0 0 0
6 4 0 6	 0	 6 0 0 0 0
8 2 0 6	 0	 3 0 0 0 0
10 0 0 0	 0	 0 0 0 0 2
12 0 0 0	 0	 0 0 1 0 0
14 0 0 0	 0	 0 0 1 0 2
16 0 0 0	 0	 0 0 3 0 1
18 0 0 0	 0	 0 0 0 0 0
20 0 0 0	 0	 0 0 1 0 1
22 0 0 0	 0	 0 0 0 0 0
24 0 0 0	 0	 0 0 0 0 1
26 0 0 0	 0	 0
---
0
--
1 0 11)
-
AVERAGE
----
5.0
-----
0.
----- ---- --- -
5.6	 0.	 4.6
--
0.
-----
16.4
-----
0.
-----
14.3
VARIANCE 2.2 0. 1.6	 0.	 4.1 0. 18.2 0. 20.7
MAXIMUM 6.4 0. 7.5	 0.	 7.3 0. 25.7 0. 23.0
NUMBER 7 0 13	 0	 12 0 7 0 7
_	 HISTOGRAM OF MANHOURS BY COMPONENT TYPE
COMPONENT TYPE 10 11 12	 13	 14 15 16 17 18'	 9
HOURS----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -----
2 5 0 0	 0	 0 0 0 0 1
4 0 0 0	 1	 0 1 0 0 1
6 0 1 0	 9	 0 4 0 0 1
8 0 0 0	 6	 0 4 0 0 3
10 0 1, 0	 0	 0' 0 0 0 3
12 0 2 0	 0	 0 0 0 0 0
14 0 3 0	 0	 0 0 0 0 4
16 0 1 0	 0	 0 0 0 0 1
-	 18 0 1 0	 0	 0 0 0 0 2
20 0 1 0	 0	 0 0 0 0 0
22 0 2 0	 0	 0 0 0 0 1
24 0 0 0	 0	 0 0 0 0 0
26 0 1 0	 0	 0 0 0 0 0
AVERAGE 0. 15.8 0.	 5.8	 0. 5.5 0. 0. 10.6
VARIANCE 0. 34.1 0.	 1.4	 0. 1.6 0. 0. 27.0
MAXIMUM 0. 26.0 0.	 7.5	 0. 7.2 0. 0. 21.5
NUMBER 0 14 0	 16	 0 9 0 0 17
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REPAIR SHOP S IMSCR I PT PROGRAM CODE
PGM
" TITLE a AVIONICS JOB SHOP SIMULATION
ANALYST : DAN STREIFFERT
G	 " G-4420
ENGINEER : JOHN ROSE
F	
' 	 ' DATE : AUGUST,1979
' ABSTRACT
THE REPAIR SHOP MODEL SIMULATES THE TEST AND REPAIR OF THE
AVIONIC EQUIPMENT USED ADOARD AN AIRLINE'S FLEET.
	
TWO TYPES
OF TEST EQUIPMENT ARE EMPLOYED BY THE REPAIR SHOP, AUTOMATIC:
is TEST EQUIPMENT (ATE) AND A MANUAL TEST BENCH (TB).	 INPUT TO
THE MODEL SPECIFIES WHICH TYPE OF TEST EQUIPMENT IS REQUIRED
to BY EACH COMPONENT. 	 A REPAIR PRIORITY IS USED TO INFLUENCE THE
to COMPONENTS FLOW THROUGH THE REPAIR SHOP.	 THE MODEL OPERATES
ONE SHIFT PER 5 — DAY WORK WEEK.	 OVERTIME LABOR IS ALLOCATED
it TO ALLEVIATE REPAIR BACKLOG.
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PREAMBLE
NORMALLY MODE IS REAL
PROCESSES INCLUDE
ARRIVAL
AND SHIFT.CHANGE
EVERY ATE;	 ''AUTOMATIC TEST EQUIPMENT
HAS A JOB.ATE	 " JOB CAUSING
AND MAY BELONG TO THE ATE.INTERRUPT
EVERY RB	 "REPAIR BENCH
HAS A JOB . RB	 ' ' JOB CAUSING
AND MAY BELONG TO THE RB.INTERRUPT
EVERY TB	 "TEST BENCH
HAS A JOB.TB	 " JOB CAUSING
AND MAY BELONG TO THE TB .INTERRUPT
DEFINE JOB.ATE; JOB.RB, AND JOB.TB AS INTEGER VARIABLES
EVENT NOTICES INCLUDE
Q1.MON,
Q2.MON,
Q3.MON,
SIM.END,
AND END.SHIFT
EVERY END.JOB HAS A JOB.END
DEFINE JOB.END AS AN INTEGER VARIABLE
TEMPORARY ENTITIES
EVERY JOB HAS
A NUMBER,	 ''ARRIVAL NUMBER
A TYPE,	 ''COMPONENT TYPE (1-18)
AN EQ. TYPE,	 "'EQUIPMENT TYPE (1=ATE, 2=TB, 3=BOTH)
A PRTY,	 "1,2, OR 3
A RANK,	 ''FOR Q2
A TM . PRE . REPAIR, 	 "MINUTES
A TM.REPAIR,
A TM.POST.REPAIR,
A STATUS,	 " 1=PRE.REPAI.R, 2=REPAIR, 3=POST.REPAIR
A START.,TIME,
MAY BELONG TO THE Q1,
MAY BELONG TO THE Q2,
MAY BELONG TO THE Q3
THE SYSTEM OWNS A Q1, A Q2, AND A 03
DEFINE Ql AS A SET RANKED BY HIGH PRTY
DEFINE Q2 AS A SET RANKED BY HIGH RANK
DEFINE Q3 AS A SET RANKED BY HIGH PRTY
THE SYSTEM OWNS A ATE.INTERRUPT, A RB.INTERRUPT, AND A TB.INTEKRUPT
DEFINE ATE.INTERRUPT AS A LIFO SET
DEFINE RB.INTERRUPT AS A LIFO SET
DEFINE TB.INTERRUPT AS A LIFO SET
DEFINE END.TIME AS A REAA L VARIABLE
vi[-9
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DEFINE SHIFT AS AN INTEGER VARIABLE '10=0VER,
DEFINE
CHECK . PROB,	 ''PROB. FAULT CONFIRMED
REPAIR.PROB	 " PROB. FAULT REPAIRED
AS REAL VARIABLES
DEFINE NO.ATE, NO.RB, AND NO.TB AS INTEGER VAF
DEFINE NO.ARRIVALS AS AN INTEGER VARIABLE
GENERATE LIST ROUTINES
DEFINE
Kl,	 " MAX P3 DELAY TIME BEFORE INTERRUPT OF ATE
K2, '' MAX P3 DELAY TIME BEFORE INTERRUPT OF TEST BENCH
K3, " MAX OVERTIME AUTHORIZED FOR ACTIVE JOBS
K4, " MAX TIME FOR REPAIR AT ATE
K5	 " MAX TIME FOR IMMEDIATE POST REPAIR TEST AT ATE
AS INTEGER VARIABLES	 " ALL IN MINUTES
DEFINE CTIME TO MEAN NDAY.F(TIME.V'), HOUR.F(TIME.V),MINUTE.F(TIME.V)
PRIORITY ORDER IS
END.JOB,
SIM.END,
ATE,
RB,
TB,
SHIFT.CHANGE,
ARRIVAL,
END.SHIFT,
Q3 MON,
Q2.MON,
OI.MON
PERMANENT ENTITIES
EVERY STATISTIC	 ''ARRAYS FOR TALLY STATISTICS
HAS A MNHRS
AND A THRPT
TALLY	 ''THROUGHPUT TIME
NO.THRPT AS THE NUMBER,
AV.THRPT AS THE AVERAGE,
VA.THRPT AS THE VARIANCEr
MX.THRPT AS THE MAXIMUM,`
HS.THRPT(0 TO 96 BY 4) AS THE HISTOGRAM
OF THRPT
TALLY	 ''MANHOURS
NO.MNHRS AS THE NUMBER,
! 	 AV,MNHRS AS THE AVERAGE,i	 VA.MNHRS AS THE VARIANCE,
MX.MNHRS AS THE MAXIMUM,
HS.MNHRS(0 TO 48 BY 2) AS THE HISTOGRAM
OF MNHRS
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DEFINE CO.EQ.TYPE AS A 1 —DIMENSIONAL ARRAY	 ''EQ.TYPE BY COMPONENT
TYPE
THE SYSTEM HAS A RN.TYPE
THE SYSTEM HAS A RN.PRTY
THE SYSTEM HAS A RN.18
PE 18
DEFINE RN.TYPE, RN.PRTY,
DEPINC MIAT AS A REAL VA.
END
RANDOM
RANDOM
RANDOM
AND RN
RI ABL E
STEP VARIABLE ''COMP. TYPE DIST.
STEP VARIABLE ''PRTY DISTR.
STEP VARIABLE '' EQ.TYPE DIST FOR TY
.18 AS REAL VARIABLES
''MEAN INTERARRIVAL TIt1E (HOURS)
ka
It r}.
^	 MAIN
NOW INITIALIZE
CALL INPUT
ACTIVATE AN ARRIVAL IN 8 HOUM"
ACTIVATE A SHIFT.CHANGE 114 
8 
H
ACTIVATE AN SIM.END IN END.TIV
START SIMULATION
END
ROUTINE TO INITIALIVP,
CREATE EACH STATISTIC(18)
RESERVE CO.SQ.TYPE AS 18
LET LINES.V = 100000
END
ROUTINE TO SET.PARM GIVEN JOB FARM
THIS ROUTINE INITIALIZES JOBS
DEFINE JOB.PARM AS AN INTEGER VA
LET STATUSJOB.PARM)	 1 'PR.RPA
F', N D
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ROUTINE FOR INPUT
DEFINE ANS AS AN ATrPHA VARIABLE
k	 1,
f	 PRINT 2 LINES THUS
`	 AVIONICS JOB SHOP SIMULATION
{	 PRINT 1 LINE THUSI	 INPUT NUMBER OF ATE, REPAIR BENCHES, AND TEST BENCHES
READ NO. ATE r NO . RB r AND NO. TB
PRINT 1 LINE THUS
INPUT K1, K2 1 K3 1 K4 1 AND K5
READ K1, K2, K3, K4, AND K5
PRINT 1 LINE THUS
INPUT RUN TIME IN DAYS
READ END.TIME
PRINT 1 LINE THUS
INPUT 18 EQUIPMENT TYPES (1=ATE,2=TB,3=EITHER)
READ CO.EQ.TYPE
PRINT 1 LINE THUS 	 i
INPUT MEAN NUMBER OF ARRIVALS PER DAY
READ MIAT
LET MIAT = 24./MIAT ''INTERARRIVAL TIME
PRINT 1 LINE THUS
INPUT PROB. FAULTS CONFIRMED, PROS. REPAIR, IS GOOD
READ CHECK.PROB, REPAIR.PROB
PRINT 1 LINE THUS
l	 INPUT RANDOM STEP VARIABLES (TERMINATE WITH ASTERISKS)PRINT 1 LINE THUS
INPUT COMPONENT TYPE DISTR.
READ RN.TYPE
PRINT 1 LINE THUS
	 {
INPUT PRIORITY DISTRIBUTION 	 1
READ RN.PRTY
PRINT 1 LINE THUS
	
3
INPUT EQ.TYPE DIST. FOR COMPONENT TYPE 18
READ RN.18
PRINT 1 LINES THUSp_	 TRACE OPTION . (YES. OR NO)
READ ANS
IF AN = "YES"
LET BETWEEN.V	 'TRA'CE'
ALWAYS a
PRINT 1 LINE THUS
LIST INPUT DATA ? (YES OR NO)
READ ANS
IF ANS	 "YES„
CALL PR.INPUT
ALWAYS
END
I	 j
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DEFINE I AS AN INTEGER VARIABLE
PRINT 4 LINES WITH NO.ATS, NO,RB, AND NO.TB
THUS
NUMBER OF
ATE =
RB
	 —
TB	 -
SKIP I LINE
PRINT 5 LINES WITH K1 t K2,K3oK4 AND KS
THUS 
KI —	 MAX P3 DELAY TIME BEFORE INTERRUPT OF ATE = MIN
K2 —	 MAX P3 DELAY TIME BEFORE INTERRUPT OF TB	 = MIN
K3 —	 MAX OVERTIME AUTHORIZED FOR ACTIVE JOBS MIN
K4 —	 MAX TIME FOR REPAIR AT ATE MIN
K5 —	 MAX TIME FOR POST REPAIR TEST AT ATE MIN
SKIP 2 LINES
PRINT 2 LINES THUS
COMPONENT
	
EQ. TYPE	 COMPONENT	 EQ.TYPE	 COMPONENT EQ.TYPE
---------	 --------	 ---------	 -------	 ---------
FOR I = I TO 16 BY 3
-------
PRINT 1 LINE WITH I, CO.EQ.TY-DE(l),	 I+l j	COiEQ.TYPE(1+1)r
1+2,	 CO.EQ.TYPE(1+2)	 THUS
SKIP 2 LINES
PRINT 1 LINE WITH MIAT THUS
MEAN INTERARRIVAL TIME	 HOURS
SKIP I LINE
PRINT I LINE WITH CHECK.PROB AND REPAIR.PROB THUS
PROS. FAULT CONFIRMED	 PROS. FAULT REPAIRED
SKIP 2 LINES
PRINT 3 LINES THUS
DISTRIBUTION OF COMPONENT TYPES (CUM)
PROBABILITY	 TYPE
---------------
FOR EACH RANDOM.E IN RN.TYPE
PRINT 1 LINE WITH PROB.A AND RVALUE.A. THUS
SKIP 2 LINES
PRINT 3 LINES THUS
DISTRIBUTION OF PRIORITIES (CUM)
PROBABILITY
	
PRIORITY
-----------
FOR EACH AANDOM.E IN RN.PRTY
PRINT 1 LINE WITH PROB.A AND RVALUE.A THUS
SKIP	 2 LINES
PRINT 3 LINES THUS
DISTRIBUTION OF EQ.TYPE FOR COMPONENT TYPE 18
PROBABILITY	 EQ.TYPE
-----------	 -------
FOR EACH RANDOM.E IN RN.18
PRINT I LINE WITH PROB.A AND RVALUE.A THUS
END
VII-14
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PROCESS ARRIVAL
THIS PROCESS GENERATES REPAIR JOBS AT EXPONENTIALY DISTRIBUTED
INTERARRIVAL TIMES. JOBS ARE ASSIGNED INITIAL PARAMETERS,
FILED IN 01, AND INITIATED IF POSSIBLE.
DEFINE WAIT.TM
 
AS A REAL VARIABLE
UNTIL TIME.V GT END.TIME
DO
'RECOMP'
LET WAIT.TM = EXPONENTIAL.F(MIAT,4)
IF WAIT.TM GT 8.*MIAT ' O TRUNC. EXPON.
GO TO RECOMP
ELSE
WAIT WAIT.TM HOURS
ADD I TO NO-ARRIVALS
CREATE A JOB
LET NUMBER = NO.ARRIVALS
LET TYPE RN.TYPE
IF TYPE	 18
LET EQ.TYPE = RN.18
ELSE
LET EQ.TYPE = CO.EQ.TYPE(TYPE)
ALWAYS
LET PRTY = RN.PRTY
LET START.TIME = TIME.V
CALL SET-PARM GIVING JOB
IF BETWEEN.V = 'TRACE'
CALL PRINT.JOB
ALWAYS
FILE JOB IN Ql
cru pn"r.p A ni unm NOW i; c pmn jnn TO amp no ma IF nnccTuTv
LOOP
END
F
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PROCESS ATE	 ''AUTOMATIC TEST EQUIPMENT
THIS PROCESS SIMULATES THE WORK DONE AT THE ATE.
IF STATUS(JOB.ATE) w 1 ''PRE.REPAIR
LET TM.PRE.REPAIR(JOB.ATE) = UNIFORM.F(.2^4- F 5) * 60.
WORK TM.PRE.REPAIR(JOB.ATE) MINUTES
IF RANDOM.F(l) LE CHECK.PROB "FAULT CONFIRMED?
LET STATUS(JOB.ATE) = 2 ''REPAIR
ELSE
SCHEDULE AN END.JOB GIVING JOB.ATE NOW
00 TO RETRN
ALWAYS
ALW711,YS
IF STATUS(JOB.ATE) = 2 ''REPAIR
LET TM.REPAIR(JOB.ATE) = UNIFORM.F(. 5 t 4.r6) * 60.
IF TM.REPAIR(JOB.ATE) LT K4
WORK TM.REPAIR(JOB.ATE) MINUTES ''IMMEDIATE REPAIR AT ATE.
LET STATUS(JOB.ATE) = 3 11POST.REPAIR
LET TM.POST.REPAIR(JOB.ATE) ;1 ) UNIFORM.F(.5 1 2.o7) . * 60.
IF TM.POST.REPAIR(JOB.ATE) LT K5
WORK TM.POST.REPAIR(JOB.ATE) MINUTES ''IMMEDIATE POST REPAIR
TEST AT ATE.
CALL CHECK.REPAIR GIVING JOB.ATE
ELSE ''DEFER POST REPAIR TEST AT ATE,
LET PRTY(JOB.ATE) = MAX.F(PRrOY(JOB.ATE)?2)
LET RANK(JOB.ATE) = PRTY(JOB.ATE)+ 1
FILE JOB.ATE IN Q2	 ''LIFO WITH PRTY
ALWAYS
ELSE ''DO REPAIR AT REPAIR BENCH.
FILE JOB.ATE IN Q3 ''REPAIR AT A REPAIR BENCH
SCHEDULE A Q3.MON NOW ''INITIATE REPAIR IF POSSIBLE
ALWAYS
GO TO RETRN
ELSE
IF STATUS(JOB.ATE) = 3 "POST.REPAIR
IF TM.PQST.REPAIR(JOB.ATE) = 0
LET TM.POST.REPAIR(JOB.ATE) = UNIFORM.F(.5 f 2.,7)	 60.
ALWAYS
WORK TM.POST.REPAIR(JOB.ATE) MINUTES
CALL CHECK.REPAIR GIVING JOB.ATE
ALWAYS
► RETRN'
SCHEDULE A 02.MON NOW ''INITIATE NEXT JOB IN Q2
END
VII-16
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PROCESS TB	 ''TEST BENCH (MANUAL)
THIS PROCESS SIMULATES ALL WORK DONE AT THE MANUAL
TEST BENCH.
IF STATUS(JOB.TB) = 1 ''PRE.REPAIR
LET TM.PRE.REPAIR(JOB.TB) = UNIFORM.F(.8,16.,8) * 60.
WORK TM.PRE.REPAIR(JOB.TB) MINUTES
IF RANDOM.F(1) LE CHECK.PROB " FAULT CONFIRMED ?
LET STATUS(JOB.TB) = 2 ''REPAIR 	 3
ELSE
	
1
SCHEDULE AN END.JOB GIVING JOB.TB NOW
GO TO RETRN
ALWAYS
ALWAYS
IF STATUS(JOB.TB)	 2 ''REPAIR
LET TM.REPAIR(JOB.TB) = UNIFORM.F(.5,4.,6) * 60.
WORK TM.REPAIR(JOB.TB) MINUTES
LET STATUS(JOB.TB)= 3 91POST.REPAIR
ALWAYS
IF STATUS(JOB.TB) = 3 '' POST.REPAIR
LET TM.POST.REPAIR( JOB.TB) = UNIFORM.F(2.,8.,9) * 60.
WORK TM.POST.REPAIR(JOB.TB) MINUTES
CALL CHECK.REPAIR GIVING JOB.TB
ALWAYS
'RETRN'
SCHEDULE A Q1.MON NOW ''INITIATE NEXT JOB IN Q1
END
PROCESS RB	 '' REPAIR BENCH'
G
THIS PROCESS SIMULATES ALL WORK DONE AT THE REPAIR BENCH.
WORK TM.REPAIR(JOB.RB) MINUTES
LET STATUS ( JOB . RB) = 3 '' POST.REPAIR
`	 LET PRTY(JOB.RB) = MAX.F(PRTY(JOB.RB),2)
FILE JOB.RB TN 01
SCHEDULE A Q1.MON NOW ''INITIATE POST REPAIR TEST IF POSSIBLE
SCHEDULE A Q3.MON NOW ''INITIATE NEXT JOB IN 03
END
E?
i
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ROUTINE TO CHECK. REPAIR GIVEN JOB.CHECK 	 {
THIS ROUTINE DETERMINES IF THE REPAIR WAS SUCESSFUL.
IF SO THE JOB IS TERMINATED. IF NOT SUCESSFUL, THE JOB
IS ASSIGNED STATUS = 1 AND FILED IN Ql.
DEFINE JOB.CHECK AS AN INTEGER VARIABLE
IF RANDOM.F(2) LE REPAIR.PROB '' FAULT REPAIRED ?	 j
SCHF.DUf,E AN END.JOB GIVING JOB.CHECK NOW ''ACTIVATE JOB IF POSSIB
L r,
ELSE
CALL SET.PARM GIVING JOB.CHECK
FILE JOB.CHECK IN Ql
SCHEDULE A Ql.MON NOW ''INITIATE JOB IF POSSIBLE
ALWAYS
END
}
EVENT FOR Ql.MON
THIS EVENT SCANS Ql AND INITIATES AS MANY JOBS AS POSSIBL
SENDING THEM TO EITHER AN ATE OR TB. ANY PRTY=3 JOBS
REMAINING AT THE END OF THE SCAN ARE SENT TO THE INTERRUP!
ROUTINE TO DETERMINE IF AN INTERRUPT IS POSSIBLE.
IF SHIFT = 0	 ''OVER
RETURN
ELSE
FOR EACH JOB IN Ql WITH EQ.TYPE NE 2 ''NOT A TEST BENCH.
WHILE N.EV.S(I.ATE) LT NO.ATE ''ATE AVAILABLE
DO
REMOVE JOB FROM Ql
ACTIVATE AN ATE GIVING JOB NOW
LOOP
FOR RACH TB IN TB.INTERRUPT
WHILE N.EV.S(I.TB) LT NO.TB ''TEST BENCH AVAILABLE
DO
REMOVE TB FROM TB.INTERRUPT
IF BETWEENN = 'TRACE'
PRINT 1 LINE WITH CTIME AND NUMBER(JOB.TB)
THUS
*-**.** JOB	 RESUMED AT TB
ALWAYS
RESUME TB
LOOP
FOR EACH JOB IN 01 WITH tO.TYPE NE 1 ''NOT ATE
WHILE N.EV.S(I.TB) LT NO.TB	 ''TEST BENCH AVAILABLE
DO
REMOVE J05 FROM Ql
ACTIVATE A T5 GIVING JOB NOW
LOOP
FOR EACH JOB IN 01 WITH PRTY 	 3	 INTERRUPT ACTIVE JOBS IF POSE
IBLE
CALL INTERRUPT GIVING JOB
ENT)
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EVENT FOR Q2.MON
of THIS EVENT SCANS Q2 AND INITIATES AS MANY JOBS AS POSSIBLE.
of IF ANY ATE S ARE AVAILABLE AT THE END, QI.MON IS ACTIVATED
10
	
SEARCH FOR QUEUED JOBS THERE.
IF SHIFT = 0 ' 'SHIFT OVER?
RETURN
ELSE
FOR EACH ATE IN ATE.INTERRUPT
WHILE N.EV.S(I.ATE) LT NO.ATE ''ATE AVAILABLE
DO
REMOVE ATE FROM ATE.INTERRUPT
IF BETWEEN.V = 'TRACE'
PRINT 1 LINE WITH CTIME AND NUMBER(JOB.AlE)
THUS
JOB	 * RESUMED AT ATE
ALWAYS
`
	
	 RESUME ATE
LOOP
Q
FOR EACH JOB IN Q2
WHILE N.EV.S(I.ATE) LT NO.ATE ''ATE AVAILABLE
DO
REMOVE JOB FROM Q2
ACTIVATE AN ATE GIVING JOB NOW
Loop
IF N.EV.S(I.ATE) LT NO.ATE ''ATE AVAILABLE ?
SCHEDULE A Q1.MON NOW
ALWAYS
END
s
Y
i
y1y
1
EVENT FOR Q3.MON
THIS EVENT SCANS Q3 AND INITIATES AS MANY REPAIRS AT THE
R[SPAIR BENCHES AS POSSIBLE.
	 ANY PRTY=3 JOBS REMAINING
IN 03 ARE SENT TO THE INTERRUPT ROUTINE TO DETERMINE IF
AN INTERRUPT IS POSSIBLE.
IF SHIFT = 0	 ''SHIFT OVER
RETURN
ELSE
FOR EACH RB IN RB.INTERRUPT
WHILE N.EV.S(,I.RB) LT NO.RB
	
''REPAIR BENCH AVAILABLE ? 1
D0
REMOVE RB FROM RB.INTERRUPT
IF BETWEEN.V = 'TRACE'
i	 PRINT 1 LINE WITH CTIME AND'NUMBER(JOB.RB)
THUS
f+JOB	 * RESUMED AT RB 1
ALWAYS
RESUME RB
LOOP I
FOR EACH JOB IN Q3
WHILE N.EV.S(I.RB) LT NO.RB 	 ''REPAIR BENCH AVAILABLE
DO
REMOVE JOB FROM Q3
ACTIVATE A RB GIVING JOB NOW
`	 LOOP
6 ;
FOR EACH JOB IN Q3 WITH PRTY = 3	 ''INTERRUPT ACTIVE JOB IF POSSIBLE
CALL RB..INTERRUPT GIVING JOB
END
i
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ROUTINE TO INTERRUPT GIVEN JOB.INT
" THIS ROUTINE SEARCHES THE ATE(S) AND TB ( S) TO DETERMINE IF Tt
" GIVEN JOB MAY INTERRUPT AN ACTIVE JOB. IF AN INTERRUPT IS
POSSIBLE THE ACTIVE PROCESS IS INTERRUPTED AND FILED IN THE
" INTERRUPT QUEUE. THE GIVEN JOB THEN ACTIVATES THE AVAILABLE
" ATE OR TB.
DEFINE JOB . INT AS AN INTEGER VARIABLE
IF EQ . TYPE ( JOB.INT) NE 2	 "NOT A TEST BENCH
FOR EACH ATE IN EV.S(I.A°B) WITH STA .A(ATE) - 1 " ACTIVE ATE(S)
DO
IF PRTY(JOB.ATE) LT 3
INTERRUPT ATE
IF TIME.A(JOB.ATE) GT K1/1440.
IF BETWEEN .V - 'TRACE'
PRINT 1 LINE WITH CTIME, NUMBER(JOB.INT) AND NUMBER (JOB.AT
E)
THUS
* — ** e • " JOB NUMBER	 "	 INTERRUPTED JOB NUMBER •
ALWAYS
LET TIME.A ( JOB.ATE)	 - TIME . A(JOB-P TE)*1.1
LET PRTY ( JOB.ATE) - 2
FILE ATE IN ATE.INTERRUPT
REMOVE JOB.INT FROM 01
ACTIVATE AN ATE GIVING JOB.INT NOW
RETURN
ELSE'
RESUME ATE
CYCLE
ELSE
LOOP
ALWAYS
IF EQ . TYPE ( JOB.INT) NE 1	 ''NOT  AN ATE
FOR EACH TB IN EV.S(I.TB) WITH STA.A(TB)
	 1 "ACTIVE TB(S)
DO
IF PRTY(JOB.TB) LT 3
INTERRUPT TB
IF TIME.A(JOB.TB) GT K2/1440.
IF BETWEEN . V -	 'TRACE'
PRINT 1 LINE WITH CTIME, NUMBER(JOB.INT) AND NUMBER (JOB.TB
THUS
JOB NUMBER
	 •	 INTERRUPTED JOB NUMBER
ALWAYS
LET TIME.A(JOB.TB) - TIME.A(JOB.TB)*1.1
LET PRTY(JOB^.,'	 j	 - 2
FILE TB IN TB .4. NTERRUPT
REMOVE JOB.INT FROM 01
ACTIVATE A TB GIVING JOB.INT NOW
RETURN
ELSE
RESUME TB
CYCLE,
ELSE
-
LOOP lei
ALWAYS
END ^,^
_9
ROUTINE FOR RB..INTERRUPT GIVEN JOB..INT
THIS ROUTINE ENTERS WITH A PRTY=3 JOB. A SEARCH OF ACTIVE
JOBS AT THE REPAIR BENCHES IS MADE TO LOCATE A JOB THAT MAY
BE INTERRUPTED. IF AN INTERRUPT IS POSSIBLE, THE IN'T'ERRUPTED
PROCESS IS PLACED IN THE INTERRUPT QUEUE AND THE NEW REPAIR IS
ACTIVATED.
DEFINE JOB..INT AS AN INTEGER VARIABLE
FOR EACH RB IN EV.S(I.RB) WITH STA.A(RB) 	 1
DO
IF PRTY(JOB.RB) LT 3
IF BETWEEN.V = 'TRACE'
PRINT 1 LINE WITH CTIME, NUMBER(JOB..INT) AND NUMBER(JOB.RB)
THUS
*--**:** JOB	 * INTERRUPTED JOB	 * AT REPAIR BENCH
ALWAYS
INTERRUPT RB
LET TIME.A(JOB.RB) = TIME.A(JOB.RB)*1.1
LET PRTY(JOB.RB) = MAX.F(PRTY,2)
FIVE RB IN RB.INTERRUPT
REMOVE JOB..INT FROM 03
ACTIVATE A RB GIVING JOB..INT NOW
RETURN
ELSE
LOOP
END
ORIGINAL PAGE I
OF POOR QUALITY
EVENT TO END.JOB
THIS EVENT COMPUTES JOB STATISTICS AND TERMINATES THE JOBS.
LET JOB = JOB.END
LET THRPT(TYPE)	 (TIME.V—START.TIME)*24. "HOURS
LET MNHRS(TYPE) = (TM.PRE.REPAIR
+ TMREPAIR
+ TM.POST.REPAIR)/6-0. ''HOURS
DESTROY JOB
END
r
^t
z
)
a
r
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PROCESS FOR SHIFT.CHANGE
THIS PROCESS SCHEDULES SHIFT CHANGES AND ALLOCATES OVERTIME
BASED ON THE END OF DAY BACKLOG.
DEFINE DAY AS AN INTEGER VARIABLE
UNTIL TIME.V GT END.TIME
DO
FOR DAY 1 TO 7
DO
IF DAY LE 5
CALL START SHIFT
WAIT 8 HOURS
IF N.Q1 GE 15	 'i OVERTIME ALLOCATION
SCHEDULE AN END.SHIFT IN 3 HOURS
JUMP AHEAD
ELSE IF N.Ql GE 10
SCHEDULE AN END.SHIFT IN 2 HOURS
JUMP AHEAD
ELSE IF N.Q1 GE 5
SCHEDULE AN END.SHIFT IN 1 HOUR
JUMP AHEAD
ELSE
SCHEDULE AN END.SHIFT NOW
HERE
WAIT 16 HOURS
ELSE
WAIT 24 HOURS
ALWAYS
LOOP ''DAILY
LOOP ''WEEKLY
END
r9
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ROUTINE TO START.SHIFT
" THIS ROUTINE INITIATES JOBS AT THE BEGINING OF THE SHIFT.
i
LET SHIFT = I
SCHEDULE A Q1.MON NOW
SCHEDULE A Q2.MON NOW
SCHEDULE A Q3.MON NOW
( t	 END
L
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EVENT TO END.SHIFT
THIS EVENT INTERRUPTS ACTIVE JOBS AT SHIFT END. THESE PROCESSES
ARE FILED IN THE INTERRUPT QUEUES. OVERTIME IS ALLOCATED
FOR JOBS NEAR COMPLETION.
LET SHIFT = 0
FOR EACH ATE IN EV.S(I.ATE) WITH STA.A(ATE) 	 1
DO
INTERRUPT ATE
IF TIME.A(ATE) LT K3/1440.
RESUME ATE
CYCLE
ELSE
LET TIME.A(ATE)	 TIME.A(ATE)*1.1
FILE ATE IN ATE.INTERRUPT
LOOP
FOR EACH RB IN EV.S(I.RB) WITH STA.A(RB) 	 1
DO
INTERRUPT RB
IF TIMEiA(RB) LT K3/1440.
RESUME RB
CYCLE
ELSE
LET TIME.A(RB) = TIME.A(RB)*1.1
FILE RB IN RB.INTERRUPT
LOOP
FOR EACH TB IN EV.S(I.TB) WITH STA.A(TB) 	 1
DO
INTERRUPT T8
IF TIME.A(TB) LT K3/1440.
RESUME TB
CYCLE
ELSE
LET TIME.A(TB) = TIME.A(TB)*1.1
FILEJ D ID IN 'I D .INTERRUPT
LOOP
END
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EVENT POR SIM.END
PRINT I LINE WITH CTIME AND NO.ARRIVALS THUS
SIMULATION ENDSD AT NO. JOBS
CALL RF.THRPT
CALL RP.MNHRS
STOP
END
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ROUTINr, . FOR RP.THRPT
DEFINE I,IHR AND MXHR AS INTEGER VARIABLES
START NEW PAGE
BEGIN REPORT PRINTING FOR I = 1 TO 18 IN GROUPS OF 9
BEGIN READING
$KIP 2 LINES
PRINT 3 LINES WITH A GROUP OF I FIELDS THUS
HISTOGRAM OF THROUGHPUT TIMES BY COMPONENT TYPE
COMPONENT TYPE
HOURS- ----- ----- ------ ----- ----- ------ ----- -----
END	 ''HEADING
LET MXHR = 0
FOR EACH STATISTIC
LET "ItHR = MAX .F(MXHR,MX.THRPT)
FOR IHR -,,, I TO MlNi.F(MXHR/4,25)	 BY 1
PRINT 1 LINE WITH IHR*4 AND A GROUP OF HS.THRPT(r,IHR) FIELDS THUS
PRINT 1 LINE THUS
---------- ----- ----- -----PRINT 1 LINE WITH A GROUP OF AV.THRPT(l) FIELDS-----THUS----- ----- -----
AVERAGE	
I	
*#* * . i6
* * 
*
PRINT 1 LINE WITH A GROUP OF VA.THRPT(I) F i ELDS ^HUS
VARIANCE	 *$* * * *
PRINT 1 LINE WITH A GROUP OF MX.THRPT(l) F I ELDS THUS
MAXIMUM	 * #*	 It .* * ' *
PRINT I LINE WITH A GROUP OF NO.THRPT(I) F iELDS 'THUS
NUMBER
END	 ''REPORT
END
OR	 is
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ROUTINE FOR RP.MNHRS
Ia DEFINE I,IHR AND MXHR AS INTEGER VARIABLES
START NEW PAGE
BEGIN REPORT PRINTING FOR I = 1 TO 18 IN GROUPS OF 9
BEGIN HEADING
SKIP 2 LINES
PRINT 3 LINES WITH A GROUP OF I FIELDS THUS
HISTOGRAM OF MANHOURS BY COMPONENT TYPE
COMPONENT TYPE
HOURS —0, --- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ------
END	 ''HEADING
LET MXHR = 0
FOR EACH STATISTIC
LET MXHR = MAX.F(MXHR,MX.MNHRS)
FOR IHR = I TO MIN.F(MXHR/2,25) BY 1
PRINT 1 LINE WITH IHR*2 AND A GROUP OF HS.MNHRS(I,IHR) FIELDS THUS
PRINT 1 LINE THUS
----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -----
PRINT 1 LI14E WITH A GROUP OF AV.MNHRS(l) FIELDS THUS
AVERAGE
PRINT 1 LINE WITH A GROU; OF 	 VLMNHRS(I) FIELDS THUS
VARIANCE
PRINT 1 LINE WITH A GROUP OF MLMNHRS(I) FIELDS THUS
MAXIMUM	 o
PRINT 1 LINE WITH A GROUP OF NOoMNHRS(I) FIELDS THUS
NUMBER
END	 ''REPORT
END
fi
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ROUTINE TO TRACE
IF RVENT.V	 I.ARRIVAL
PRINT I LIN ►, WITH CTIME AND NO.ARRIVALS+1 THUS
*-**•** PROCESS ARRIVAL 	 NO
RETURN
ELSE IF EVEN'V.V = I.SHIFT.CHANGE
PRINT 1 LINE WITH CTIME
AND MOD.F(SHIFT+1 f 2) THUS
*-**:** PROCESS SHIFT.CHANCE, SHIFT
RETURN
ELSE, IF EVENT.V = I.ATE
PRINT 1 LINE WITH CTIME, NUMBER(JOB.ATE) AND STATUS(JOB.ATE') THUS
*-**:** PROCESS ATE FOR JOB 	 * STATUS
RETURN
ELSE IF EVENT.V = I.RB
PRINT 1 LINE WITH CTIME, NUMBER(JOB.RB) AND STATUS(JOB.RB) THUS
*-**:** PROCESS RB FOR JOB 	 * STATUS
RETURN
ELSE IF EVENT.V = I.TB
PRINT 1 LINE WITH CTIME, NUMBER(JOB.TB) AND STATUS(JOB.TB) THUS
*-**:** PROCESS TB FOR JOB 	 * STATUS *
RETURN
ELSE IF EVENT.V	 I.QI.MON
PRINT 1 LINE WITH CTIME THUS
*-**:** EVENT Q1.MON
RETURN
ELSE IF EVENT.V = I.02.MON
PRINT 1 LINE WITH CTIME THUS
**:** EVENT 02.MON
RETURN
ELSE IF EVENT.V = I.Q3.MON
PRINT 1 LINE WITH CTIME THUS
*-**:** EVENT Q3.MON
RETURN
ELSE IF EVENT.V	 I.END.JOB
PRINT 1 LINE WITH CTIME AND NUMBER(JOB,
*-**:** EVENT END.JOB FOR JOB
RETURN
ELSE IF EVENT.V = I.END.SHIFT
PRINT 1 LINE WITH CTIME THUS
*-**:** EVENT END.SHIFT
RETURN
ELSE IF EVENT.V = I.SIM.END
PRINT 1 LINE WITH CTIME THUS
*-**.** EVENT SIM.END
RETURN
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ROUTINE TO PRINT.JOB
PRINT 4 LINES WITH NUMBER, TYPE, CQ.TYPC, PRTY, RANK,
TM.PRC.RGPAIR, TM.RFPAIR, TM.POST.-REPAIR,
AND STATUS THUS
L70B
NUMt3l^R
	
* TYPE * CQ.TYPE * PRTY * RANK
TM.PRE.REPAIR *.*** TM.REPAIR *.*** TM.POST.REPAIR *.***
STATUS
CND
...
.777i.
t
T
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REPLICATED SYSTEM COMPONENT REMOVALS
REPLICATED SYSTEM CMPONENT REMOVALS INTRODUCTION
In this appendix, a simplified fault-tolerant computer is considered, consisting of
several different stages in series, each stage having replicated components in parallel.
The predict on of line and shop maintenance cost depends on the ability to determine
the removal rate of the LRU and components within the LRU. The simplified fault-
tolerant multiprocessor (FTMP) has the following component characteristics:
Nineplex	 MTBF ( Each), Hours
o Central Processors
	
20,000
o Memories	 20,000
o 1/0 Ports	 30,000
o Clocks	 30,000
To dispatch the airplane, there must be no more than one failure in any nineplex. Two
or more failures in any nineplex will entail removal and repair of the entire FTMP.
Two analytical solutions for the removal rate of the LRU are provided below: a
general solution to the removal rate of the components and a simulation program that
provides removal rate of the LRU and component stages. The SIMSCRIPT simulation
provides results in close agreement with the analytical solutions and represents a short
programming task compared with work required for the analytical solutions. Simula-
tion of 22 million operating hours costs approximately $10.
Dispatch with No More Than One Failure per Nineplex
The FTMP dispatch success rate is the existence of no more than one failure in any of
the four modules. In the (i)th nineplex, 1 < (i) < 4, the probability of success is given
by:
(1) R (t)	 NO failures) + P(1 failure
= P(9 successes) + P(8 successes)
(exp(-a(i).t))**9 + 9(exp(-a(i).t))**8
(1 - exp(-a(i).t))
where a(i)	 1/M(i) 
	 failure rate of each of the 9 subunits
t:	 Simplifying,
(2) _ R(i)
	 exp(-9a(i).t) + 9 exp(-8a(i).t)
In this case,
a(1) = a(3) = 1/20,000 failures/hour
a(2) = a(4) = 1/30,000 failures/hour
Therefore,
R(FTMP) = (R(1)**2).(R.(2)**2)
i }
g
i
= (-8 exp(-9a(1).t)_+ 9 exp (-8a(1).t))**2)
. (-8 exp(-9a(2).t) + 9 exp (-8a(2)•t))**2), where
VIII-1
..
2(s)	 R(FTMP) =	 IT	 64 exp( -18a(i).t)- 144 exp (-17a(i).t)
i=1
	
+ 81 exp (-1 6a (i) . 0)
To obtain the FTMP 's mean time to removal,
(4)	 MTTR(FTMP) =	 IQ R(FTMP) dt
Expanding equation (3) and integrating term-by -term, we obtain
(5)
	 MTTR(FTMP) =	 4096	 -	 9216	 +	 5184
18 a 1
	 + a^27	 1-8a(l) + 17a(2)	 18a (l) + 16a 2
-	 9216	 +	 20,736	 -	 11t664
17a1	 +18a2j	 17a1	 +a;t^j	 17a1	 +16a2f
+	 5184	 -	 11,664	 +	 6561
16a(l) + 18a(2)	 16a 1	 + 17a(2)	 16 a 1	 + a(2)) 
In the case under analysis,
a	 = 1/20,000 = 5 x 10**(-5) failures/hr
a	 = 1/30 ,000 = 3.333 x 10**(-5)	 failures/hr
Substituting in (5),
MTTR	 = 2259 hours; removal rate /1000 hours = 1.000 /2259 r	 s
-, 0.443
R(FTMP) was programmed on the T1 /59. The program listing and user instructions are
provided in Figure 4.
As verification, R(FTMP) was tabulated and integrated via the trapezoidal Simpsonts a
Rule (see fig. 1), obtaining an approximate result of 2255 hours, which agrees
beautifully with the exact analytiusal result of 2259 hours.
If only the offending nineplex were removed rather than the entire FTMP; what would
this do to overall removal rate?	 Integrating equation (2) from 0 to :^Ifinity,
(6)
	
MTTR 	 =	 -8	 +	 9	 = -8M (i)
	
+ 9M(i) 1
9a(i)
	 8a(i)	 9	 8
a
whero M(i) are the MTBF's for component type (i).
If M(1) = 30,000 = M(3), then MTTR(1) = MTTR(3) = 7083 hours
If M(2) = 20,000 = M(4), then MTTR(2) = MTTR(4) = 4722 hours
To depict the difference that results from removing the entire FTMP, compare the
{	 expected number of removals per 1000 hours.
k
j,
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i
Removal bevel	 Removuis 1000, Hours
Entire FTMP	 0.443
Central Proc. I s	 0.212
Memories	 0.212
1 /0 Ports	 0.141
;locks	 0.141
TOTAL	 0.706
ltemoving at the, nineplex level would entail 61 percent more .airplane removal actions
than at the FTMP level.
Dispatch with No More Than Two Failures per Nineplex
If the FTMP dispatch success state is relaxed to permit a maximum of two failures per
nineplex, what is the expected improvement in MTTR? Employing the same notation
as before, for each nineplex
(7) R(i) = P (9 successes) + P(8 successes) + P(7 successes)
(exp( -9a(i).t)) + 9(exp(-9a(i).t)) (1 - exp(-a(i).t))
+ 36(exp(-7a(i).t)) (1	 exp(-a(i).t))**2
= 28 exp(-9a(i).t) - 63 exp( -8a(i).t) + 36 exp(-7a(i).t)
Simplifying,
(8) R(i) = 784 exp( -18a(i).t) - 3528 exp(-17a(i).t)
+ 5985 exp(-16a(i).t) - 4536 exp(-15a(i).t)
+ 1296 exp(-14a(i).t) 1 1 e- i :^= 2
2
The complete formula, of course, is yield/ad by i nl (R(i))**2
and is shown in Figure 3.
The removal rate per nineplex is determined by integrating equation (7):
a
MT ,rR(i)
	
tQ (28 exp(-9a(i).t) - 63 exp(-8a(i)•t)
	
+	
1
36 exp(-7a(i).t)dt
_ 28	 63 + 36
9a i T 8a Ti	 7a(i)
1/a(i)(0.379)	 0.379M(i)
where M (1) = 3.0 1 000 hours, MTTR(1)	 11v370 hours
M(2)=  20, 000 hours, MTTR (2) = 7 580 hours
As before, the expected number of removals per 1000 hours will be compared.
J
a
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Removal Level	 Removals /1000 'Hours
Entire FTMP
	
0.230
Central Proc. I s 	 0.132
Memories	 0.132
1/0 Ports	 0.088
Clocks	 0.088
TOTAL	 0.440"t
In this case, vemoval at the nineplex level would require 91 percent more removal
actions than at the highest (FTMP) level The TI/59 computer program for R(FTMP) in
this case is given In Figure 5.
A NOTE ON ANALYSIS METHODS
In general, combinatorial reliability problems, such as the subject "k out of n" system,
become forbiddingly complex if exact solutions are sought for MTBR. 	 Furthermore,
the calculations ordinarily involve small differences between very large numbers and
erroneous results may occur due to computer (or calculator) truncation errors. 	 As
demonstrated here, Simpson's Rule integration of the reliability function is quite
'	 accurate for MTBF or MTTR determination. Furthermore, if any or all of the failure
tanalytical power, whereas the Simpson s Itule approach offersno inherentdifficulties.
SUMMARY
A simplified FTMP was analyzed here for two dispatch rules. ^s
a
onefailure in an	 nineplex; repairP	 y	  with two or
P	
A.
	 Dispatch
 tch if no
P	 P^
in any6	 YB.	 Dispatch if no more than two failures in any nineplex, repair if three or
more failures in any nineplex.
The results for each case are repeated below.
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The remainder of appendix Villoonsists of output from the
	 6]
reliability simulation and a listing of the program.
k'j
C14
E O+RIO(NAL FAi^C !,6Off' 
Po()R QUALITY
79/08/11. 12.23.14,
EKS2 175n.N0460.41B 79/08/0 5. DS-0	 20.21.28. 79/08/09.
TERMINAL
	
5, TTY
RECOVER/USER ID 1 rose
N>call,box
INPUT THE TOTAL NUMBER OF BOX FAILURES TO BE RUN
(SUGGEST A MINIMUM OF 1000)
I>10000
THERE ARE 4 DIFFERENT TYPES OF COMPONENTS (CLOCK, CPU, MEMORY, AND I/O PORT
EACH TYPE HAS 9 COMPONENTS, SEVEN OF WHICH MUST BE OPERATING FOR THE BOX TO
OPERATE
COMPONENT	 MEAN TIME BETWEEN FAILURES
CLOCK	 30000 HOURS
CPU	 20000 HOURS
MEMORY	 20000 HOURS
I/O PORT
	
30000 HOURS
«trircc>»»» )
<<	 >>N RESULTS	 >?
E << < «<»»» >i ^
TOTAL BOX OPERATING HOURS = 	 2560.2470 YEARS (22^427^764.1456 HOURS)
TOTAL NUMBER OF FAILURES OF THE BOX = 10000
MINIMUM NUMBER OF COMPONENTS FAILED WHEN THE BOX FAILED =	 2
MAXIMUM NUMBER OF COMPONENTS FAILED WHEN THE BOX FAILED =	 5 m
}AVERAGE NUMBER OF COMPONENTS FAILED WHEN THE BOX FAILED =	 3.2489
} TOTAL NUMBER OF COMPONENTS FAILED = 32489
.gam
REMOVAL RATE
	 NUMBER OF FAILURES AS
COMPONENT	 (REMOVALS/OPERATING HOUR)	 FAILURES
—
	
------	
— ------------------ ---	 -
	 ---------
g OF TOTAL
----------- ^	 a
a CLOCK	 2.85584E-04	 6405 19.71
CPU	 4.34640E-04	 9748 30.00
-+
MEMORY	 4.29780E-04	 9639 29.67
I/O PORT	 2.98603E-04	 6697 20.61
BOX REMOVAL RATE =	 4.45876E-^04 REMOVALS/OPERATING HOUR
, 1
s' COMMENT.RUN COMPLETE
N?bye
JOB PROCESSING CRUS	 3.579
TOTAL JOB PROPRIETARY, CRUS 	 3.272
JOB PRINTING CRUS	 0.434
BYE
	
79/08/11.	 12.25.47.
t(
M
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'' TITLE;	 BOX RELIABILTY SIMULATION
''ANALYST:	 JIM WASSAL
''ENGINEER: JOHN ROSE
''DA'TE:	 JULY,1.979
" ABSTRACT .THIS PROGRAM SIMULATES 4 DIFFERENT STAGES OF A
HYPOTHETICAL FTMP WITH 9 COMPONENTS PER STAGE. B OF THE 9
"	 COMPONENTS IN EACH STAGE MUST BE OPERATIVE FOR DISPATCH.
^t
PREAMBLE
NORMALLY, MODE IS INTEGER
PERMANENT ENTITIES
EVERY TYPE HAS A MTBF, A NUMBER.F 'AILED AND A TOT . FAILED
DEFINE MTRF AS A REAL VARIABLE
EVERY TYPE AND UNIT HAS A STATUS AND A TIME . TO .FAILURE
DEFINE 'TIME.TO . FAILURE AS A REAL VARIABLE
EVENT NOTICES
EVERY FAILURE HAS A TYPE . FAILING AND A UNIT.FAILING
DEFINE LIMIT, MAX.FAILURES, COMPONENTS . FAILED,
SUM.OF. COMPONENTS. FAILED, TOTAL.FAILURES AS INTEGER VARIABLES
TALLY MIN . COMPONENTS . FAILED AS THE MINIMUM,
MAX.COMPONENTS . FAILED AS THE MAXIMUM,
AVG'.COMPONENTS . FAILED AS THE AVERAGE AND
TOT.COMPONENTS . FAILED AS THE SUM OF COMPONENTS . FAILED
DEFINE GOOD	 TO MEAN 1
DEFINE BAD	 TO MEAN 0
DEFINE EXCEEDED TO MEAN 1
DEFINE RESET	 TO MEAN 0
END ''OF PREAMBLE
-
3
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MAIN
DEFINE FIRST,FAILURE AS A REAL VARIABLE
USE UNIT 7 FOR OUTPUT
PRINT 3 LINES THUS
INPUT THE TOTAL NUMBER OF BOX FAILURES TO BE RUN
(SUGGEST A MINIMUM OF 1000)
READ LIMIT
SKIP 2 LINES
CREATE EACH TYPE(4) AND UNIT(9)
PRINT 20 LINES THUS
THERE ARE 4 DIFFERENT TYPES OF COMPONENTS (CLOCK, CPU, MEMORY, AND I/O
PORT)
EACH TYPE HAS 9 COMPONENTS, SEVEN OF WHICH MUST BE OPERATING FOR THE B
OX TO
OPERATE
COMPONENT	 MEAN TIME BETWEEN FAILURES
CLOCK 30000 HOURS
CPU 20000 HOURS
MEMORY 20000 HOURS
I/O PORT 30000 HOURS
<<<<<<«?»}»>
<,< RESULTS
<<<<»>»»
LET MTBF (l)	 _	 !
LET MTBF(2) = 2
LET MTBF(3)	 = 2
f LET MTBF(4) - 3 i
` LET FIRST.FAILURE = RINF.0
FOR EACH TYPE, FOR EACH UNIT,DO
LET STATUS(TYPE,UNIT) = GOOD
LET TIME.TO .FAILURE(TYPE,UNIT)	 EXPONENTIAL.F(MTBF(TYPE),3)
IF TIME.TO .FAILURE(TYPE,UNIT)
	 < FIRST.FAILURE,
LET FIRST.FAILURE = TIME.TO .FAILURE(TYPE,UNIT)
ALWAYS
LOOP
FOR EACH TYPE, FOR EACH UNIT,
SCHEDULE A FAILURE GIVING TYPE AND UNIT
j IN TIME.TO .FAILURE(TYPE,UNIT) - FIRST.FAILURE HOURS
START SIMULATION
END "OF MAIN ROUTINE
'a
i
I i
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EVENT FAILURE GIVEN TYPE AND UNIT
s
IF TOTAL.FAILURES >= LIMIT, tEk
PRINT 7 LINES WITH TIME.V*1.0040/365, TIME.V * 240000, LIMIT,
MIN,COMPONENTS.FAILED, MAX.COMPONENTS.FAILED,
AVG.COMPONENTS.FAI_LED, TOT.COMPONENTS . FAILED THUS
TOTAL BOX OPERATING HOURS ffi	 *.**** YEARS (	 *.''*** HOURS)
TOTAL NUMBER OF FAILURES OF THE BOX =	 r
MINIMUM NUMBER OF COMPONENTS FAILED WHEN THE BOX FAILED
MAXIMUM NUMBER OF COMPONENTS FAILED WHEN THE BOX FAILED :
AVERAGE NUMBER OF COMPONENTS FAILED WHEN THE BOX FAILED m	 * ****
TOTAL NUMBER OF COMPONENTS FAILED s	 *
SKIP 3 LINES
PRINT 12 LINES WITH TOT.FAILED ( 1)/TIME.V/240000, TOT.FAILED(1),
TOT.FAILED ( 1)/TOT.COMPONENTS.FAILED*100,
TOT.FAILED(2)/TIME.V/240000, TOT.F4ILED(2),
TOT.FAILED(2)/TOT.COMPONENTS.FAILED*100,
TOT.FAILED(3)/TIME.V/240000, TOT.FAILED(3),
TOT.FAILED(3)/TOT'.COMPONENTS.FAILED*100,
TOT.FAILED(4)/TIME.V/240000, TOT.FAILED(4)0
TOT.FAILED(4)/TOT.COMPONENTS.FAILED*100, LIMIT/TIME.V/240
000 THUS
REMOVAL RATE	 NUMBER OF
	
FAILURES AS
COMPONENT	 (REMOVALS/OPERATING HOUR)	 FAILURES	 8 OF TOTAL",
---------
	
--------------- --------- 	 ---------
	
-----------
CLOCK
	
............	
***t:n	 **	 * 1
F
CPU	 ............	 +ttt*	 •tt,i
MEMORY	 ..	 tt**t	 tt^t^
.....I/O PORT	 ...	 ttt+t	 tt,tt
BOX REMOVAL RATE _	 ............ REMOVALS/OPERATING HOUR3jf
STOP
ELSE
LET STATUS(TYPE,UNIT) = BAD
ADD 1 TO NUMBER.FAILED(TYPE)
ADD 1 TO TOT . FAILED ( TYPE) w
IF NUMBER . FAILED(TYPE) = 2 OR MAX.FAILURES = EXCEEDED,
FOR EACH SAME.TIME.FAILURE IN EV . S(I.FAILURE),
WITH TIME.A(SAME . TIME' . FAILURE) = TIME.V,
FIND THE FIRST CASE
IF FOUND,
LET MAX . FAILURES = EXCEEDED
RETURN
ELSE
LET MAX . FAILURES = RESETi
ADD 1 TO TOTAL.FAILURES
r	 FOR EACH TYPE,
DO r1ADD NUMBER.FAILED(TYPE) TO SUM.OF.COMPONENTS.FAILED y
LET NUMBER.FAILED(TYPE) = 0 j
ALSO FOR EACH UNIT, WITH STATUS(TYPE,UNIT) = BAD, ^u
DO
LET STATUS(TYPE,UNIT) = GOOD
SCHEDULE A FAILURE GIVING TYPE AND UNIT'
IN EXPONENTIAL.F(MTBE'TYPE),3) HOURS
LOOP
LET COMPONENTS.FAILED = SUM.OF.COMPONENTS.FAILED
LET SUM.OF.COMPONENTS.FAILED = 0 GM
ALWAYS
APPENDIX IX
HYPOTHETICAL FTMP COST AND BENEFIT ANALYSIS
4
An example is provided in this appendix of a Cost and Benefit Analysis of two
hypothetical configgurations for Fault Tolerant Multiprocessors (FTMP). The first
configuration FTMP9, consists of 4 stages with 9 components in parallel in each stage
and a requirement that at least 8 out of 9 components in each stage must be operating
for dispatch. The second configuration, FTMP8, also consists of 4 stages but all 8
components of each stage are required for dispatch (i.e., no replication for dispatch.
reliability).
The question to be answered is "Does FTMP9 justify the additional investment
required?"
Tor the example, it was assumed that FTMP8 or FTMP9 are required for an aciive
control system which results in 2964 and 2960 pound reductions in structural weight
for the respective alternatives.
The current version of ACES was used for the analysis. Removal rates used for
FTMP9 were derived in appendix VIII. While there are a number of shortcomings in the
current ACES type of analysis, the analysis does serve to indicate the advantages of
replication and importance of accurately assessing delay, cancellation, and spares
cost, which turn out to be very significant in the sample analysis. Note that ACES in
its present form does not answer the question "Are the weight savings benefits of
zither scheme economically justified?" and in any event _a total. Fault Tolerant Active
f'	 Control System Analysis would be necessary for this purpose.
DESIGN TOTAL COST' 	 OWNERSHIP SUMMARY
PROGRAM
	 TECO38	 ORIGINAL PAGE IS
VERSION	 CO38G1	 OF POOR QUALITY
RUN DATE
	 08/10/79
ANALYST	 OIIARE/7-0102/9R-27.	 AIRPLANE MODEL 767
INVESTMENT ASSUMPTIONS FOR CASE FTMP8	 OF DESIGN FLT-CNTRL
BASE YEAR FOR EQUIVALENT VALUE 	 1979
TAX RATE	 50.00 PER CENT
INVESTMENT TAX CREDIT RATE 	 10.00 PER CENT
TAX DEPRECIATION LIFE	 10 YEARS
USEFUL LIFE OF PROJECT	 15 YEARS
EQUIPMENT LIFE	 20 YEARS
FLEET SIZE/YEAR	 9.	 21.	 30.	 30.
INFLATION RATE/YEAR	 8.00	 8.00	 8.00 ...	 8.00
MIN. ATTR. RKRE OF RET./YEAR 15.00 15.00 15.00 ...	 15.00
COST ANALYSIS - (SEE D6-42875 FOR DEFINITIONS)
PEX PEX.	 AV.
CUMULATIVE CUM. PRESENT PC OF DOLLARS/
CASH FLOW EQ. VAL(PEX) IC+OC FLT. HR .
-1740896. -1512925.
-1.35
-292058. -250831. -66.7 -.22
-342. -342. -.1 -.00
0. 0. 0.0 0.00
0. 0. 0.0 0.00
0. 0. 0.0 0.00
0. 0. 0.0 0.00
-10000. -10000. -2.7 -.01
0. 0. 0.0 0.00
0. 0. 0.0 0.00
-211136. -72153. -19.2
-284406.
-97372. -25.9
-441597. -151089. -40.1
-698534. -240781. -64.0
-32215. -16356. --4.3
12357833. 4156416.
-3931561. -1378459.
-121461. -49794. -13.2
0. 0. 0.0
ENTITY	 I
INVESTMENTS:
AIRPLANE
ROTABLE SPARES
EXPENDABLE SPARES
GROUND EQUIPMENT
SPECIAL TOOLS
BUILDINGS
RAMP EQUIPMENT
TRAINING EQUIPMENT
MAINTENANCE MANUALS
OTHER
OPERATING COSTS:
MAINTENANCE:
MAINTENANCE MATERIAL
MAINTENANCE BURDEN
SPARES HOLDING
MAINTENANCE TRAINING
FUEL/WEIGHT
DELAYS/CANCELLATIONS
AIRPLANE INSURANCE
0'111ER
RETIREMENT COST:
-.06
-.09
-.14
-.22
-.01
3.72
-1.23
-.04
0.00
NET CREDIT 0. -0. 0.00
TAXATION:
INVEST. TAX CREDIT 184532. 162528. .15
DEPRECIATION CREDIT 1021477. 621815. .56
INCOME TAX BSNEFIT -3318462. -1075207. -.96
TOTAL 2481174. 85451.	 100.0
IX-2
-77224.
-310234.
-367728.
-392917.
32215.
12341156.
-1317607.
-138024.
0.
0.
194489.
10 75297.
-48526.04.
3971422.
26390.
-106215.
-125862.
-13601.9.
-16356.
4150807.
-461971.
-56584.
0.
0.
171488.
655651.
-1610705.
567195.
-2.0
-7.9
-9.3
-10.1;
-1.2
307.3
-34.2
-4.2
0.0
100.0
-.02
-.10
.13.
.12
.01
3.72
.41
-.05
0.00
0.00
b
.15
.59
-1.44
%,,
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DESIGN TOTAL COST OF OWNERSHIP SUMMARY
PROGRAM	 TECO38
VERSION	 CO38G1
RUN DATE	 08/10/79
ANALYST	 OHARE/7-0102/9R-27. 	 AIRPLANE MODEL 767
INVESTMENT ASSUMPTIONS FOR CASE FTMP9 OF DESIGN FLT-CNTRL
BASE YEAR FOR EQUIVALENT VALUE 1979
TAX RATE	 50.00 PER CENT
INVESTMENT TAX CREDIT RATE	 10.00 PER CENT
TAX DEPRECIATION LIFE 10 YEARS
USEFUL LIFE OF PROJECT 15 YEARS
EQUIPMENT LIFE 20 YEARS
FLEET SIZE/YEAR	 9. 21.	 30. ... 30.
INFLATION RATE/YEAR 	 8.00 8.00	 8.00 ... 8.00
MIN. ATTR. RATE OF RET./YEAR	 15.00 15.00	 15.00 ... 15.00
COST ANALYSIS - (SEE D6-42875 FOR DEFINITIONS)
PEX PEX.	 AV.
ENTITY	 CUMULATIVE CUM. PRESENT	 PC OF DOLLARS/
CASH FLOW EQ. VAL(PEX) IC+OC FLT. HR .
INVESTMENTS:
AIRPLANE	 -1978291. -1719232. ***** -1.54
ROTABLE SPARES	 -162303. -141043. -10.4 -.13
EXPENDABLE SPARES	 -374. -374. -.0 -.00
GROUND EQUIPMENT 	 0. 0. 0.0 0.00
SPECIAL TOOLS	 0. 0. 0.0 0.00
BUILDINGS	 0. 0. 0.0 0.00
RAMP EQUIPMENT	 0. 0. 0.0 0.00
TRAINING EQUIPMENT	 -10000. -10000. -:7 -.01
MAINTENANCE MANUALS	 0. 0. 0.0 0.00
OTHER	 0. 0. 0.0 0.00
OPERATING COSTS:
MAINTENANCE LABOR
MAINTENANCE MATERIAL
MAINTENANCE BURDEN
SPARES HOLDING
MAINTENANCE TRAINING
FUEL/WEIGHT
DELAYS/CANCELLATIONS
AIRPLANE INSURANCE
OTHER
RETIREMENT COST:
NET CREDIT
TAXATION:
INVES`'. TAX CREDIT`
DEPRECIATION CREDIT
INCOME TAX BENEFIT
TOTAL
IX-3
ICOMPARISON OF CASE FTMP9 AND	 CASE FTMP8
lc^
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INVESTMENT ANALYSIS -
DESIGN FLT-CNTRL
ENTITY:
INVESTMENT
OPERATING
RETIREMENT
TAX
TOTAL
CUMULATIVE
CASH FLOW
- 2150967.
9705207,
0.
-3582818.
3971422.
CuM.PR4SENT
EQUIV.VALUE
-1870649.
3221410.
0.
-783566.
567195,
CUMULATIVE
CASH FLOW
-2043296.
6636924.
0.
-2112453.
2481174.
CUM.PRESENT
EQUIV.VALUE
-1774098.
2150413.
0.
- 290864.
85451.
ki
tj
COMPARISON OF CASE FTMP9	 MINUS	 CASE FTMP8
ENTITY: CUMULATIVE CUM.PRESENT
CASH FLOW EQUIV.VALUE
DIFFERENCE DIFFERENCE
1 "'I'VE S T M E N T - 1 07671. -96551.
OPERATING 3068283. 1070997.
RETIREMENT 0. 0.
TAX -1470365. -4927034
TOTAL 1490248. 481744.
INVESTMENT IN	 CASE FTMP9	 INSTEAD OF	 CASE FTMP8
YEARS TO PAYBACK PRES.EQ.VAL. OF CASH
	 1.97
EXTRA RETURN ON INVESTMENT 12.67
MINIMUM ATTRACTIVE RATE OF RETURN 15.00	 15.00	 15.00	 ...	 15.00
COMBINED RATE OF RETURN 27.67	 27.67	 27.67	 ...	 27.67
IX4
rAy.
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APPENDIX X
Partition Theory for Counting Possible Packaging Schemes
With the ,advent of inexpensive large and very large scale
integration and the geometrically increasing cost of
maintenance labor, the widespread application of throwaway
and/or replacement modules is just around the corner.
This will permit more freedom than heretofore to package
avionics systems such as the fault-tolerant flight control
system, FTFCS. other innovations will also be seen such
as actuators, sensors, and specialized computers packaged
as a unit. Optimization of packaging is a very relevant	 .!
consideration for the FTFCS and this appendix addresses
the problem of determining the number of unconstrained
packaging arrangements which can be made from N components.
How many ways a group or N components can be packaged
is treated by an application of combinatorial mathematics.
The number of distinct ways N different objects may be
arranged is N1 If N(1) are of one category, N(2) are
another, and so on, then the number of distinct patterns
becomes
a
t 	 -
i
X-1
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NI	 where
N (1) IN (2) 1	 N (K) I
N (1) + N_(2) +	 N JK) = N
However, it N(I)
	
N(j) vL i f then the relationship becomes
N (1) 1 N (2) 1	 N (K) I
where there are V pairs, triplets, or n-tuples. A simple
illustration will demonstrate the principles involved.
f ^^
xfi
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Consider four objects A, B, C and D.
F
r
No. of Distinct
Partitions Package Packaginas
4 ABCD 1
3+ 1 A-BCD 41	 - 4
B-ACD 31	 11
C-ABD
s
r
D-ABC
` AC-BD 21	 21
k^k AD-BC
2+1+1 AB=C-•D 41	 = 6
AC-8-D 21	 21
°a AD-B-C
A-B-CU
A--C-BD j
A-D-BC
1+1+1+ 1 A-B-C-D 1 3
TOTAL 15
3
The calculations for N = 1 through 6 are shown below.
7
.;F X-3
-777
J
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N Partitions Examples Packagngs Total
1 1 A 1
E
4 2 AB 1
1+1 A-B 1
2
3 3 ABC 1
2+1 AB—C 3 1/21 11 3
1+1+1 A-13-C 1
5
4 4 ABCD 1
3+1 ABC—D 41/31	 , 4
2+2 Ab—CD 41/212121	 = 3
241+1 AFB—C—D 41/211111	 - b
1 +1 + 1+ 1 A—B—C-D 1
15
5 5 ABCDF. 1
4+1 - A-BODE 51/4111	 = S
3+2 ABC-DE 51/3121	 = 10
3+1+1 ABC—D-E 51/3121
	 = 10
2+2+1 AB-CD-E 51/2121.21	 = 15
2+1+1+1 A13-C-D—E 51/213!'	 = 10 s
1+1+ 1+1+i A-B—C-D-E 1
52
;.'.
,. X "T
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b	 6 ABCDEF 1
5+1 A-BCDEF 61/5ti =	 6
4+2 ABCD-LF 6t/4121 = 15
4+1+1 ABC'`D-E-F 61/4121 = 15
3+3 ABC-DEF 61/213131 10
3+2+1 ABC-DE-F 61/312111 - .60
3+1+1 +1 ABC-D-E-F 61/3131 = 20
2+2+2 AB-CD-EF 6 1/21212121 = 45
2+2+1+1 AB-CD-E-F 61,/21212121 = 45
2+1+1+1+1 AB-C-D-E-F 61/2141 = 15
1+1+1+1 + 1 +1 A-B-C-D-E-F 1
233
The enumeration was also performed for N=7 and 8, with the results
tabled thus:
No. of Components, N
	 No. of Distinct Packagings D
^,^	
_
1 1
2
2
3 5
4 15
5 52
6 233
7 1087
8 8094
X•5
low
i'
An appr^,;s i'nate relationship for .N ?- 4 is given as D (N)
= exp (exp (. 2 + N/4)) . Using this relationship for N=10
produces 2,898,000 different packaging alternatives.
In the year 1935, H. Gupta published a table of partitioni
in the Proceedings of the London Mathematics Society,
Volume 39, pp. 142-149. This table does not solve our
problem directly, because it provides only the number
of partitions. For example with 6 objects, there are
11 partitions and 233 packagings. -However, Gupta provides
a useful asymtotic relationship on the number of
	 s
partitions, P (N)
	
This is, with Pi. = 3.14159...,	 i
P (N) = (1/(4N SQRT (3)) exp (Pi SQRT (2N/3))
Since the number of packagings is given by D(N) = exp
(exp(.2 + N/4)), then the average number of packagings
per partition, X(N), would be given by
X (N) = D(N)/P(N)
= 4N SQH?' (3) exp (exp (. 2 + N/4)	 Pi
S^1^T (ZN/3))
	
^^
with P (N) irom Gupta's tables,
U (N) , the number of packagings = P (N)	 X (N)
_	
^	 a
For N	 20, P (N) . from table 1, is 627	 3
X-b
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Substituting N=20, one obtains
D(N)	 627	 80 SQAT (3) exp (exp (5 . 2)	 Pi SQRT ( 40/3) )
4.82	 1079
For very modest numbers of objects, the number of packaging
schemes is astrononnical. If it were possible to cost
out 1 million packagings per nanosecond, xt would take
2.04 x 10 6 ► years for only 20 objectst The key to a
practical solution is to observe that although there are
an enormous nwnber of unconstrained packagings permitted,
as soon as practical constraints are introduced, the
number of possibilities is greatly reduced to a much
smaller and, hopefully, manageable quantity. We believe
due to the relatively small size of the FTFCS, whose
components are to be packaged in half-ATR boxes or smaller,
that installation costs and the costs of gaining access
to malfunctioning devices are virtually independent of
packaging. The major cost element will be for spares
inventory. Practical constraints which tend to restrict
packaging fee.dom are items such as;
• Shielding requirements! 9
Components reguiring shielding usually are
isolated.
	
_	
t
• Power consumption differences
a
E^
	
	 Power and signal level components are
usually isolated.
0 Failure rate disparities
X-7
High failure modules should not be packaged
with low failure ones.
• Maintenance approaches
it is unwise to mix rotables with nonrotables
and locally repairable modules should not be
,copackaged with depot- or vendor-repairable
modules.
• Shock-mounting
Only those modules requiring this should be
copaokaged.
Cooling and heat sinking
• Functional testing
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f	 TABLE 1
No. of Partitions, P(N), of N OBJECTS ve N
(Per Gupta, op cit)
N
u
1
4
2
t
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
r:
10
11
12
13
14
^ 15
P(N) N P(N)
1 20 627
2 25 1, 958
3 30 5, 604
5 35 14,883
7 40 37,338
11 45 89,134
15 50 204,226
i
22 55
i
k
451,276
30 60
r
966,467
	 j
42 65 2,012,558
56 70 4,087,968
77 75 8,118,264	 j
1,01 80 15,796,476
3
135 90 56,634, 173
176 100- 190, 569, 292
iI
e"f
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APPENDIX XI
DERIVATION OF DELAY AND CANCELLATION COSTS
(ABSTRACT FROM,REFERENCE (P) D6-40895-1)
The cost of a delay (excluding work required to fix the cause) is assumed to
consist of three parts:
* Crew cost For the extra time involved
Loss of revenue fron the passengers who take another
airline's flight
• Passenger handling expenses such as phones, taxis, meals, and
hotel accommodations.
CREW COSTS
Figure l shows a plot of flight
crew costs for a number of
airplane types and an equation
for the best straight line*
through the points is given by:
$ seat hour = 1.8- .0028;
where n is the number of seats
which is typical of a given
airplane type.
cR¢u cosYS (^a^i t tit
.o	
cAb_fyRh 4%
p 711 ^Tul. M nw GR .i^
^'S acq ^	 '117
101
you
'et ^ 'Dc 10
1^0	
3
747
160	 Sao	 1660
16 . or SEAZs
FIGURE 1
A
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LOSS OF PASSENGER REVENUE
Figure 2 provides a plot showing the number of passengers lost from
a cancellation. The curve is from a survey included in a report
entitled "Cost Benefit Analysis for A11 .-Weather Landing, Systecs"
prepared for FICA by R. Dixon Speas Associates (October 19-J-7, AD 661
834).
VAtiSQ^r,a'i.S 1.OS'T 7nRoJC^h
GA+vti^^.' .t+oNL« (`TrtuN^ oTc^M^4)
The N of passengers lost
-- 27,1110-"!'3y x s where s'	 Lo	 ...:,,..,.....
is the flight length in
thousands of statute miles,
VTo arrive at a delay cast the 	 a
assurantion is made that at
some length of delay = d hours :
the delay will turn into a	 o
cancelled flight. Typical	 r
values of d are assumed to be:
.	 ..
	
too*	 A
fu t►M'i-Ck4t.+ {S;AtuTt r, i+iS
FIGURE 2
eL
0075 hours for high frequency
s`iort range
1.50 hours for intermediate ranee
0
3 I
	 I3.00 hours, for long range
In addition it is assumed that up to the time a cancellation occurs,
the cost of _a delay increases in direct proportion to the ircrease
r	 in delay tine.
^'D
Correlation cocficien^. ^ - . 934 l
X[-2
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The typical revenue for a 10:90 split of first and tourist is given
^f
by s[
Revenue/passenger - 0.14 + 53.38) (1972 Dollars) whare s
(above) is the flight length in thousands of statute miles.
From a knowledge of the flight length, number of seats and load k
factor, it is thus possible to calculate the loss of revenue per
t
passenger:
_ 
27. 14 e-' 439s
 7* 4d 	 xfx (4.114 +53.3 s ) x 
whexe s flight length in statute miles (1000's)
f load factor (fraction of seats occupied)
d delay tame at which flights on an average are cancelled
(hours)
t = defy time (hours)
e = 2.'1183
	
Y
The above formula gives revenue cost in 1972 dotars.
I P:
I^
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Interrupted trip e::aenses reported :.o CAB for a cta;ae ^^ic: air] ; ^ 'or
19'T2 ware $1.3 . For 151,  de parture dol ys, one hour average 01 altL;
t3j;e, 301-1_passenl;ers carrjed, and a load factor of .75, Whe cIgJa;;
cost/seat due to passenger candling per Hour delay.
znterruotion ex»ense
r I1wSber of passengers delayed -1-load factor
^132 x ]06	 x 
.55^30x100x.13
$.16 per seat hour delay (1972 dollars)
l
`	 X[-4
:c
w
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x
The' three delay costs above can be simplified and 'combined to give,
the foi lowing er)res ,ion for delay coast in .1972 dollars:
^F
Delay cost - Cl.96 - OQ n	 -
271	
619 )C a s} ^3.35) :n
where	 standard n=ber of seats for airplane ty
s = load Factor (eractron 
of 
seats occupied)
s = average flight lenGth (statute miles : 1000)
t	 delay time (),.ours)
n = nidber of seats fitted in a given airplane
d delay time at which flights on an averaGe are cancelled
L (hours)
C 2.71$3 (constant)
r
6
9
i
1
i
ii
X1-S
JORIGINAL PAGF- 'S
of pooR QUALITY
CANCELLATION COSTS
The cost of a cancellation can be considered as a combination
of the delay costs up to the time a cancellation occurs,
plus the value of investment for the lost flight time while
the airplane is being returned to service. 	 An approximation
to the true value of inactive time can be obtained using
long-term (3 years or more) dry lease costs.	 Dry lease costs
are typically as shown in the table below:
MON IMLY	 FLIGHT HOURS	 COST/CANCRLLED
MODEL	 LEASE	 PER DAY	 OEW	 FLIGHT HOUR
707-3200	 $1000000	 10	 146,000	 $333
727-100	 63,000	 8	 88P000	 $250
737-200	 50,000	 8	 59,000	 $200
747	 $300 000	 10	 356,000	 $1000
Thus the cost per cancelled flight hour for teat portion of cost
associated with inactive airplane time is about $3 per 1.000 lbs.
of airplane O.E.W. in 1972 dollars.	 Note that this value
does not account for loss of goodwill or account for substitutions
by an airplane of the same or different type. 	 No satisfactory
method of accounting for such substitutions has been developed.
4-1k
X1-6
Delay Cost	 1972 Dollars
15 1 Delay * 451 Delay	 *	 2 Hour Delay
Model Seats
No of
Airline Boeing Airline Boeing	 Airline Boeing
707 M^ 140 95 16o 265 48o	 126o 1280
707 (Yy 180 100 2o6 270 617	 1300 1645
727 p 100 90 105 220 315	 950 84o
727 ( 14o 95 146 235 439	 1100 1170
0;
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CO314PARISON OF COSTS Wrr)i THOSE USED BY AIRLINES
Costs estimated in 191 2 dollars, using the methods of this
f
document, compare with those quoted by several airlines and
adjusted to 1972, as follows;
	 ;J
DELAYS (747, 1 hour delay)
Airline A	 Delay Cost	 $ 85
Airline B	 = $ 420
Airline C	 = $ 525
Airline D	 $ 840
Airline E	 $ 1420'
D6-40895-1 Estimating method	 1113If!
CANCELLATIONS (747, 10 hours flying lost)
Airline A	 Cost = $11,800
Airline B	 = $ 20200
Airline C & D
	
= $ Not available
Airline S	 $ 60300
D6-40895 -1 Estimating method	 = $14,000
r	 Model 707/727 Airline "B" Delays versus"Boeing A6-40895 -1 Grnnpare
a
t as follows:
3
Short Range
PIntermediate Range
Average Delay Length
3
Xt•7
